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Régulation, politiques et innovation industrielle 
: approche par méthodes et implications 
 
Yunhee KIM 
 
Institut Henri Fayol  
Ecole  Nationale  Supérieure  des  Mines  de  Saint  Etienne 
 
Résumé 
 
De manière générale, différentes approches s’offrent aux décideurs politiques lorsqu’il 
s’agit de promouvoir l’innovation. Pour reprendre la distinction posée par la plupart des 
économistes industriels, les politiques peuvent être de nature presciptive ou incitative. A 
travers une série d’analyses théoriques et empiriques, cette thèse identifie plusieurs facteurs 
clés qui déterminent l’efficacité des politiques d’innovation, que l’approche adoptée soit de 
nature prescriptive ou incitative.  
En guise de préambule, nous soulignons que les politiques mises en oeuvre constituent 
un déterminant fondamental des capacités d’innovation d’une industrie, notamment parce que 
les incitations marchandes à engager des activités de recherche fortement exploratoires sont 
limitées. Par ailleurs, nous signalons que la nature des politiques susceptibles de favoriser 
l’innovation dépend fondamentalement des caractéristiques des industries, et même des 
firmes, auxquelles elles sont destinées. La mise en oeuvre de politiques (incitatives ou 
presciptives) efficaces requiert ainsi une compréhension approfondie du secteur d’activité que 
l’on souhaite promouvoir et de la nature des processus d’innovation qui impliquent 
notamment différents types d’investissements (à plus ou moins long terme, plus ou moins 
risqués et plus ou moins exploratoires).  
Cette thèse analyse ensuite, à travers trois études de cas, l’incidence de différentes 
politiques (incitatives ou presciptives) mises en oeuvre dans des contextes industriels 
distincts. Partant de l’hypothèse selon laquelle les politiques presciptives ont un impact 
bénéfique sur l’innovation et le développement technologique d’un secteur à court terme mais 
des effects plus incertains à long terme, nous étudions l’impact des politiques de libéralisation 
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(ouverture à la concurrence et privatisation des opérateurs historiques) qui ont été mises en 
oeuvre dans le secteur des télécommunications. A travers une étude économétrique portant 
sur un panel de 20 pays de l’OCDE sur la période 1994-2008, nous soulignons que l’impact 
de la concurrence sur les décisions d’investissement s’exerce à travers deux effects : l’effet « 
profitabilité » et l’effet « efficacité opérationnelle ». Nous soulignons par ailleurs que la 
relation entre intensité concurrentielle et investissement varie signicativement entre 
entreprises publiques et firmes privées.  
Dans une seconde étude, nous analysons le lien entre la propension des firmes à adopter 
spontanément des comportements écologiques (mesurée à partir des données du Carbon 
Discloser Project et du Dow Jones Sustainability Index) et la nature de leurs innovations. Ce 
travail fait apparaître de forte différences inter-industries et inter-entreprises mais permet de 
valider l'hypothèse d'une relation positive entre le niveau des investissements de R&D et la 
propension à adopter des comportements écologiques.  
Nous nous intéressons enfin à la relation entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et 
innovation. Nous utilisons pour cela le classement Vigeo ainsi que des données financières 
sur l’année 2009. Notre étude met en évidence une relation positive entre responsabilité 
sociale d’entreprise et capacité des firmes à innover. Nous interprétons ce résultat de la 
manière suivante : la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise conduit les firmes à réaliser des 
investissements non seulement de court terme mais également de long terme et à tenir compte 
de la complémentarité de ces investissements. La responsabilité sociale d’entreprise accroît 
ainsi les synergies entre les différents types d’investissement réalisés par les firmes. 
 
Mots clefs: Autorégulation des entreprises, comportements écologiques, nature de 
l'innovation, innovation, politiques de libéralisation, développement durable. 
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Regulation, Policies and Innovation Activities in Industries 
: Approaching Methods and Implications 
 
Yunhee KIM 
 
Institut Henri Fayol  
Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Saint Etienne 
 
Abstract 
 
In general, policymakers are often faced with a different choice, i.e., the choice between 
using regulation-based approaches and using incentive-based approaches, where the policy 
instruments could be based either on mandatory approach or voluntary approach with 
economic incentives in market. Historically, industrial economists have regarded the issue of 
policy design as the one focused primarily on the choice among alternative policy 
instruments, where those are generally viewed as falling into two broad categories: 
regulation-based instruments and incentive-based instruments.  
Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, this study identifies some key features 
that are likely to increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of industrial policies with 
voluntary and mandatory approaches. On the other hand, we also investigate the existence of 
a strong relationship between innovation and industrial policies. In particular, we divide 
investment activities of firms into two parts like explorative and exploitative investments. 
Then we find that the explorative innovation increases the incentives for participation in 
long-term but also reduces the financial incentives in short-term. In sum, when based on the 
understanding and consideration on the nature of innovation and other impact factors, 
industrial policy can provide a mechanism for meeting industrial quality goals both 
effectively and efficiently. 
Considering firms' characteristics and industry sector also increases the synergy effect of 
policies and regulations. This understanding also can help policy makers to decide whether or 
not use of such policy approach is advisable and to design the policy ensuring that it is as 
effective and efficient as possible. Consequently, the current research investigates the 
difference and tendency of industrial policy approaches and the type of innovation carrying 
iv 
 
out three analyses according to the mandatory and voluntary approaches.  
With the assumption that the mandatory approach has short-run impact to prompt new 
technology or grow a specific industry, we firstly assess the impact of regulation, such as 
privatization of nature monopoly. Using the firm level data of 20 OECD countries between 
1994 and 2008, we tested assumptions in telecommunication market, where there exist 
competition and privatization regulations. Based on the empirical results, we can claim that 
considering interaction among liberalization policies and allowing the industry characteristics 
are critical to determine for the Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect and level 
of investments. This means that firms seek strategies for exploitative investments in the case 
where competition becomes severe and many dimensions are faced. Therefore, it is necessary 
for policy regulators to take account of the interactions among liberalization policies 
providing an incentive to create new knowledge and technologies. 
Secondly, we analyze the voluntary industrial policies with comparing of environmental 
and sustainable behaviors. This approach has long-run effective characteristics and can be 
applied to more general industry. Based on our assumption that the ‘Corporate 
Environmentalism’ is a bilateral agreement between a policy maker and a firm, we try to find 
the relationship between voluntary activities and the nature of innovation. 1032 observations 
are divided into specific groups according to the Carbon Discloser Project (CDP) Global 500 
report and the list of Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) between 2008 and 2009. From 
the empirical analysis, we identify the correlation between the ‘Corporate Environmentalism’ 
and innovative activities. These results show that the variations of firms’ sustainable and 
environmental behaviors are varied depending on the industry sectors, firm characteristics, 
and environmental and sustainable activities. 
Finally, this study identifies the relationship between ‘Business-led Initiatives (CSR)’ 
and innovation activities of firms. We assume that CSR is a business-led initiative that 
recognizes that the impact businesses have on society is more than purely financial. In 
particular, this study advocates a new approach to incorporate sustainability with innovation 
strategies by taking into account voluntary sustainable activities not just for investors, but 
also for other shareholders including communities firms serve. Using the Vigeo rating and the 
Thomson Reuters financial data in 2009, we divided 619 firms into groups according to their 
industry sectors, regions, and firm characteristics such as size and age. This study identifies 
the relationship between CSR and innovation activities of firms based on the assumption that 
v 
 
innovative investment is needed to prepare tomorrow’s profits not only by considering 
investments in technology and in R&D, but also by dealing with sustainability to human, 
social, environmental, technical, and economic investments. Consequently, when the firm 
builds their short- and long-run business strategies, the consideration of the relationship 
between types of investment and CSR practice will lead to more cooperating effect on the 
outcome of investments. The findings of this study could provide a comprehensive 
understanding on the effect of sustainable management strategies on the innovation and 
sustainability of firms.  
 
Keywords: Business-led Initiatives, Corporate Environmentalism, Nature of Innovation, 
Innovation, Liberalization Policies, Sustainability  
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Chapter 1. Overview 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
1.1.1 Industry policies with voluntary and mandatory approaches  
 
In the theory of economic regulations, there is a demand of industrial regulation because 
the subliminal uses of governmental resources and authorities can improve the economic 
behaviors’ status. Although the regulation could and dose treat or compel or help 
shareholders, the effective and well-implemented regulation make the allocation of resources 
more fairly and efficiently (Stigler 1971). With this background, industrial economists have 
historically regarded the issue of policy design as the one focused primarily on the choice 
among alternative policy instruments, where those instruments are normally viewed as falling 
into two broad categories: regulation-based and incentive-based approaches (Bohm and 
Russell 1985). Therefore, policymakers are often faced with different choices, that is to say, 
the choices among using a voluntary approach or using a mandatory approach or using both 
approaches simultaneously, where the ways could be based either on regulation-based or 
market-based economic incentives (Alberini and Segerson 2002).  
The key distinction between voluntary and mandatory approaches is the extent of ability 
to impose unwanted costs or regulations on firms. Through a voluntary approach, a firm will 
not participate unless his payoff is at least as high as it would be without participation, i.e., 
the firm must perceive some gain (or at least no net loss) from participation (Paton 2001). 
Through mandatory approaches (based on inducing regulations and commands), regulators 
can change market circumstance or impose net costs on firms, thereby making them worse 
than they would have been in the absence of the policy. It is assumed that the mandatory 
industrial policy is driven mainly by policy or public intervention, while the voluntaries 
industrial policy is driven rather by market. The main distinction of such policies is whether 
the approach dictates a firm designed to improve the quality of policy implication results or 
tries to induce the behavior by modifying the market signals faced by them.    
For the policy maker, the interest in the use of industrial policy approaches has spurred a 
growing literature within industrial economics on the relative merits of voluntary vs. 
mandatory approaches to social welfare and satisfaction of behaviors. Much literature is 
  
 
2
devoted to the choice between the two (Lyon and Maxwell 1999; Khanna 2001). Theoretical 
conclusions generally favor one of two scenarios: (i) to the extent that voluntary agreements 
are less costly than regulation, organizations prefer voluntary agreements; and (ii) as 
regulatory stringency increases, compliance costs increases the incentives to exceed 
compliance to gain advantage increase (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Lyon and Maxwell 2004). 
Regulatory constraint may be positively associated with voluntary industrial management, as 
organizations seek relief through strategic behavior, which is one of the conclusions 
supported by extensive empirical findings, as noted earlier (Jones 2010).    
In addition, various theories demonstrate that regulation provides incentives and 
opportunities to achieve the resulting objectives through voluntary environmental 
management (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Lyon and Maxwell 2004). Regulation is widely 
considered to be more expensive and less efficient than voluntary action (Segerson and 
Miceli 1998; Baldwin and Cave 1999), based on theoretical conclusions and empirical results 
consistently finding regulatory pressures among the strongest determinants of both types of 
voluntary efforts (Stigler 1971; Arora and Cason 1996; Videras and Alberini 2000; Khanna, 
Koss et al. 2007). In terms of firms’ motivation to adopt or cite voluntary initiatives, (Paton 
2001) indicates that there are some limitation to present the rapid growth of voluntary 
behaviors of firm with conventional economic model. Using the two concepts of “the Porter 
hypothesis” and “the energy efficiency gap”, they describe the key generic strategies for 
firms’ voluntary adoption.       
 There are three typically voluntary approaches in industry policy implementations 
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1996; Lyon and Maxwell 1999; Segerson and Li 1999; Braathen and 
Co-ope 2003). Such actions are often termed “business-led initiatives,” “corporate 
environmentalism,” or “industry self-regulation1” (Alberini and Segerson 2002). Under these 
approaches, this study focuses on the ‘business-led initiatives’ and ‘corporate 
environmentalism’. Because self-regulation involves rater mandatory restrictions on quantity 
or sales territory, such as ‘‘cartel’’ and ‘‘collusion’’, and antitrust investigation (Kaserman 
                                               
1
 ‘Self-regulation may encourage consumer demand by reducing uncertainty about quality of product or ensuring 
interoperability of the products of various firms. It may enhance labor satisfaction by improving the safety or other quality 
aspects of the workplace. It may also serve more strategic purposes, such as softening competition or preempting stricter 
government regulations. If self-regulation is more cost-effective than government regulation, firms might self-regulate even 
if doing so has no impact on the ultimate level of restraint required.’ Maxwell, John W., Thomas P. Lyon, et al. (2000). 
"Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism." Journal of Law and 
Economics 43(2): 583-618.           
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and Mayo 1995)2. We presume that the second form of voluntary approach is a bilateral 
agreement between a policy maker and a firm. Corporate environmentalism is more related 
with environmental protection. The global environmental issues on climate change and wider 
scope of sustainability have growing impact over the few decades on the social demand and 
the international political agenda.  
Regarding empirical methodology, industrial management studies commonly examine 
decisions within a profit maximization framework. However, some studies indicate that a 
utility maximization framework may increase explanatory power (Baron, 2001; Nakamura et 
al., 2001). According to a utility maximization theory, organizations are assumed to 
undertake voluntary management out of self-interest, both to appeal to a range of 
stakeholders and to achieve competitive and other benefits, rather than engaging in behaviors 
strictly designed to maximize profit (Khanna, 2001; Henriques and Sadorskry, 1996; Esty and 
Winston, 2006; Baron, 2001; Nakamura et al., 2001). So, theory and empirical evidence 
demonstrate the cost and efficiency advantages of voluntary action as well as a positive 
influence of regulatory constraint, but the choice of strategy depends on various factors.  
In fact, the concepts of the industry policies with voluntary or mandatory approaches 
have applied in specific industry like environment and energy. This comparison is famous 
with metaphorical expression like mandatory control (the “Stick”) and incentive subsidies 
(the “Carrot”). Then most studies have more emphasized on voluntary approach than 
mandatory one and tried to find the reasons and motivations (Paton 2001; Alberini and 
Segerson 2002; Khanna, Koss et al. 2007). They conclude that the voluntary  approach is 
more comprehensive and have long-term effect, and the mandatory approach have intensive 
and short-run effect (Bohm and Russell 1985).  
However, when we compare these two industry policy approaches in the general and 
broader perspectives and circumstances, mandatory approach could be effective and increase 
social welfare. From the positions of both regulators and governed-firms, the each approach 
has several desirable features that might prompt the sustainable development. In particular, 
the policy maker want to make a growth or a rapid diffusion of specific technology or 
                                               
2
 There are some examples of self-regulation such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act in the USA. Under this acts, 
firms are enforced compliance with rather mandatory rules but not critical to firms’ operation like receiving penalties if it 
does not signal its ability to reduce its level of waste generation. Anton, W. R. Q., G. Deltas, et al. (2004). "Incentives for 
environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 48(1): 632-654. 
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industry, mandatory policy instruments could be chosen as industry policy. For instance, a lot 
of countries have implemented strong government-induced policies in telecommunication 
industry for last few decades3. The policy makers set up the price and market structure. So, 
the design of policy could entail numerous effects on the social welfare, shareholder’s 
behaviors, firms’ performance and innovation.             
For the mandatory policy approaches, most literatures on the relationship between 
regulation and investment in the one industry sector focus the impact of asymmetric ex-ante 
regulation. From these, we argue that there is a relationship between adoption of a more 
general standpoint and consideration of the different regulatory policies in industry. In the 
liberalization policies process, there are several dimensions of regulation. Therefore, we try 
to clarify the relationship between these voluntary or mandatory industrial approaches and 
investment activities of firms according to their specific firms’ characteristics and industry 
sectors.   
In sum, the main purpose of this study is to highlight on understanding why specific 
policies or agreements are adopted and what impact this approach has on firms investment 
activities such like infrastructure and R&D investments. As an aspect of stakeholder 
management, company couldn’t be longer held merely to their profit maximizing but 
shareholder. The shareholder includes customers, employees, suppliers, networking and non-
government organization (Cetindamar and Husoy 2007).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3
 For the literature reviews in telecommunication regulation, see Cambini, C. and Y. Jiang (2009). "Broadband investment 
and regulation: A literature review." Telecommunications Policy 33(10-11): 559-574. 
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1.1.2 Sustainability and innovation 
 
The topic of the corporation social responsibilities (CSR) has been a subject of intense 
controversy and interest over the past three decades (Jamali 2008). In part, this debate is an 
outgrowth of the proliferation of different conceptualizations of CSR. Such a term has indeed 
been defined in various ways from the narrow economic perspective of increasing 
shareholder wealth (Friedman 1967)4 to economic, legal, ethical and discretionary strands of 
responsibility (Carroll 1979) including good corporate citizenship (Hemphill 2004). These 
variations stem in part from differentiating fundamental assumptions about what CSR entails, 
varying from conceptions of minimal legal and economic obligations and accountability to 
stockholders to broader responsibilities to the wider social system in which a corporation is 
embedded.   
Basically, the CSR is based on the concept of shareholder theory. Stakeholders, acting 
either formally or informally, individually, or collectively, are a key element in the firm’s 
external environment that can positively or negatively affect the organization (Murray and 
Vogel 1997). The main challenge for businesses is the task of identifying to whom they are 
responsible and how far that responsibility extends. There are several approaches which 
explain the voluntary CSR behavior of firms and the CSR field presents not only a landscape 
of theories but also a proliferation of approaches, which are controversial, complex and 
unclear (Garriga and Melé 2004).   
Recently, the CSR is more getting the major consideration of firms’ strategies and they 
focus on this due to making the satisfaction of their shareholders and giving the positive 
image to the market. Various theories demonstrate that regulation provides incentives and 
opportunities to achieve these objectives through voluntary environmental management 
(Jones 2010). Theory and empirical evidence demonstrate the cost and efficiency advantages 
of voluntary action as well as a positive influence of regulatory constraint, but the choice of 
strategy depends on numerous factors (Porter and Linde 1995; Lyon and Maxwell 2004; 
Khanna, Koss et al. 2007).  
On the other hands, voluntary industrial management appeals to policy makers 
pursuing to reduce administrative burdens and costs, and to organizations seeking to reduce 
                                               
4
 "There is one and only one social responsibility of business: to use its resources to engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud." 
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expenses and increase efficiency through innovating solutions, compared to using standard 
technologies or prescribed practices (Khanna and Brouhle 2009).  
While the relationship between industrial policy and social issues is subject to a well-
established academic literature, the role of innovation in influencing that relationship has 
received relatively little attention (Pavelin and Porter 2008). However, sustainable innovation 
has been widely defined as a process of creating new ideas, behavior, products and processes 
that contribute to a reduction in environmental burdens or to ecologically specified 
sustainability targets (Rennings 2000). With an interpretation which emphasize on collective 
learning and monitoring devices, (Aggeri 1999) also support the reason why monitoring of 
innovation and using of negotiated instruments by the policy makers is a pivotal issue in 
industrial policy. Innovation is firms’ primary concerns as well as their performance. 
Furthermore, innovation is a sustainable engine for firm’s growth and survival.  
Until recently, lots of studies have showed the impact of industrial policy on the 
performance in the sustainable development aspect. However, there are lots of converse 
debates on the correlations between voluntary or mandatory activities and performances, and 
their results have a number of limitations statically. Furthermore, they just focus on the 
relationship between short-term performances and industrial policy approaches and estimate 
the limited effect. Therefore, this paper concludes that innovative investment is to prepare 
tomorrow’s profits not only considering investments in technology and in R&D, but also 
dealing with sustainability to human, social, environmental, technical, and economic 
investments.  
In particular, the adoption or implementation of industry policies with voluntary and 
mandatory approaches has longitudinal effect and it is difficult to find the causality between 
adoption and their performance. Nevertheless, most studies only consider the existence of 
significant impact for performance. Innovation is the priority of firms as well as another core 
sustainable factor for firms’ growth and survival. In detail, this study considers the 
dimensions of innovation.  
Based on the previous studies (March 1991), the type of investment could be defined as 
the allocation of resources between R&D investment (R&D expenditure; Creating new 
knowledge and technologies; Radical; Exploration) and capital expenditure (CAPEX; Using 
existing knowledge and technologies to develop new products and services; Incremental; 
Exploitation). There exists a tendency of the adaptive systems selecting exploration to suffer 
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from the costs of experimentation with no relevant benefit. In contrast, the system selecting 
exploitation is apt to be set in an optimal steady state. Based on these ideas, we premise that 
explorative investment is the one which induces and prompts firms’ innovation because it has 
more uncertainty for future and there is less guarantee for the return of the investment. So 
explorative investment is rather innovative investment than exploitative investment. Thus, it 
is very important to keep a proper balance between exploration and exploitation pursuing 
firms’ strategies.  
Regarding the investigation into the detailed innovation, recently there are some papers. 
(Calderini and Garrone 2001) identify the relationship between mandatory regulation and 
R&D activities of firms using the patent and publication data. (Hellström 2007) also analyses 
environmentally sustainable innovation in order to establish dominant structures of such 
innovations and current weaknesses. They estimate in terms of Schumpeterian innovation 
type and innovation mode (radical or incremental & component or architectural). With these 
backgrounds, the current study tries to empirically identify the relationship between firms’ 
behavior and their innovation activities with firm-level data. After then, we will find what 
factors drive the sustainable behavior and whether the industry policies with voluntary and 
mandatory approaches can prompt the innovative investments of firms or not. 
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1.2 General Research Framework  
   
According to the research framework presented in Fig 1-1, this study investigates the 
difference and tendency of industry policy approaches on the type of innovation. In here, 
there exist three analyses according to the mandatory and voluntary approaches.  
 
 
Fig 1-1 The schematic diagram of the general research framework 
 
The mandatory approach has short-run impact to prompt new technology or grow a 
specific industry. For instance, incentive of investment in the telecommunication sector is a 
key issue since it not only increases the consumers’ welfare but also generates positive 
externalities on many other activities. Also, it could be a source of competitive economic 
growth (Greenstein, McMaster et al. 1995; Roller and Waverman 2001; Datta and Agarwal 
2004), and then the liberalization policies of most of the OECD countries have been 
implemented with the assumption that competition and privatizations would lead to the 
enhancement of both the static and dynamic efficiency of former “natural monopoly” 
industries. While policies to promote competition are the core of liberalization policies, 
privatizations are more optional. For example, European directives, that govern the regulation 
of telecommunications for the European Union Member Countries, do not set any 
requirement for privatization while they precisely dene the policies to be implemented to 
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promote competition. Therefore, this study firstly assesses the impact of regulation, such as 
privatization of nature monopoly and inducing competition, on the different type of 
innovations. Using the 97 nature monopoly firms of 20 OECD countries between 1994 and 
2008, we identify the impacts of the liberalization policies on the nature of investment in 
telecommunication industry.  
Secondly, we analyze and compare the voluntary industrial policies with sustainable and 
environmental behaviors. The environmental behavior of firms can be represented by Carbon 
Discloser Project (CDP) activity and the other one is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI) which shows firms’ sustainable activities. This chapter chooses both of these concepts 
simultaneously because there are a lot of initiatives in the market as a term of firm’s 
strategies. These approaches have long-run effective characteristics and can be applied to 
more general industry. Based on our assumption that the ‘Corporate Environmentalism’ is a 
bilateral agreement between a policy maker and a firm, we try to find the answers to these 
questions; i) what is the relation between voluntary activities and performance of firms? ii) 
Do firms’ voluntary activities in environmental and sustainable implementations induce 
innovation? iii) How is the nature of innovation depending on voluntary types of firms? and 
iv) what is the link between firm characteristics and innovation according to voluntary types? 
1032 observations are divided into specific groups according to the CDP Global 500 report 
and the list of Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) between 2008 and 2009. From the 
empirical analysis, this part identifies the relation between the ‘Corporate Environmentalism’ 
and innovative activities. Classifying the established environmental and sustainable issues as 
well as proposing an empirical model of the links among environmental, sustainable 
behaviors, and innovation activities is another contribution of this study.   
Finally, using the 619 multinational firms listed on the DJ STOXX 600 and MSCI World 
indexes, this study introduces an empirical model according to their industry sectors, regions, 
and firm characteristics such as size and age. Based on the analysis, we identify the 
relationship between ‘Business-led Initiatives (CSR)’ and innovation activities of firms which 
can be an answer to research questions: (i) what drives the CSR behavior of firms? (ii) What 
are the different effects of explorative investment (long-run return) and exploitative 
investment (short-run return) on the CSR behavior of firms? In particular, this chapter 
advocates a new approach to incorporate sustainability with innovation strategies by taking 
into account voluntary sustainable activities not just for investors, but also for other 
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shareholders including communities firms serve. The findings of this study could provide a 
comprehensive understanding on the effect of sustainable management strategies on the 
innovation and performance of firms.  
This study is organized as follows. The second section identifies the impacts of the 
different dimensions about the liberalization policies on the nature of investment in 
telecommunication industry. The third section explains the voluntary industrial policies with 
the ‘Corporate Environmentalism’. The forth section presents the relationship between 
‘Business-led Initiatives (CSR)’ and innovation activities of firms. Finally, we conclude and 
discuss the policy implications of the analysis in the fifth section. In order to arrive at a fair 
and valid evaluation of public utilities, it is indispensable to look more closely to the 
particular circumstances of the technological, economic and social environment and the goals 
of the provision of a concrete service of public interest. (Bognetti and Obermann 2008) 
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Chapter 2. Liberalization Policies and Innovation in the 
Telecommunication Industry 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Comparing the developing timeline with other industries such as material, energy and so 
on, it has been just a few decades since telecommunication became universe and penetrated. 
Now the effect and portion of telecommunication industry in our society is prodigious such 
that we cannot exemplify industries without telecommunication sector. So, the developing 
and proliferating of telecom industry was the top priority of policy maker. For this reason, a 
lot of mandatory industry policies (including access regulation and price regulation) like 
USA’s telecommunication act of 19965  has dominated and implemented as the national 
policy design in order to serve the public interest and enhance consumer welfare (Hausman 
and Sidak 1999; Datta 2003; Cave 2006).  
There also exists an incentive regulation which is the alternative to the traditional sunk 
cost recovery regime, like rate-of-return (RoR). It provides incumbents with the opportunity 
to retain as profit additional revenues or cost savings (Cave, Majumdar et al. 2002; 
Armstrong and Sappington 2006). However, this incentive regulation is implemented within 
a specified period because as long as retail based competition increases over time, regulators’ 
concern shifts from incentive regulation to access or price regulation, becoming the key 
regulatory instrument (Cambini and Jiang 2009).  
As a matter of mandatory policy instrument, the organization of the telecommunications 
sector has undergone fundamental transformations over the past 25 years. Although public or 
regulated monopolies have long been regarded as the most efficient way to ensure the 
provision of telecommunications services, some countries undertook in the mid-1980s, a 
change in liberalization policies aimed at removing barriers to entry, promoting effective 
competition and privatizing public firms (Hausman and Sidak 2005). In the 1990s, this 
                                               
5
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sets forth rules governing the unbundling of local telecommunications networks. For 
detailed discussions of this open-access regulation, see Kahn, A. E. (1998). Letting go: deregulating the process of 
deregulation. Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press., Harris, R. G. and C. J. Kraft (1997). "Meddling through: 
Regulating local telephone competition in the United States." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4): 93-112. and 
Sidak, J. G. and D. F. Spulber (1997). "The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network 
Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996." Columbia Law Review 97(4): 1081-1161. 
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movement, commonly known as “liberalization policies”, has spread to most OECD 
countries (Ahn 2002). 
Therefore, incentive of investment in the telecommunication sector is a key issue since it 
not only increases the consumers’ welfare but also generates positive externalities on many 
other activities. Finally, it could be a source of competitive economic growth (Greenstein, 
McMaster et al. 1995; Roller and Waverman 2001; Datta and Agarwal 2004), and then the 
liberalization policies of most countries have been implemented with the assumption that 
competition and privatizations would lead to the enhancement of both the static and dynamic 
efficiency of former “natural monopoly” industries (Bortolotti, D'Souza et al. 2002; Cave 
2010).  
These policies are largely based on the premise that competition encourages innovation. 
However, this hypothesis remains largely debated. The defenders who believe the 
‘Schumpeterian’ assume that market concentration is ‘the price to pay’ for encouraging 
investment. On the other hand, it is often argued that competitive pressure creates incentives 
for investment and innovation. 
Similarly, the impact of privatization on innovation is controversial issue. On the one 
hand, it can be assumed that public firms aim at maximizing social welfare. As a 
consequence, their investment behavior may be more socially efficient than private firms’ 
investment behavior, since the latter is based on profit maximization. Added to this, some 
authors argue that public ownership is a source of organizational inefficiency and the state 
owned enterprises tend to waste resources and make unprofitable investment. 
This study discusses and tests the assumption that liberalization policies are favorable to 
innovation in telecommunications. It focuses on the impact of these policies on the incumbent 
operators’ investment strategies. Although new telecommunication services are not always 
introduced by incumbents, they are in most cases based on technologies which were 
developed by incumbents. Moreover, the case of incumbent operators presents a specific 
interest: over the last 25 years these firms have faced radical changes – in both their 
competitive environment and their internal organization – which have probably transformed 
dramatically their investment strategies (Bauer 2010). 
Over the past decades, a literature has emerged to study the relationship between 
mandatory industrial policy approach (liberalization process) and innovation in 
telecommunications. However, most of this work may is dedicated to a very specific 
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question: the impact of access regulation on infrastructure investment (Kotakorpi 2006; 
Waverman, Meschi et al. 2007)6. Access regulation7  is the only one tool for promoting 
competition (Vareda and Hoernig 2007; Cave 2010).  
Moreover, the deployment of new infrastructure is a particular form of innovation: the 
operators are also introducing new services, investing in R&D and developing new 
technologies. Studying the impact of liberalization policies on the investment of incumbent 
telecom operators therefore require to refer to more general work on the relationship between 
competition and innovation and between privatization and innovation (Melody 2003; 
Friederiszick, Grajek et al. 2008; Jung, Gayle et al. 2008). 
Although this literature is particularly abundant, empirical work on these issues have not 
been able to establish meaningful results regardless of the industries concerned. Furthermore, 
although the theoretical literature highlights different mechanisms through which 
privatization and the developments of competition affect innovation, there are only few 
unified theoretical frameworks to study how these mechanisms are related (Li 2008).  
The impact of liberalization policies has been investigated empirically by some recent 
papers. However, no consensus has emerged from this research, although the assumption that 
liberalization policies encourage the operators to invest is the one that has received the most 
theoretical support. In addition, a central question has been largely ignored by this literature: 
Does competition have to same impact on investment for private and government-owned 
operators? 
While policies to promote competition are the core of liberalization policies, 
privatizations are historically more optional. For example, European directives that govern 
the regulation of telecommunications for the European Union Member Countries do not set 
any requirement for privatization when they narrowly define the policies to be implemented 
to promote competition8. Thus among the incumbent telecommunications operators, we find 
fully private companies, partially privatized firms and firms that are still among the 
government control. 
Although it is quite likely that the development of competition does not produce the 
                                               
6
 See ‘Cambini, C. and Y. Jiang (2009). "Broadband investment and regulation: A literature review." Telecommunications 
Policy 33(10-11): 559-574.’ for a review of this literature 
7
 The obligation for incumbents to share their infrastructure with new entrants that are not able to roll out their own networks 
8
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/568&format=H 
TML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
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same effects on the investment of private and government-owned firms, the previous 
empirical studies on the relationship between liberalization and investment in 
telecommunications did not pay much attention to this issue. Therefore, we make some 
assumptions about the transition of operators’ activities over the liberalization policies and 
identify it. 
This part is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical foundations of the 
assumption that the relationship between competition and privatization is different for private 
and government-owned with cost-based model. Section 2.3 describes methodology and 
variables after then reviews the previous empirical studies on liberalization and investment in 
telecommunications. Section 2.4 presents the results and analysis of the hypotheses and 
assumptions. Section 2.5 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the analysis. 
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2.2 Theoretical Background  
 
In this section, we investigate the theoretical foundations of the assumption that the 
relationship between competition and innovation is different for private and government-
owned firms. The impact of competition on the firms' investment and incentives to innovate 
has been analyzed by two types of work. The former is based on the assumption that ‘firms 
maximize their profits and emphasize that competition affects the profitability 9  of 
investments’. The second set of work considers ‘the agency relationship between firms' 
shareholders and managers’.  
In big modern corporations, the decisions (including investment decisions) are not made 
directly by the owners of the firms but by professional business managers (Berle Jr and 
Means 1930). This arrangement results in an agency relationship where the owners have only 
incomplete information on the work undertaken by managers (Jensen 1986). Given that their 
decisions cannot be observed or measured directly by the owners, the managers can 
undertake actions that are not in the owners’ interest (moral hazard). In this framework, many 
studies have underlined that competition (and privatization) reduces the managers' power10. 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1989; Shirley and Walsh 2000) and several papers have analyzed the 
consequence of this effect on the firms' investment behavior11. 
In section 2.2.1, we revisit the argument that competition affect the profitability of 
investment (the firms' investment decisions) and extend it to non-profit-maximizing firm. We 
show that this “profitability effect” of competition may be different for private and 
government-owned operators (ex-ante privatization) since private and government-owned 
firms do not have the same objective function. In section 2.2.2, following the pioneering 
work of (Aghion and Howitt 1998), we identify how the “profitability effect” affect the firms' 
investment decision in combination with the impact of competition on the managers' power 
(the “operational efficiency” effect). The latter is also different for private and government-
owned operators, because the nature of the agency relationship varies from type of firm. 
                                               
9
 By “profitability”, we do not only mean the financial viability of the investment (e.g. its net present value) but also its 
strategic or “option” value. 
10
 See. Vickers, J. and G. K. Yarrow (1989). Privatization: an economic analysis, MIT press, Shirley, M. M. and P. M. 
Walsh (2001). Public vs. Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate, SSRN., of a review 
11
 See e.g. Jensen, M. C. (1986). "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers." The American 
Economic Review 76(2): 323-329., Stulz, R. M. (1990). "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies." Journal of 
financial Economics 26(1): 3-27. 
  
 
16
2.2.1 The profitability effect 
 
 Many papers have highlighted that competition affects the firm's investment behavior 
because it has an impact on the profitability of the investment (Ahn 2002; Gilbert 2006; 
Vives 2008). However, the definition of a “profitable” investment is probably different for 
private and government-owned firm. It is a broadly accepted assumption that private firms (or 
at least, the shareholders of these firms) are interested in profit maximization. Consequently, 
from the point of view of a private telecommunication operator, a “profitable” investment is 
one that generates higher additional profits. In principle, a government-owned firm is not 
intended to maximize its profit but the social welfare and its investment decisions are not 
based only on pursuit of additional profits but also on the benefit to industry and consumers. 
These dissimilar conceptions of what is a “profitable” investment may result in 
important difference as regards the impact of competition. The private incentives to invest 
can be defined as the difference between the profit after and before investment 
( 2 1p pi pi∆ = − where 1pi  and 2pi  are respectively the profits before and after investment). For 
example, “Schumpeterian” models underline that higher competition intensity results in post-
investment prices ( 2p ) and profits ( 2pi ) and reduce the private incentives to invest. However, 
because higher competition intensity implies lower post-investment prices, it increases the 
“social incentives to invest”, that can be defined as the difference between the welfare after 
and before investment ( 2 1p w w∆ = −  where 1w  and 2w  are respectively the welfare before 
and after investment). 
As underlined by the literature (Aghion, Bloom et al. 2005), the Schumpeterian models 
only tell one part of the story. In fact, increased competition will also reduce the pre-
investment profits 1pi  and thus increase the private incentives to invest (“Escape competition” 
effect). Thus, increased competition has conflicting effects on the private incentives to 
invest 12 . Similarly, it has conflicting effects on the social incentives to invest since it 
increases both the pre- and post-innovation welfare. 
To illustrate and discuss these intuitions, we introduce a simple model of quantity 
competition where the investment increases the quality of service (QoS). We assume that two 
                                               
12
 As shown by Aghion, P., N. Bloom, et al. (2005). "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship*." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120(2): 701-728., at the industry level these conflicting effects may result in an inverted-U 
relationship between competition intensity and investment. 
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operators, the incumbent I and the entrant E, are competitions on the retail market for 
telecommunication services. The incumbent can invest to improve the quality of its 
infrastructure and service, whereas the quality of infrastructure owned by the entrant and the 
quality of its service is a parameter13. 
The firms face the inverse demand function  
 
{ }, , , ,i i i jp A x q q i j E I i j= + − − ∈ ≠                                  (2-1) 
 
where ip , iq and ix are respectively the price, the quantity and the quality of the service 
provided by firm i, and where A is a parameter representing the willingness to pay for the 
“basic service” ( ix =0 ) of the consumer with the highest valuation for telecommunications 
services14. 
To keep the notations as simple as possible and because the level of the marginal cost 
does not matter for the purpose of our analyses, it is normalized as zero. The profit of the 
entrant is thus  
 
               E E Ep qΠ = ⋅ .                                                    (2-2) 
 
To increase marginally the quality of its infrastructure and services, we assume that the 
incumbent has to pay a fixed cost Ixγ . Consequently, the cost for reaching any level quality 
Ix  is 
2
2
Ixγ
, and the profit of the incumbent is 
              
2
I 2
I
I I
xp q γΠ = ⋅ −                                                (2-3) 
The social welfare is the given by 
2 2[ ]
2 2
E I I
E E I I
p q xW p q p q γ+= + ⋅ + ⋅ −                             (2-4) 
where 
2[ ]
2
E Ip q CS+ =  is the consumers' surplus. 
                                               
13
 As we will see in the following, this parameter determines the intensity of competition. 
14
 For details on this model see Foros, s. (2004). "Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure 
in the broadband access market." International Journal of Industrial Organization 22(1): 1-24., p. 7-9. 
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The timing of the game is as follows: first, the incumbent invest to improve the quality 
of its infrastructure and services; then, the firms compete in quantities on the retail market.15 
From the computation detailed in Appendix 2.2.1, we may have the following results in table 
2-3: i) for private (profit-maximizing) firms, increased SBC or FBC reduces the profitability 
of investment and lowers the incentives to invest (the Schumpeterian effect dominates the 
escape competition effect), ii) for government-owned (with hybrid behavior) firms, firstly  
increased FBC reduces the profitability of investment and lowers the incentives to invest (the 
Schumpeterian effect dominates the escape competition effect). Secondly, increased SBC 
increases the profitability of investment and strengthen the incentives to invest (the escape 
competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect). 
 
 
2.2.2 The operational efficiency effect 
 
 As an extension of the theory of the X-inefficiency (Leibenstein 1966), numerous 
studies have shown that competition has - besides its consequences on prices and 
“Allocative” efficiency - an impact on the operational efficiency. According to (Shirley and 
Walsh 2000), the argument that competition facilitates monitoring the managers is based on 
two main arguments: the incentive and the information effects. The former emphasizes that 
the competitive pressure is accompanied by a threat of losing market shares and of being 
evicted from the market, which directly contributes to discipline the managers. The latter 
refers to the idea that competition acts as an information-revealing mechanism that allows the 
shareholders to assess the efforts made by the managers and to implement incentive contracts.  
The interaction between the profitability effect and this “operational efficiency effect” 
has been investigated by some pioneering work such (Aghion and Howitt 1998) and (Schmidt 
1997). This literature focused on the case of private firms where the shareholders seek to 
maximize the profit and considered forms of competition where the profitability effect always 
results in a decrease in the incentives to invest.  
In order to combine our previous analyses on the profitability effect of competition with 
the mechanisms described by the literature on the operational efficiency effect of 
                                               
15
 In the appendix section, we use this framework to study the impact of competition on investment by a private and a 
government-owned incumbent operator.  
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competition, we assume that a raise in the competition intensity decreases the investment 
cost. As underlined in section 2.2.1.1, the intensity of the competition faced by the incumbent 
can be measured by the price Ip  (the lower is the price, the higher is the intensity of 
competition). Thus, we assume that the cost parameter increases when the price increases. 
More specifically, the cost of increasing the QoS marginally is   
 
( )oIf pθ γ= +                                                      (2-25) 
 
where  f  is an increasing function and where oIp  is firm I’s equilibrium price when the QoS 
Ix are zero (under FBC, 3
o E
I
A xp −=  ; under SBC, 
3
o
I
A ap += ).  
In line with the literature, we assume that operational efficiency (reflected by the cost 
parameter θ ) does not result from the firm's strategic behavior. It is just a parameter that 
depends on the intensity of competition. As a consequence, we did not use Ip  (as defined by 
eqs. 2-5 and 2-19) as the indicator of the competition intensity in the definition of θ , but the 
“pre-investment” price  oIp
16
. 
Finally, while theory suggests that any raise in competition intensity increases operational 
efficiency, it does not specify the nature of this relationship. We will therefore analyze two 
cases: a linear ( )( )oI If p pβ= ⋅ and quadratic ( )2( )oI If p pβ= ⋅  relationship. 
The new equilibrium quality and investment are determined as follows: for each type of 
firm (welfare-maximizing or firm with hybrid behavior) and each type of competition (FBC 
and SBC), we just reconsider the investment stage assuming that the cost parameter is θ  
(instead of γ  as in section 2.2.1). The new equilibrium quantities of Ix  are given by table 2-
1. In order to study the impact of competition on investment under the assumption that 
competition affects both the profitability of the investment and the firm’s operational 
efficiency, we derivate the investment functions of table 2-1 with respect to Ex  in table 2-2. 
 
                                               
16
 Ip  depends on the incumbent's investment decision. Consequently, using Ip  in the definition of the cost function would 
imply that firm I can influence its operational efficiency through its investment decisions: reducing (resp. increasing) Ix  
would reduce (resp. increase) Ip  and improve (resp. lessen) operational efficiency. 
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Table 2-1 Equilibrium qualities ( Ix ) 
 Profit-maximizing firm Firm with hybrid behavior 
Linear operational efficiency effect 
Facilities-based 
competition (FBC) 
                         
4( )
9 3 ( ) 8
E
E
A x
A xγ β
−
+ − −
 
         
4 7
9 3 ( ) 11
E
E
A x
A xγ β
−
+ − −
 
Service-based 
competition (SBC) 
                         
2 5
9 3 ( ) 2
A a
A aγ β
+
+ + −
 
         
8
9 3 ( ) 8
A a
A aγ β
−
+ + −
 
Quadratic operational efficiency effect 
Facilities-based 
competition (FBC) 
                        
2
4( )
9 3 ( ) 8
E
E
A x
A xγ β
−
+ − −
              
        
2
4 7
9 3 ( ) 11
E
E
A x
A xγ β
−
+ − −
 
Service-based 
competition (SBC) 
                         
2
2 5
9 3 ( ) 2
A a
A aγ β
+
+ + −
 
         
2
8
9 ( ) 8
A a
A aγ β
−
+ + −
 
 
In addition, the operational efficiency effect increases the equilibrium quality and 
investment: for a given marginal incentive to invest, the lower is the marginal investment 
cost, the higher are the equilibrium quality and investment. When competition improves the 
profitability of investment (i.e. when an incumbent with hybrid investment behavior faces 
service-based competition), the operational efficiency effect reinforce the positive effect of 
competition on investment. In fact, in eqs. (2-23) and (2-27), 0Ix
a
∂
<
∂
 and the increase in the 
equilibrium quality Ix
a
∂
∂
 is higher than in appendix section 2.2.1.3.1. When competition 
decreases the profitability of investment a linear operational efficiency effect soften but does 
not compensate the negative impact of competition on investment. In fact, in eqs. (2-20) and 
(2-22), 0I
E
x
x
∂
<
∂
 and in eqs. (2-21), 0Ix
a
∂
>
∂
. However, if the operational efficiency effect is 
quadratic, there is a U-inverted relationship between competition intensity and investment. In 
eqs. (2-24) and (2-25), 0I
E
x
x
∂
≥
∂
 for low values of Ex  and 0I
E
x
x
∂
<
∂
 for high values of Ex . In eqs. 
(2-26), 0I
E
x
x
∂
<
∂
 for low values of a and 0I
E
x
x
∂ ≥
∂
 for high values of a17. Moreover, it can be 
easily shown that if competition has a very significant effect in improving the operational 
efficiency (e.g. 3( )oI If p pβ= ⋅ ), the operational efficiency effect dominates the profitability 
effect for any level of competition intensity. 
                                               
17
 This result is very similar with Schmidt (1997). 
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Table 2-2 Variations of the with respect to the competition intensity 
 Profit-maximizing firm  Firm with hybrid behavior 
Linear operational efficiency effect 
Facilities-based 
competition (FBC) 
eq (2-20), 
( )2
4(8 9 )
9 3 ( ) 8
I
E E
x
x A x
γ
γ β
∂ −
=
∂ + − −
 eq (2-21), 
( )2
77 63 9
9 3 ( ) 11
I
E E
x A
x A x
γ β
γ β
∂ − −
=
∂ + − −
 
Service-based 
competition (SBC) 
eq (2-22), 
( )2
45 9 10
9 3 ( ) 2
Ix A
a A a
γ β
γ β
∂ + −
=
∂ + + −
      eq (2-23), 
( )2
9 27 8
9 3 ( ) 8
Ix A
a A a
γ β
γ β
∂ + −
= −
∂ + + −
 
Quadratic operational efficiency effect 
Facilities-based 
competition (FBC) 
eq (2-24), 
( )
2
22
( ) 9 8
( ) 9 8
I E
E E
x A x
x A x
β γ
β γ
∂ − − +
=
∂
− + −
 
eq (2-25), 
( )
2 2
22
8 7 63 77
9 ( ) 11
I E E
E E
x A Ax x
x A x
β β β γ
γ β
∂ − + − +
=
∂ + − −
 
Service-based 
competition (SBC) 
eq (2-26), 
( )
2 2
22
4 5 45 10
( ) 9 2
Ix A Aa a
a A a
β β β γ
β γ
∂ − − + −
=
∂ + + −
  eq (2-27), 
( )
2 2
22
17 16 9 8
9 ( ) 8
Ix A Aa a
a A a
β β β γ
γ β
∂ + − + −
= −
∂ + + −
 
 
It is broadly accepted in the literature that the nature of the agency relationship varies 
from one type of firm to the other and that the operational efficiency effect is the same for 
private and government-owned firms. However, there is no consensus on whether it is 
stronger for former or for the latter. On the one hand, many studies suggest that managerial 
slack is higher in government-owned than in private firms (Vickers and Yarrow 1989; Shirley 
and Walsh 2000). Thus, it can be considered that the profitability effect of competition is 
dominant for private firms while the operational efficiency effect will have a more significant 
(or even dominant) impact for government-owned firms (Assumption 1). On the other hand, 
several papers (Megginson and Netter 2001; Shirley and Walsh 2001) show that the positive 
effect of competition in improving the operational efficiency is stronger when it is combined 
with privatization (Assumption 2). In the framework of our model, Assumption 1 could be 
reflected by a linear operational efficiency effect for private firms and a cubic operational 
efficiency effect for government-owned firms. Under Assumption 2, the operational 
efficiency effect would be linear for government-owned firms and cubic for private firms. 
Finally, the impact of competition on investment by incumbent operators can be 
summarized by the following table 2-3. The literatures strongly support the view that 
relationship between competition and investment is differ between private and government-
owned firms. Our analyses suggest that in most cases the positive impact of competition on 
investment is more clear for government-owned than for private firms. 
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Table 2-3 Expected results from assumptions and hypotheses  
    
Privated incumbent 
(profit- maximizing) 
Government-owned incumbent 
(hybrid behavior) 
Profitability SBC   - + 
effect FBC        - - 
Operational Assumption 1        . + 
efficiency effect Assumption 218        + . 
Overall impact 
of 
SBC or FBC 
SBC * Assumption 1 - 
« - » 
++ 
« + » 
SBC * Assumption 2 ? + 
FBC * Assumption 1 - 
« - » 
? 
« - » 
FBC * Assumption 2 ? - 
Notes: If the incumbent is a private firm: SBC and FBC reduce the investment through the 
profitability effect. Under assumption 1, the operational efficiency effect will be insignificant and the 
overall impact of SBC and FBC will be negative. Under assumption 2, the operational efficiency 
effect will be significant and the overall impact of SBC and FBC may be negative, positive, or non-
linear. 
 
 
2.2.3 Review of the previous studies 
 
The theoretical literature and empirical research on the impact of liberalization policies 
on investment have mostly focused on the link between access regulation and investment19. 
Nevertheless, there are few general papers on the relationship between liberalization and 
investment, reflecting some of the issues raised in the previous section. Table 2-4 provides a 
Summarized previous research on the impact of liberalization policies on investment. It 
shows the variables that each paper seeks to explain (Column “Dependant variables”) and the 
variables related to liberalization policies used as explanatory variables (Column 
“Independent liberalization variables”).  
                                               
18
 The only exception is the case of facilities-based competition (FBC) under the assumption that the operational efficiency 
effect is significant private firms and insignificant for government-owned firms (assumption 2). 
19
 For the literature reviews, see Cambini, C. and Y. Jiang (2009). "Broadband investment and regulation: A literature 
review." Telecommunications Policy 33(10-11): 559-574. 
  
 
23
Table 2-4 Summarized previous research on the impact of liberalization policies on investment 
Papers Endogenous liberalization variable (Dependent variables) 
Exogenous liberalization variables (Explanatory vriables) 
Data 
Competition Privatization Regulations 
(Calderini and 
Garrone 2001) 
Basic research (Publication) 
Applied research (Patent) 
Market openned (-) 
Market openned (+)   
17 European 
incumbents,  
1985-1999 
(Datta 2003) R & D intensity Productivity 
1 – AT&T’s market share (+) 
1 – AT&T’s market share (+)  
Divestiture (+) 
Divestiture (-) 
AT&T,  
1962-1997 
(Koski and 
Kretschmer 
2005) 
New services (induce date) 
Prices 
Diffusion speed 
At least 2 operators (+) 
At least 2 operators (-) 
At least 2 operators (+) 
 
IRA ( ?), Standards (+) 
IRA ( ?), Standards (?) 
IRA ( +), Standards (+) 
25 countries, 
1991-2000 
(Li 2008) 
Service penetration 
Network expansion 
Prices 
Labor productivity 
Entry (+) 
Entry (+) 
Entry (+) 
Entry (+ then -) 
Privatization (+,?) 
Privatization (-,?) 
Privatization (?) 
Privatization (?) 
IRA ( +) 
IRA ( ?) 
IRA ( ?) 
IRA ( +) 
30 countries 
1991-2006, 
Mobile market 
(Li and Xu 
2004) 
Employment 
Investment ( industry level) 
Density of fixed-line network 
Density of mobile network 
Demand  
Prices 
Labor productivity 
Total Factor Productivity (FTP) 
Nb. of market opened (?) 
Nb. of market opened (+,?) 
Nb. of market opened (?) 
Nb. of market opened (+) 
Nb. of market opened (+) 
Nb. of market opened (?) 
Nb. of market opened (?) 
Nb. of market opened (?) 
Full (?), partial (?) 
Full (+), partial (?) 
Full (+), partial (?) 
Full (+,?), partial (?) 
Full (?), partial (?) 
Full (+?), partial (?) 
Full (+), partial (?) 
Full (?), partial (?) 
 
177 countries 
1990-2001 
(Ros 1999) 
Network density 
Network density growth 
Productivity 
Productivity growth 
Market opened (?) 
Market opened (?) 
Market opened (+,?: +) 
Market opened (?) 
Privatization (+?) 
Privatization (+; ?) 
Privatization (+?) 
Privatization (+?) 
 
130 countries 
1986-1995 
Note: IRA means “Independent Regulation Authority”  
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The latter liberalization variables can be grouped into three categories: variables related 
to competition, privatization and regulation. Boxes belonging to the corresponding columns 
specify what proxies are used for these variables. For example, in (Calderini and Garrone 
2001), competition is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
telecommunications sector is opened to competition, and the value 0 otherwise. These boxes 
also show the relationship found by each paper between the independent and the dependent 
variable. A "+" means that the correlation is positive, a sign "-" that it is negative and a “?” 
that no significant correlation was found. When significance levels are low or when the 
results are not robust, the signs "+" or "-" are followed by a question mark. For example, 
(Calderini and Garrone 2001) find a positive and significant relationship between competition 
and investment in applied research (number of patent), and a negative and significant 
relationship between competition and fundamental research (number of publication). Finally, 
the last column specifies what kinds of data are used by the different papers.  
Among these works, only (Datta 2003) and (Calderini and Garrone 2001) consider the 
operators’ investment as the variable to explain. However, the other papers seek to explain 
several variables that are directly related with the operators’ investments. This is particularly 
the case of network density (Ros 1999; Li and Xu 2004) and expansion (Li 2008) and, to a 
lesser extent, of service diffusion and penetration (Koski and Kretschmer 2005; Li 2008).  
With the exception of (Calderini and Garrone 2001) and (Datta 2003), the works 
presented are based on country-level data. Although these data are clearly relevant (the 
development of the telecommunications sector is linked to the investment of all firms in the 
industry and not just to the investment of incumbent operators), studies that use them do not 
indicate how liberalization policies affect the investment strategies of the different types of 
firms of the industry. Obviously, liberalization policies do not have the same impact on the 
operators (who are directly affected by these policies) and on upstream firms, such as 
equipment suppliers. Furthermore, their impact also probably differs between incumbent and 
entrant operators20.  
                                               
20
 For example, while it is widely accepted that a regulation setting low access prices reduces the incumbents’ incentives to 
invest in their infrastructures (because it reduces the post-investment profits), the impact of such a policy on infrastructure 
investment by the entrants is more debated. On the one hand, low access prices increase the profits of the entrants when they 
rely on the incumbent’s infrastructure to provide services (i.e., using Bourreau and Dogan (2005)’s terminology, when they 
choose the “buy” rather than the “build” option) and reduce their incentives to roll-out their own infrastructure. On the other 
hand, the theory of the “ladder of investment” in Cave (2006) suggests that by facilitating the development of service-based 
competition low access charges may facilitate the further development of facilities-based competition. 
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Many empirical studies also show that opening the market to competition improves the 
operational efficiency of incumbent public firms (Phoenix 2003; Ford and Spiwak 2004). It 
seems however that these policies are more efficient when combined with privatizations 
(Megginson and Netter 2001). These results refer to the essential question of the roles of 
ownership and competition in promoting organizational efficiency. While (Shirley and Walsh 
2000) point out that ownership is more important than competition, (Vickers and Yarrow 
1989) consider that the literature supports the opposite point of view. Without trying to 
decide between these two positions, one can underline that there are complementarities 
between opening the market to competition and privatizing the incumbent firms. In other 
words, the improvement in monitoring the managers is more significant when these policies 
are combined.   
In the previous literature, many studies also strongly support the view that the 
relationship between competition and investment is different from that between R&D 
investment and capital investment. Therefore, the different impacts of competition on 
investments can be summarized in table 2-5. The effect of competition shows different 
consequences when it combine with privatization (i.e. for private and government-owned 
firms). Therefore, it is worth noting that this was almost ignored in the previous literature 
(Bognetti and Obermann 2008). (Ros 1999)21 uses privatization as a dependant variable but 
does not consider the interaction between competition and privatization22. In other words, 
(Ros 1999) considers privatization as a dimension of liberalization policies that may have an 
impact on the firms’ investment behavior (just as the development of competition), but 
ignores the fact that competition may have different effects on private and government-
owned firms.   
                                               
21
 (Ros 1999) distinguishes two groups of countries. In most cases, the results are identical. When different, it first shows the 
results for those whose per capita GDP exceeds $ 10,000, then those obtained for countries whose GDP per capita is below $ 
10,000. 
22
 The same is true for most of the papers on access regulation and infrastructure investment reviewed by Cambini and Jiang 
(2009). 
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Table 2-5 Summarized previous theoretical studies  
Liberalization policies Key issues Expected impact on R&D Expected impact on CAPEX References 
Privatization - Ownership  
- Managerial behavior 
- Agency problem 
- Risk 
- Short/long term 
- Budget constraints 
(-) by "Myopic 
Investment Behavior 
(MIB)” assumption 
(-) but lower than on R&D 
(+)23 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972), (Laffont 
and Tirole 1993), (Munari and Sobrero 
2005), (Sappington and Stiglitz 1996), 
(Laverty 1996), (Bushee 1998), (Shirley 
and Walsh 2000), (Hansmann 1988), 
(Hart and Moore 1996) 
Competition 
 (SBC &FBC) 
 
Service-
based 
competition 
(SBC) 
- Spillover effect 
- Risk 
- Build-or-buy strategies 
(-) impact if R&D is 
mainly dedicated to 
infrastructure innovation 
(+) with a change in the 
nature of R&D  
(-) for incumbents 
More balanced for entrants 
(Foros 2004),  
(Kotakorpi 2006), 
(Vareda and Hoernig 2007), 
(Friederiszick, Grajek et al. 2008) 
Facilities-
based 
competition 
(FBC) 
- Appropriability 
- Cost-based rate  
- Contestable market 
- the Ladder of investment  
?  
(-) with sunset   
? 
(-)  
(+) 
(Jorde, Sidak et al. 2000), (Hausman and 
Sidak 2005), (Bourreau and Dogan 
2005), (Waverman, Meschi et al. 2007), 
(Cave and Vogelsang 2003), (Baumol 
1982) 
Competition 
& 
Nature of 
investment 
- Schumpeterian & 
Darwinian effects 
- Inverted-U relationship 
- Drastic & incremental 
innovations 
- Efficiency & Replacement 
effects 
Depends on the level of 
competition intensity 
(-- to +) 
Depends on the level of 
competition intensity 
(+) impact stronger than on 
R&D  
(-) impact lower than on 
R&D (- to ++) 
(Arrow 1962), (Aghion, Bloom et al. 
2005), (Gilbert and Newbery 1982) , 
(Calderini and Garrone 2001) 
Interaction between 
privatization &  
competitions 
- Complementarities 
- Productivity 
- Efficiency pressure 
 (+) (??) (Bognetti and Obermann 2008), (Parker 
and Kirkpatrick 2005), (Li and Xu 2004), 
(Li 2008), (Koski and Kretschmer 2005), 
(Fumagalli, Garrone et al. 2005) 
                                               
23
 Resources are reallocated from R&D (risky and long term investment) to CAPEX (short term and less risky).  
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This study assumes that in most cases the positive impact of competition on investment 
is more clear for government-owned than for private firms24. Finally, some dimensions of 
liberalization policies, and in particular privatizations, only concern the incumbent operators. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, two reasons led us to focus on the latter type of firms: 
in most countries the incumbent are still, among the operators, the main providers of new 
infrastructures and technologies; the liberalization policies have changed radically the 
incumbents’ competitive environment and internal organization.  
(Li and Xu 2004) and (Li 2008) 25  have paid more attention to this issue. A first 
limitation of this work is that they explain phenomena related to the entire 
telecommunications sector from policies that cover only the operators (opening markets to 
competition and the existence of a regulatory authority), or even only the incumbent 
operators (privatization). Also, how the interaction between competition and privatization is 
studied does not fully reflect the fact that competition may have different effects on private 
companies and government-owned incumbent firms.  
There are still some limitations in previous studies when they consider both privatization 
and competition. For example, in the regressions proposed by (Li and Xu 2004) and (Li 
2008), the vector exogenous variables include the proxies for competition and privatization 
and an interaction term “competition*privatization”. (Li and Xu 2004) found that the 
coefficient on variable “competition” is positive but lower than the coefficient on variable 
“competition*privatization” and interpret this result as an evidence that the impact of 
competition on investment is higher when it is combined with privatization. This 
interpretation is not so obvious especially as the proxy for competition intensity is not a 
dummy26.  
Therefore, if one seeks to study to what extent competition has different effects on 
private and government-owned incumbents, it seems more natural to evaluate the correlation 
between the intensity of competition and investment for each type of firm (i.e. to consider 
                                               
24
 The only exception is the case of facilities-based competition (FBC) under the assumption that the operational efficiency 
effect is significant private firms and insignificant for government-owned firms (assumption 2). 
25
 (Li 2008) and (Li and Xu 2004) also consider the interaction between the liberalization variables (see p. 33). 
26
 If the variable x is a dummy such as x=1 if condition A is satisfied and x=0 otherwise, and if y is a dummy such as x=1 if 
condition B is satisfied and x=0 otherwise, then the meaning of variable z=x*y is clear: z=1 if conditions A and B are 
satisfied and z=0 otherwise. But if y is not a dummy but a discrete or continuous variable, the meaning of z is less clear. 
Moreover, interpreting the results would have been even more difficult if (Li and Xu 2004) had obtained coefficient with 
opposite signs on the variables “competition”  and  “competition*privatization”. 
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two groups of firm: private and government-owned firms) than to introduce an interaction 
term as (Li and Xu 2004) and (Li 2008) did. With this intention on the liberalization 
dimensions, this study identifies the different effect of competition on firms’ investments 
according to whether the firm is private or government-owned firms. Thus, it can firstly be 
estimated that the profitability effect of competition is dominant for private firms and the 
operational efficiency effect is more significant for government-owned firms (assumption 1). 
Secondly, it is clarified that the positive effect of competition in promoting the operational 
efficiency is stronger when it is combined with privatization (assumption 2). Finally, this 
study shows that the type of investments is changed as a result of the combination between 
competition and privatization.  
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2.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
This study considers a model with a vertically integrated monopoly network provider 
who faces price taking rival operators in the retail market. The network is an essential input 
to the production of the downstream telecommunications services and we assume the network 
operator is required to provide access to its rivals. And it is supposed that the services of the 
rivals and the incumbent are vertically differentiated, and we examine the incumbent’s 
decisions on how much is invested in network quality with the division of private firms and 
government-owned firms when there is competition.   
 
2.3.1 Data and variables 
 
To investigate the impact of competition on different type of investments by private and 
government-owned incumbent operators, this study use several databases. The firm list and 
yearly financial data are based on the DataStream of Thomson Reuters27 for the fixed and 
mobile telecommunication industry in OECD countries. This data contains both mobile and 
fixed operators because the firms have nature government-owned origin. The firms are still 
the major telecom operator and most of them have both mobile and fixed business unit in 
their own domestic market. Then we choose former nature monopoly firms and match the list 
with regulatory variables of WBIS28, WCIS29 and OECD regulatory database30. Table 2-6 
shows the definition, sources and descriptive statistics of variables such as dependent, 
regulatory, firm characteristics and control variables. Finally, an unbalanced yearly panel 
with 97 observations for 15 years from 1994 to 2008 is used and these firms account for 
nature monopolies of 20 OECD countries. The rationales for inclusion of each variable are 
described below.  
                                               
27
 This database covers 51,900 active global companies and offers the broadest company coverage, representing 99% of the 
global market capitalization,  http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/  (2011).  
28
 World broadband Information Service (WBIS) is an online database of broadband, fixed-line telephony and multichannel 
TV subscriber numbers from 2000 to 2008 and broadband forecasts to 2013. Launched in 2003, WBIS currently covers 160 
countries and more than 1100 operators’ market share, penetration rate and ARPU,  http://www.wbisdata.com  (2011). 
29
 Since 1995, World Cellular Information Service (WCIS) has offered the mobile industry players and an invaluable insight 
into the industry - encompassing 50 different key markets,  http://www.wcisdata.com (2011). 
30
 Indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications (ETCR) in OECD. The ETCR indicators cover sectors in 
which anti-competitive regulation tends to be concentrated, given that manufacturing sectors are typically lightly regulated 
and open to international competition in OECD countries, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_34323_35791136_1_1_1_1,00.html  (2011). 
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Table 2-6 Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
Dependent variables Definitions (Units) Source Obs.     Mean St. D Min Max 
lcapex   Log value of (Capital expenditures31 (US$)) Thomson DB 234 14.610 1.175 11.891 17.210 
lrnd   Log value of (R&D expenditure (US$)) Thomson DB 189 11.645 2.198 6.358 15.081 
SBC&FBC competition 
SBC_bb Nb. of DSL non-incumbent access / Total nb. of 
DSL access in broadband market 
Computed from 
WBIS and WCIS 300 .1282 .1704 0 .6509 
FBC_bb Nb. of DSL incumbent access / Total nb. of 
DSL access in broadband market 
Computed from 
WBIS and WCIS 300 .1511 .2009 0 .8025 
SBC_m Nb. of mobile non-incumbent access / Total nb. 
of mobile access in mobile market 
Computed from 
WBIS and WCIS 300 .0029 .0093 0 .0663 
FBC_m Nb. of mobile non-incumbent access / Total nb. 
of mobile access in mobile market 
Computed from 
WBIS and WCIS 300 .5026 .2417 0 1 
Privatization 
Private Ctrl  Dummy value =1 if  the government the 
majority shareholder and if not 0. 
OECD regulation 
DB (ETCR) 300 .43 .4959 0 1 
Firm characteristics   
lemployee   Log value of (Total employees)  Thomson DB 238 10.7814 1.2125 7.4425 12.6413 
lage  Log value of (1998 - Established year)  Thomson DB 238 3.2122 1.0126 0 4.8752 
lnetprofit  Log value of (Net profit (US$)) Thomson DB 209 13.8634 1.2004 8.7502 16.0733 
Control variables 
lnb_bb  Log value of (Nb. of subscribers for broadband)  WBIS DB 155 13.5681 1.9802 7.8240 16.5640 
lnb_m  Log value of (Nb. of subscribers for mobile) Wireless intelligence 271 15.3855 1.4639 11.1882 18.1200 
gdp_pop 
 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (US$) / 
Population of n country 
ITU DB 300 25784.26 11641.01 0 57232.38 
lpopbigcity   Log value of ( Population of urban (%)) ITU DB 263 15.1946 .9284 12.7234 16.3180 
_Iyear_1995 ~_Iyear_2008 Year dummies between 1995 and 2008 Calculation 300 .0667 .2499 0 1 
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 It represents the funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions. This includes property, plant and investments in machinery and equipment. 
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Our investment measures of exploration (creating new knowledge and technologies) and 
exploitation (using existed knowledge and technologies to develop new products and 
services) are R&D investment  and capital expenditure (He and Wong 2004). Using 
logarithms, we can interpret the results of respective coefficients as elasticity. itlrnd  is the log 
value of research and development cost and it is implicit that firms will take advantage of 
new business opportunities by trying to impose a different industrial structure and possibly 
new dominant paradigms. Traditionally, new technological trajectories do provide the chance 
to lead the market and play a key role (Fields 2004). lcapex is represented the exploitation 
property of investment and it is a very accurate measure of infrastructure investment 
(Friederiszick, Grajek et al. 2008). Once the regulatory induced in the market, the main 
concern of incumbent firms is to defend their position and to avoid competition. For this 
reason, the incumbent create strong barriers to entry and R&D efforts are in these cases 
mostly directed towards the incorporation of new and incremental innovations on the existing 
products, rather than towards the development of radically new products (Cesaroni, Minin et 
al. 2005). 
Privatization of incumbent operators (Private Ctrl), inter-(SBC_m, SBC_bb) and intra-
platform (FBC_m, FBC_bb) competitions on the operators' investment choices (forcing 
infrastructures operators to open their infrastructures; Virtual Network Operators (VNOs)), 
and interactions between liberalization policies are the most represent able liberalization 
processes in telecommunication industry. This various regulatory processes are observed in 
fixed-telecommunication as well as in other network industries (Bognetti and Obermann 
2008). In fact, the process is not exactly the same between countries and network industries. 
Some of OECD countries are not forcing an access regulation. And the level of privatization 
is different under the specific political situations (OECD 2007). Therefore, this study 
identifies the impacts of the different dimensions about the liberalization policies on the level 
and activities of investment. 
The installed network resources are used as control variables in this study. Before the 
1990's, the activities of the national monopoly were almost the only fixed line telephony. 
Then mobile telephony and internet developed and became more and more important sources 
of income for the operators. Generally, the installed base of previous networking 
deployments and learning-by-using effects are likely to affect the timing of subsequent 
network investments (Farrell and Saloner 1985). For example,  (Koski and Kretschmer 2005) 
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study that standardization prompt 2G entry and accelerated the commercialization of 2G for 
incumbent technologies because 1G profitability is a likely indicators for adopting new 
technologies and expected 2G profits. Therefore, the installed network base accelerates the 
possibility of higher investment based on the previous resources of network and deployments. 
From this, our intuition is that we have to take into account these previous market shares 
(lnb_bb and lnb_m) of operators as control variables to suggest the policy for the network and 
R&D deployment. 
The characteristics of firms such as age (lage) and size (lemployee) are considered as 
well as the year dummies and a dummy of mobile operators. The time period effect variables 
can capture macroeconomic shocks that affect all operators in the analysis. For instance, the 
IT market bubble in early of 2000s, which affected the investments in telecommunication 
industry, can be accounted for by yearly dummies. GDP per population of country (gdp_pop) 
and population in big city (lpopbigcity) are considered as the proxies of demand and cost in 
this model. Population density in big city reflects the costs of infrastructure deployment for 
the reason that the density of households in limited area determines the expenses of 
constructing in the network deployment. For the demand, we assume that the level of wealth 
in a country is related with entry time and investment of the new network deployments. With 
these variables, this study estimates the activities of the operators have changed over the 
liberalization policies. 
 
 
2.3.2 Model 
 
To find the impacts of liberalization policies on the activities of investment, we need to 
set up an empirical model based on the consideration of two points. First, the consideration of 
endogeneity is essential for the econometric modeling of the investments because ignoring 
this may cause severe biases in the empirical results and difficulties in interpretation of the 
results . All of liberalization implementations including privatization and inter-(SBC) and 
intra-competitions (FBC) have the effect of political and administrative processes, which 
might interact with the investment strategies by firms (Friederiszick, Grajek et al. 2008). In 
order to control the endogeneity, this study induces instrument variables which are the 
determinants of liberalization implementations.  
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Second, the current state of investment is influenced by the last period’s decisions, but 
static models assume that all the relationships of the model occur immediately in the same 
period. (Greenstein, McMaster et al. 1995) put more structure into the hypothesized dynamic 
process by considering a long-term equilibrium relation along with an adjustment equation. 
As a consequence, they derived an infrastructure equation with structural lags. For an 
investment model, it is very important to incorporate these dynamics. Some of the investment 
decisions can be made immediately and will lead to the observable short term effects. Also, 
they need adjustment time and will therefore only gradually translate into real effects. Hence, 
the accumulated effect can significantly differ from the short term effect. Investment has 
dynamic characteristic and two-way relations with impact factors such as sales, price and 
employers. To measure the regulations impact on the investment needs controlling of lots of 
statistics problems. So, considering the dynamic effect is necessary to identify the effect of 
liberalization policies. Therefore, the simplest solution to account for these dynamics is to use 
lagged explanatory and lagged dependent variables to the model (Alesina, Ardagna et al. 
2005).  
For the impact of regulation on the network deployment, (Chang, Koski et al. 2003) 
finds that a lower access price causes more investment of digital technology among the US 
incumbents. On the contrary, they suggest the competition has worked by facilitating new 
entry through decreasing interconnection prices using European data for interconnection. A 
balanced panel firm-level data for the 5-year period from 1994 to 1998 is used and they 
estimate Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method with the controlling of heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Using the 180 fixed operators of 25 European from 1990 to 2006, 
(Friederiszick, Grajek et al. 2008) identify relationship between entry regulation and 
infrastructure investment. The results of dynamic investment models show that unbundling 
discourages infrastructure investment by entrants but has no effect on incumbents in fixed-
line telecommunications.  
(Koski and Kretschmer 2005) estimate the effects of regulatory policy and competitive 
environment on the three the performances (entry time, service price and diffusion) using a 
panel of 25 countries over the years 1991-2000. Considering the non-random sampling and 
using 3SLS model, they suggest that the within regulation (standardization) prompt 2G entry 
and diffusion, whereas within- standards competition accelerate less aggressive price 
competition than between-standards competition. For the mobile network, (Li 2008) 
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examines the impacts of privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority using 
30 OECD countries (including China) over the time period 1991-2006. The three equation 
model shows that introducing new entry is positively correlated with mobile network 
penetration and expansion. Based on the national-level panel dataset, the results also 
highlight an independent regulator in privatized mobile markets has crucial role. For instance, 
privatization is negatively correlated with mobile network expansion without an independent 
regulator, even in certain competitive market environments. 
Until now, there is few empirical findings support the relation between regulation and 
investment of entrants and incumbent (Cambini and Jiang 2009). The insufficiency of micro-
data in the firm level data has a limitation to the evaluation for investment activities by fixed 
or mobile operators to prove the effectiveness of regulations. To solve this problem and test 
the relations between regulation and investments, this study apply The Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator (1991)32 approach to estimate how the different regulatory dimensions affect the 
level and the nature of investment for the natural monopoly operators.  
GMM is more efficient way in cases where there is more IV than endogenous variables 
(over identified) (Arellano and Bond 1991). The intuition behind the optimal weights is to 
use weights that are inversely proportional to the variance of the moments (Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey et al. 1988). Dynamic panel model have their specification both lagged dependent 
variables and unobserved individual effects. Through explicitly including variables to 
consider past behavior and time-invariant individual-specific effects, dynamic panel method 
allow us to understand better what factors drive firms’ activities over time, differentiating, 
even through such variables are latent (Wawro 2002). There are still some controversial 
issues for using GMM according to the length of time (T) and the number of observations 
(N), (Judson and Owen 1999) suggest a suitable time period (T) between 5 and 30 for GMM 
with first-moment instruments using the Monte Carlo method. Since our data set has 15 years 
period and 20 individual firms, it is proper to use GMM. We estimate fundamental models 
like this:    
                                               
32
 See, Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). "Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations." The Review of Economic Studies 58(2): 277. 
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The dependent variables ( ijtlcapex and ijtlrnd ) in equations (i-ii) reflect the level and 
activities of different investments for firm i of j country in time period t and their previous 
period values are used as explanatory variables in right term. The lagged variables include the 
assumption that firms do not instantly adjust the investment activities according to the present 
market circumstance. For the competition in inter- 33  and intra- platform34 , we used for 
variables such as 
_ ijtSBC bb , _ ijtFBC bb , _ ijtSBC m  and _ ijtFBC bb . The ijtPrivateCtrl  represents 
the level of privatization of j country in time t.   
To test the general assumption that competition has different effects on private and 
government-owned firms, and the specific assumption summarized by Table 2-3, this study 
divides data set into two parts according to ijtPrivateCtrl  dummy such as government-owned 
firms (p=0) and private firms (p=1).   
 As control variables which stand for the installed base of previous networking 
deployments and learning-by-using effects, _ itlnb bb  and _ itlnb m are used to represent of the 
market share of broadband and mobile markets. We also consider the firm characteristics 
variables ( ijtlage , ijtlemployee  and ijtlprobit ), demand proxy of service ( / jtgdp pop ) and cost 
proxy of investment ( / jtlpop bigcity ). Finally, this model includes time dummies ( .D year ) and 
error term (
ijtµ ) which captures the variation in the unexplained investment activities.  
                                               
33
 For the inter-platform competition, we used SBC_bb and SBC_m which are “broadband connections of non-incumbent fir
ms using LLU or other wholesale services / total broadband connections”. 
34
 For the intra-platform competition, we used FBC_bb and FBC_m which are “broadband connections of non-incumbent fir
ms using their own networks (e.g. cable, FTTH) / total broadband connections”.    
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Using different measures for the equation, we estimate the elasticity of each regulation 
on the nature of investment. In detail, we make categories of the liberalization policies which 
can lead to absolute or relative increase of exploitation investments at the expense of 
exploration investment. In addition, since there are more moment restrictions than necessary 
for identification, the restrictions are tested by (Sargant’s test of over identifying restrictions) 
and Arellano-Bond test.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
37
2.4 Results and Analysis 
 
In order to test the implications of various regulations' dimensions presented above, the 
empirical analysis has been conducted for the firm level data of 20 OECD countries. In the 
dynamic panel models, we choose the Arellano and Bond system GMM with various 
assumptions for the number of lags, predetermined and endogenous variables. The results 
show the best efficient and consistent values of coefficients is used. To validate the proper 
models, we consider both over-identifying condition and first-, second-order autocorrelation 
tests. For the over-identifying condition, we use the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions which has the null hypothesis such as “H0: over-identifying restrictions are 
valid”. According to the values of the Sagan test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore the model has no problem regarding the over-identifying restriction.  
Concerning the test for autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors, we calculate the 
Arellano-Bond test (Abond test) with the null hypothesis such as “H0: no autocorrelation”. 
When the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d), the first 
differenced errors are first-order serially correlated. So, as expected, the outputs of Abond 
test shown in the table 2-7 suggest an evidence against the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation in the first-differences errors at first order. For the second order, the test 
identifies no significant evidence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order 2.  
There are two types of results according to dependent variables such as CAPEX and 
R&D  in table 2-7. The results of our estimations are summarized for both private and 
government-owned firms (model a), for government-owned firms only (model b), and for 
private firms only (model c). 
In the dynamic investment model, considering the previous variable is generally 
essential. Our results show that, capital expenditure is not significantly affected by previous 
invest values expect when there are both competition and privatization, whereas the last 
investment of R&D and investment’ activities have general positive effect on present 
activities. Above all, the elasticity of activities in investments is significantly related with the 
previous investment values with 1 % confident level, as well as the previous effect of R&D is 
broadly significant than network deployment.   
When we consider the assumptions in section 2.2, the estimated results for CAPEX 
(exploitative) investment fit well with the theoretical framework. For model (1), the overall 
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impact of competition when we consider it individually is insignificant. The impact of 
competition is much clearer when we distinguish between government-owned and private 
firm. This first results support the general assumption that competition does not have the 
same effect for government-owned and private firms.   
More specifically, we find that the effect of competition has a negative impact on 
private firms (model 1-c), whereas it fosters the infrastructure investment of government-
owned firms (model 1-b). According to our theoretical framework, this result denotes that the 
operational efficiency effect dominates for government-owned firms, whereas the 
profitability effect dominates for private firms. So, firms less focus on infrastructure 
investment when they are private firms and faced with market competition.  
Comparing the results for the different forms of competition in model (1), we can see 
that for private firms, the negative impact of competition on infrastructure investment is 
stronger for service-based (-2.360a and -7.753a) than for facilities-based competition (-
0.842a). Furthermore, for private firms, the negative correlation (-0.161) between facilities-
based competition on mobile market (fbc_m) and investment is not significant. This result can 
be interpreted in different ways. First, the impact of FBC on mobile market may not be 
clearly negative: Although more intense competition reduces the incentives to invest since it 
decrease the post-investment profits of a larger amount than it reduces the post-investment 
profits (see section 2.2.1), it may also induce more intense “rivalry” and lead to preemption 
behavior and investment races (see section 2.2.2.1.3 of Appendix). A second interpretation is 
that the operational efficiency effect and the profitability effect cancel each other. A reason 
why the operational efficiency effect would be more important for FBC on mobile market 
than for other forms of competition,  may be that fbc_m was chronologically the first type of 
competition to develop35. When FBC was introduced on mobile market, incumbent operators 
were pure monopolists. Thus, the introduction of FBC on mobile market has probably played 
in important role in reducing managerial slack. Conversely, when the other forms of 
competition  have probably played a less important role in reducing managerial slack, since 
FBC on mobile market preexisted.  
The theoretical result that for a government-owned company (model 1-b), the 
                                               
35
 In fact, in most countries, mobile market were opened to competition in the early 90s whereas fixed-line market were 
liberalized in the late 90s. Furthermore, in mobile market, competition was originally facilities-based -- service-based 
competition started to develop very recently 
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profitability of investment increases as the intensity of SBC increases, whereas it decreases as 
the intensity of FBC increases is not supported by our estimations. In fact, from this 
theoretical result, we expected the coefficient of SBC to be higher than the one of FBC 
whatever the market (fixed-line or mobile). However, it is true only for the mobile market. 
Although the estimated results for infrastructure investment fit well with our theoretical 
framework, there are some findings in R&D investment model (2). First, the sign of most of 
the coefficients does not clearly change between government-owned (model 2-c) and private 
firms (model 2-b). By examining the results more in detail, there is a negative and significant 
correlation between SBC in the broadband market (-3.177a) for government-owned firms, as 
well as a positive and significant correlation of FBC in the mobile market (9.166b) for private 
firms. This result could be interpreted as evidence that as regards R&D investment, the 
operational efficiency effect dominates for privative firms, whereas the profitability effect 
dominates for government-owned firms. 
However, when we check general models (a) between CAPEX and R&D, we can find 
that the individual effects of competition and privatization are insignificant for infrastructure 
investment and lead to a negative effect for R&D investment (-2.642a and -1.189a). This 
means that for the investment of “exploration of new possibilities”, each competition and 
privatization has separated negative effects at least. Once the firms are faced with any of 
liberalization policies, the firm try to reduce their long-term oriented investment. Therefore 
considering of the combination of each liberalization policies are important. This point is 
firmly backed up when we compare detailed models (1-b vs. 2-b and 1-c vs. 2-c ) of R&D.  
When there is only competition without privatization in the market (in model 1-b vs. 2-
b), firms prefer the infrastructure investment to the R&D investment. If competition is 
adopted, firms are likely to emphasize investments with exploitable characteristics. That is, 
the firms try to aim at abundant productivity and refinement related to a creating reliability in 
experience. For instance, (Calderini and Garrone 2001) show that the nature of investment is 
shifted into more applied investment which has short-term return in the liberalization process. 
On the contrary, there are significant reverses of the investment strategy when there are both 
competition and privatization (in model 1-c vs. 2-c). This means that well-blended 
liberalization policies can prompt the long-term investment (“exploration of new 
possibilities). (Li 2008) also indicated the importance of liberalization policies and support 
system such as independent industry regulator.  
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Table 2-7 Estimated results on the dynamic models 
  y=lcapex (exploitative investment) -Model (1) 
 
y=lrnd (explorative investment) -Model (2) 
  Model(1-a) -Individual effect  
of competition and privatization 
Model(1-b) -Government-
owned firm (p=0) - 
Model(1-c) -Private firm 
(p=1)   
Model(2-a) -Individual effect  
of competition and 
privizaion 
 Model(2-b) –Government 
 -owned firm (p=0)  
Model(2-b)-Private 
firm (p=1) 
  Coef. Se. Coef. Se. Coef. Se. 
 
Coef. Se. Coef. Se. Coef. Se. 
Y (t-1) 0.62 0.328 -0.178 0.191 0.294b 0.138 
 
0,625a 0,125 0,813a 0,13 -
2
0,367 
SBC_bb -0.947 0.579 1.139b 0.04 -2.360a 0.617 
 
-2,642a 0,67 -3,177a 0, -2,86 2,9
6 FBC_bb -0.549 0.643 2.040a 1.063 -0.842a 0.279 
 
-1,067 0,761 -0,591 0,859 -2,170 1,759 
SBC_m 4.407 3.700 12.949b 5.721 -7.753a 4.583 
 
-4,094 3,514 -1,232 5,774 53,808 82,97
3 FBC_m 0.945 1.769 7.134a 2.590 -0.161 1.169 
 
0,545 2,300 0,354 3,268 9,166b 4,528 
Private Ctrl -0.215 0.396 
     
-1,189a 0,332 
    
lnb_bb 0.288b 0.129 0.180 0.127 0.125 0.136 
 
0,494a 0,165 0,048 0,206 1,595 1,336 
lnb_m 0.865b 0.404 0.865a 0.263 0.316 0.352 
 
0,723 0,445 1,162a 0,420 -2,229 2,184 
lage -0.164 0.277 -0.551a 0.285 -0.091 0.144 
 
-0,483 0,359 -0,941 0,633 2,276 1,617 
lemployee 0.036 0.210 0.682a 0.224 0.421a 0.101 
 
0,192 0,130 0,424 0,351 1,325a 0,419 
lprofit 0.019 0.056 -0.073 0.084 -0.070 0.044 
 
0,091 0,098 0,036 0,094 -0,268 0,221 
gdp_pop -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
-0,000 0,000 -0,000 0,000 -0,000 0,000 
lpopbigcity -0.955 0.596 -0.512 0.367 -0.295 0.511 
 
-1,258b 0,530 -1,560b 0,771 0,135 0,428 
_cons 7.265 4.533 0.377 3.368 5.425a 3.217 
 
3,754 3,985 6,097 4,676 -0,045 10,37
5 Observation
s 
97  46  51  
 
73  43  30  
Sargan 
Test36 
chi2(15) = 13.668 chi2(15) = 14.026 chi2(16) = 10.898 
 
chi2(15) = 8.425 chi2(15) = 6.822 
 
  Prob > chi2 = 0.551 Prob > chi2 = 0.524 Prob > chi2 = 
0.816  
Prob > chi2 = 0.906 Prob > chi2 = 0.962 
 
Abond test37 
(1) 
-1.9789b -0.768 -2.176b 
 
-2.321b -1.504 -1.7802c 
Abond test 
(2) 
-0.735 0.379  1.2712  
 
-0.875 -1.020 -0.457 
Note:  a= p<0.01, b= p<0.05, c= p<0.1 
            
                                               
36
 Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid) 
37
 Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors (H0: no autocorrelation) 
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For the complementarity between competition and privatization, (Li and Xu 2004) 
suggest evidence of complementarity between privatization and competition in improving 
network penetration and in maintaining service pricing among privatized operators. (Parker 
and Kirkpatrick 2005) also find that if privatization is improved when it is complemented by 
other policies that promote competition and effective state regulation. In other words, 
privatization without a simultaneous implementation of competition may just make private 
monopolies. From this, our intuition is that the contemporaneous implementations among 
liberalization policies make firms concentrate more on the investment for developing new 
products and services than the existing knowledge and technology. This supports most of the 
previous economists’ statements that privatization works best when there is a competition 
that limits the market power of the incumbents.  
From these finding about combination of liberalization process and different type of 
investment, it is meaningful to investigate because encouraging and balancing between 
exploration and exploration in the development of industry (Danneels 2002; Sheremata 2004). 
(He and Wong 2004) also empirically support that exploration and exploitation represent two 
fundamental approaches in organizational learning, it is necessary for firms to maintain a 
balance with a sample of 206 manufacturing firms. Recently, (Bauer 2010) recommends that 
the design of policies might be complicated by trade-offs between short-term and long-term 
policy objectives in telecommunication industry.    
For the detailed formation of competitions (SBC_bb, FBC_bb, SBC_m, FBC_m), we can 
find that the effect of competition of mobile industry is much bigger than that of fixed market 
when we compare the coefficients of the competition in mobile and broadband industries. 
This implies that the mobile market is much sensitive and flexible to liberalization policy. 
Here, it is recognized that since most of natural monopoly firms started their business in the 
fixed-line network and then took part in the mobile industry, they are more sensitive to 
external stimulation. In fact, various studies investigate the issue of infrastructure versus 
service competitions. However, these studies only focus on the service penetration 
considering just one market (Distaso, Lupi et al. 2006; Höffler 2007; Bouckaert, Van Dijk et 
al. 2008). This chapter considers mobile and broadband industry together and detailed firms’ 
activities relevant to investment. From this, we can suggest not only which policy is effective 
according to types of markets but also what is implication regarding kinds of competition.  
In addition, the result of our estimations and the difference between infrastructure and 
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R&D investment could be interpreted as follows: i) as regards R&D investment, the reduction 
of managerial slack dominates (resp. is dominated by) the profitability effect for government-
owned (resp. private) firms (whereas we found the contrary for CAPEX); ii) in the case of 
infrastructure investment, the main consequence of reduced managerial slack is the 
operational efficiency effect, whereas for R&D it is the reduction of over-investment effect.  
It could be argued that the reduction in the managers’ power (or “managerial slack”) induced 
by increased competition does not increase but decrease R&D investment. In fact, several 
authors have highlighted that managers have incentives to “over-invest” (i.e. to investment 
more than the level of investment targeted by shareholders) if they are not monitored 
efficiently (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990)38. In this framework, any decrease in the managerial 
slack will result in lower investment (in a reduction in the tendency to over-invest). Since it is 
probably more difficult for shareholders to assess the quality of R&D investment projects 
than to assess the quality of infrastructure investment projects, the “reduction of over-
investment” effect is probably more significant for R&D than for CAPEX.  
The drawback of interpretation i) is that it is difficult to find theoretical arguments to 
explain that the efficiency effect dominate for government-owned firms and is dominated for 
private firms when one consider CAPEX investment, and that the opposite is true when one 
consider R&D investment.. The drawback of interpretation ii) is that it only explains why, for 
R&D investment: the effect of SBC in the broadband market (sbc_bb) in R&D investment is 
negative and significant (-3.177a) for government-owned firms and insignificant for private 
firm (-2.846); the effect of FBC in the mobile market (fbc_m) is positive and significant 
(9.166b) for private firms and insignificant (0.354) for government-owned firms. However, 
another result contradicts our initial theoretical framework: the fact that the sign of the 
coefficients of fbc_bb and sbc_m in model 2-b and 2-c does not change between government-
owned and private firms.  
Finally, it is likely that our theoretical framework is not well suited to the analysis of the 
impact of competition on the telecommunications operators R&D investment. In fact, the 
rationale for the operators’ R&D investment may not be producing new technologies and 
services (as in our theoretical model) but to absorbing knowledge created by upstream firms 
(see (Cohen and Levinthal 1989) on the concept of absorptive capacities, see also (Fransman 
                                               
38
 If shareholders cannot monitor managers efficiently, the latter use the liquidity generated by the firm (the free cash flow) 
to finance unprofitable investment projects 
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2000) on the change in the vertical organization of R&D in telecommunications).” .  
The firm’s characteristic indicates that, the sign of the variable lage shows significant 
and negative effects on CAPEX investments, which means that, more older firms invest less 
than younger firms. From this, we can comprehend that the new firms are more likely to 
concentrate on the investment activities and that they lay emphasis on infrastructure 
investment (“exploration of old certainties”). With the size of firms (lemployee), we can 
determine that more bigger firms are focusing on the investment. But there is no explicit 
difference between CAPEX and R&D investments. For the residue, we also consider other 
firms’ characteristics such as sales, debt, market price and tangible assets in the beginning of 
empirical estimation. However, there is no strong and significant coefficients just like, the 
lprofit has no effect on the investments strategies.  
There are cost-, demand- proxies, yearly dummies from 1995 to 2008 and the 
penetration on mobile and broadband network services which used in our analysis as control 
variables. Yearly dummies represent macroeconomic shocks that may affect the activities of 
all firms, but it is not shown in table 2-7 for brevity’s sake. The demand effect measured by 
GDP per capital turn out insignificant and the cost effect (population in big city) mostly 
shows negative effect on the investment activities. One explanation for this, the cost of 
investment in telecommunication industry has less relationship with the decision of 
investment. In present, the fundamental infrastructures of big city with lots population in 
telecommunication industry are already matured, so the investment decision for tomorrow is 
less related with the population density in major city. For the former infrastructure, the 
lnb_bb and lnb_m shows the positive effect of market size in mobile industry on the 
investment activities and this means having lots of previous consumers in industry may 
trigger the incentives for the firm’s investment decision. When the firm makes the investment 
decision, the existing market size is important to determine the level of investment. 
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2.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
To encourage the invest efficiency of former “natural monopoly” industries, 
telecommunication liberalization policies such as competition and privatizations, have 
implemented. Until now, this assumption is still very controversial from a theoretical point of 
view. Nevertheless, prompting the investment in new knowledge and technologies is essential 
for economic growth (Greenstein and McDevitt 2009; Qiang, Rossotto et al. 2009). Besides, 
telecommunication is an infrastructure oriented industry and the possessing of new network 
gives a decisive role to firms in the market (Cambini and Jiang 2009). Therefore, the 
regulatory concerns are needed to control some problems such as under-invest problems, 
appropriability, and so forth. This chapter tries to shed some implication on the role of 
liberalization policies in determining the level and activities of firms’ investments.  
Using the firm level data between 1994 and 2008, we tested assumptions in 
telecommunication market, where there exist competition and privatization regulations. 
Specifically, we consider the nature of investment and adopt more general and complemented 
policy. The assumption regarding Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect related 
with R&D investment and network deployment allows us to decompose the investment 
activities of firms. Hence, this study has two distinct contributions to the regulation and 
innovation in telecommunication industry. First, we consider the composition of investment 
(exploration vs. exploitation investment) while most of the studies dedicated to the impact of 
competition on innovation have focused on the level of R&D investment. We apply these 
concepts, "exploration of new possibilities" and "exploration of old certainties" to the 
relationship, R&D vs. infrastructure investment. Second, not only focusing on the impacts of 
single regulation but also adopting more general and complemented policy views is the other 
main contribution of this chapter. 
The main results of this chapter concern the relationship between competition and 
infrastructure investment. Our theoretical and empirical analyses converge on the conclusion 
that competition has different effect on government-owned and private operators. More 
specifically, we found theoretical support and empirical evidence that increased competition 
fosters investment by government-owned operators and deters investment by private 
operators, whatever the market (mobile or fixed-line) and the form of competition (service-
based or facilities-based). Our results suggest that the main positive impact of competition on 
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investment has been achieved through an improvement of the firms’ operational efficiency 
(operational efficiency effect). Now that the incumbent operators have reached a satisfactory 
level of operational efficiency, the impact of competition on infrastructure investment occurs 
mainly through a decrease in the profitability of investment (profitability effect). Under the 
assumption that it is desirable to encourage investment in telecommunications infrastructures, 
the main policy implication of this chapter could be that national regulatory authorities have 
promote forms of competition which increase the profitability of investment for private 
operators or induce pre-emptive strategies such as investment race39. 
Unlike the results for infrastructure investment, our empirical results on the relationship 
between competition and R&D investment are inconsistent with our theoretical model. 
Further theoretical and empirical analyses would be necessary to account for the nature of 
R&D investment (the main adjustment variable may be the nature of R&D investment rather 
than its level) and for the vertical reorganization of R&D in telecommunications. The latter 
phenomenon – and more specifically the shift in the innovation engine for operators towards 
equipment supplied (Fransmann 2000) – also open new research perspectives. This should 
include a better understanding of what was the impact of liberalization policies in the vertical 
reorganization of R&D activities (in the literature, the former appears to be both a cause and 
a consequence of the latter). Moreover, in a context where R&D activities are mainly 
performed by upstream firms such as equipment suppliers, one should not only investigate 
the impact of competition between operators on their own investments, but also the 
relationship between competition in the downstream market and investment by upstream 
firms. 
Using the empirical method, we try to suggest the answer to these questions; i) How do 
liberalization policies affect the operators' investment strategies? ii) To what extend do they 
affect the Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect between exploration (R&D) 
and exploitation (CAPEX) investments? Based on the empirical results, we can claim that 
considering interaction among liberalization policies and allowing the industry characteristics 
are critical to determine for the Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect and level 
                                               
39
 This conclusion is consistent with the literature on dynamic competition (see e.g. Ellig 2001) and with recent theoretical 
papers on access regulation and infrastructure investment (in particular Gans, J. S. (2001). "Regulating private infrastructure 
investment: optimal pricing for access to essential facilities." Journal of Regulatory Economics 20(2): 167-189. and Vareda, 
J. and S. Hoernig (2007). "The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve 
the First Best?" SSRN eLibrary. 
  
 
46
of investments. More precisely, there are major three findings from our analysis. First, there 
is a significant Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect among firms’ investment 
activities. If competition is induced, firms are likely to emphasize investments with 
exploitable characteristics which using existing knowledge and technologies to develop new 
products and services. Particularly in the case of privatization, firms make more investments 
in “exploitation of old certainties” than in “exploration of new possibilities”. Second, 
competition effect leads to more higher influences on liberalization policies in the mobile 
industry than in the broadband industry. In the case of mobile industry, inter- and intra-
competition highly lead firms to make short-term investments. Finally, the simultaneous 
implementations among liberalization policies make firms to more concentrate on the 
investment for developing new product and service than existed knowledge and technology.   
The implications of our overall results are straightforward. The liberalization policies 
may weaken the firms’ sustainable ability of next generation networks in long terms. 
However, when privatized firms adopt competition, they focus on explorable investments in 
new possibilities. In other words, firms seek strategies for long-term investments in the case 
where competition becomes severe and many dimensions are faced. According to (Cave 
2010), prompting the investment of firms for the new network infrastructure yields a chance 
and challenge for regulators. Therefore, it is necessary for policy regulators to take account of 
the complementary among liberalization policies providing an incentive to create new 
knowledge and technologies. Also, the design of liberalization policies should consider the 
Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect between investments from a perspective 
of long term policy.  
Some economic theory indicates that competition is the good proficient tool at the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources. However, it might not be good at prompting 
investment of new and advanced technology, particularly when the market is dominated by 
former natural monopoly. In such a case, governmental leadership combined with market 
circumstances can attain better results more easily. It has not only allowed its priorities public 
but has also set up an arena for the relevant stakeholders to achieve a mutual understanding of 
their relatively long term objectives. Again, such an intervention is able to be effective only 
in the existence of a cooperative circumstance among the related stakeholders.   
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Chapter 3. Environmental, Sustainable Behaviors and Innovation 
  
3.1 Introduction 
 
This part focuses on the ‘Corporate Environmentalism’ with the basis of typical 
voluntary approaches (Carraro and Siniscalco 1996; Lyon and Maxwell 1999; Segerson and 
Li 1999; Braathen and Co-ope 2003). We premise that this approach is a rather bilateral 
compromise between a policy maker and a firm. Corporate environmentalism is more related 
with environmental protection. For example, the global environmental issues on climate 
change with wider scope of sustainability have growing impact over the few decades on the 
social demand and the international political agenda. To make the stabilization of CO2 
emissions, countries are required to reduce their emissions between 1.3% and 40% below by 
2020.   
These regulations for eliminating of CO2 have changed the market mechanism and 
activities of corporations. Moreover, the recognition and reaction of business leaders and 
consumers are friendly turning into voluntary. For instance, CSR (Corporation Social 
Responsibility) 40  and SRI (Social Responsibility Investment) 41  are becoming globalised 
concepts and most multinational firms try to induce the sustainability practices to make 
stakeholders’ satisfaction and give a positive signal to the market; the stakeholder theory 
(Freeman 1983; Frooman 1999). Consumers and investors also show the confidence for the 
corporation’s social responsible activities in the market: the legitimation theory (Campbell, 
Craven et al. 2003; Lopez, Garcia et al. 2007).  
For the firms’ environmentalism behaviors, this chapter considers two major concepts. 
One is an environmental behavior of firms which can be represented by Carbon Discloser 
Project (CDP) activity. The other one is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) which 
shows firms’ sustainable activities. The reason why we adopt both of these concepts 
simultaneously is that there are a lot of initiatives in the market as a term of firm’s strategies. 
From this, we choose major two activities of firms’ environmentalism strategies then we try 
                                               
40
 CSR is "A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis." European Commission, 2011. 
41
 Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) integrates - apart from the financial criteria - social, environmental and/or ethical 
criteria into the processes of analysis, selection, and choice of investment. “The environmental, social and governance stakes 
(ESG) may affect the performance of investment portfolios in different degrees according to the company, economic sectors, 
regions, classes of assets and the term of investment". VIGEO Group, 2011. 
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to find the answer of theses research questions: i) What is the relation between voluntary 
activities and performance? ii) Do firm’s voluntary activities in environmental and 
sustainable implementations induce innovation? iii) How is the nature of innovation 
depending on voluntary types of firm? iv) What is the link between firm characteristics and 
innovation according to voluntary types?  
Until recently, lots of studies have showed the impact of CSR and SRI on the 
performance in the sustainable development aspect. However, there are still conversely 
debates on the correlations between voluntary activities and performances as well as their 
results have a number of limitations statically. Furthermore, they just focus on the relation 
between financial performances and responsible activities and estimate the only short-term 
effect. (Akrich, Callon et al. 2002; Martin Curran and Moran 2007) examines whether 
corporate financial performance is affected by public endorsement of environmental and 
social performance. The results show a trend towards positive and negative announcements 
having the expected effects on daily returns. However, these movements are not significant 
and the data do not suggest that a firm’s presence on the index brings it any significant 
financial return for signaling its CSR. (Lopez, Garcia et al. 2007) examine whether business 
performance is affected by the adoption of practices under the term CSR. They show a short-
term negative impact on the performance produced. (Consolandi, Jaiswal-Dale et al. 2009) 
examines whether these incentives have been so far detectable with particular reference to the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Stoxx Index (DJSSI). They analyze the performance of the DJSSI 
over the period 2001–2006 by comparing to that of the Surrogate Complementary Index 
(SCI42). The result suggests that the evaluation of the CSR performance of a firm is a 
significant criterion for asset allocation activities.  
In particular, environmental and sustainable implementations have a long-term impact 
on the performance and innovation of firms. The adoption or quotation of sustainable 
standard and environmental implementations has latent effect and it is difficult to find the 
causality between adoption and performance. Nevertheless, most studies only consider the 
existence of significant impact for performance. Innovation is the priority of firms as well as 
performance because it is also sustainable factor for firms’ growth and survival. Therefore, 
                                               
42
 Consolandi, Jaiswal-Dale et al. (2009), p185: “The Surrogate Complementary Index (SCI) is a new benchmark that 
includes only the components of the DJ Stoxx 600 that do not belong to the ethical index to evaluate more correctly the size 
of possible divergent performances.” 
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we propose the each influence of environmental and sustainable behaviors on the innovation 
activities and performance of firms. Specifically, we divide 806 firms into three groups 
according to the survey response of Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Global 500 and the 
firm list of Dow Jones Sustainable Index (DJSI)43 between 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
Fig 3-1 The schematic diagram of the research framework 
 
According to the research framework in Fig 3-1, this chapter investigates the difference 
and tendency of performance and innovation activities for each categorized firm groups. The 
empirical analysis suggests the solution of the above questions based on the results of sample 
selection methodology. Another contribution of this study is to categorize the establishing 
criteria of environmental issues and to propose an empirical model of the links between the 
issues and innovation activities. In particular, we consider the concept of environmental and 
sustainable implementations simultaneously. This is expected to suggest the understanding 
for the effect of environmental and sustainable issues on the innovation and performance of 
                                               
43
 The Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) comprises the companies with the best CSR practices in their respective 
industries. The evaluation is based on the cooperation of Dow Jones Indexes, STOXX Limited and SAM. 
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firms and market.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The section 3.2 briefly categorizes the concept of 
environmental, sustainable issues and innovations, and then descries the innovation relevant 
studies. Section 3.3 explains data, variables and methodology with the state of the empirical 
studies between innovation and environmental and sustainable issues. The 3.4 section 
presents the results and analysis of the empirical models. Finally, we conclude and discuss 
the policy implications of the analysis. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
There are two major theories which enhance the momentums of the environmental and 
sustainable issues. According to the first theory, the legitimation theory, it is necessary to 
achieve society’s confidence for the survival of firms (Deegan 2002). The second one, the 
stakeholder theory indicates that companies should only respond to shareholders’ interests, 
their only social responsibility being the maximization of company value. From this 
perspective, any positive social act undertaken by the firm is associated with costs that would 
reduce profit and prejudice shareholders. It would not, therefore, be opportune (Friedman 
1970).  
 
3.2.1 Environmental and sustainable behaviors of firms 
  
There are contemporary debates on the concepts and definitions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Sustainability (CS) since the beginning of explosive 
growth in the demand for social development. Based on historical perspectives with using the 
philosophical analyses, (Van Marrewijk 2003) provides an review for the debates of concepts 
and suggests a definition like that “CS(R) should be abandoned, accepting various and more 
specific definitions matching the development, awareness and ambition levels of 
organizations”. Based on the corporate governance, sustainable development, and stakeholder 
theory literature, (Ricart, Rodriguez et al. 2005) investigate how corporate governance 
systems integrate sustainable development with other factors. They analyze the governance 
systems of the 18 corporations that are leading the market sectors considered by the Dow 
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Jones Sustainability World Index and suggest a sustainable corporate governance model. 
With a theoretical analysis for the previous studies, (Konrad, Steurer et al. 2006) empirically 
find that the adoption and implementation of SD can be achieved through stakeholder 
relations management (SRM) on the firm level. By using specific 14 issues of SD they 
explain solutions of multinational corporations (MNCs) to particular issues of SD and roles 
of particular stakeholders. Also, they conclude that SRM boosts SD but cannot act as a 
government regulation.   
For the heterogeneity between practices and performance of sustainable behaviors, 
(Gjolberg 2009) develops two indexes to measure the CSR practices and CSR performance in 
20 OECD countries. The two indexes find that there are significant differences between the 
20 countries, indicating a need to address the impact of domestic structures on CSR. 
Recently, (Sandberg, Juravle et al. 2009) discuss the issue of the heterogeneity of SRI using 
four features such as terminological, definitional, strategic and practical features. Then, they 
suggest that accounting for the heterogeneity is necessary for SRI implementations because 
there are cultural and ideological differences between different regions and distinctions in 
values, norms and ideology between various SRI stakeholders. (Cerin and Dobers 2001) 
investigate the structure and transparency of the DJSGI by comparing with the DJGI. They 
show that in general the DJSGI emphasize the technical sector more than the DJGI. (Martin 
Curran and Moran 2007) also examines whether corporate performance is affected by public 
endorsement of environmental and social performance. With the FTSE4Good UK Index as a 
proxy measure for good (poor) CRS, their results show a trend towards positive and negative 
announcements having the expected effects on daily returns.  
Concerning with firms’ environmental behavior, (Okereke 2007) finds the motivations, 
drivers and barriers to carbon management, using the FTSE 100 companies. Motivations of 
environmental management are based on those factors that closely relate to profit and 
comparative advantage while drivers are regarded to be the factors that are related with wider 
social pressures and environmental issues. With UK study, this study presents five 
motivations and five drivers for corporate environmental activity on climate change. (Luo, 
Lan et al. 2010) also investigate how the Global 500 companies prepare to the challenge of 
climate change with carbon disclosure strategy. The research motivation is increasing social 
interesting of studies that investigates the role of large firms in carbon disclosure 
responsibility and practices. With considering the impact of economic, regulatory, social and 
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financial market factors on voluntary motivation of Global 500, they find that the financial 
factors are significantly related with the voluntary environmental behaviors. It means that a 
company which faces direct economic consequence is more easily to disclose carbon 
associated information. They also provide reason of why a large proportion of Global 500 
firms refuse to disclose carbon information. The result shows the information demands of 
investors for environmental management are not determined by the carbon disclosure 
decision of companies.  
As verified in previous studies, environmental and sustainable issues are affected by 
many internal and external factors of firms. That is, the firms’ behavior is varied depending 
on the industry sectors, governance of corporation, and social pressures. Hence, with 
reflecting of such factors more studies on the sustainable, environmental behavior and 
innovation of firms are required. This can offer solution to which value for which 
organization. 
 
3.2.2 Innovation, environmental and sustainable issues  
 
There are several dimensions of market environments and several types of invest 
activities such as radical or incremental, explore or explicate investments. From this, the 
consideration and detailed analysis for the innovative activities of firms are needed. Because 
of the heterogeneity of firms’ investment, it is necessary to take into account the composition 
and the level of competition in market (Mansfield 1981). In managerial processes of firms’ 
activities, the relation and balance between the exploration of new possibilities and the 
exploitation of old certainties are primary factors in survival and prosperity (March 1991). 
Based on these ideas, we premise that explorative investment if the one which intend to 
induce and prompt firms’ innovation because it has more uncertainty for future and there is 
less guarantee for the return of this investment. So explorative investment is rather innovative 
investment than exploitative investment. (Holmqvist 2004) also investigates the dynamics of 
exploitation and exploration in intra- and inter-organizational learning processes as 
fundamental characteristics of modem organizations. In sustainable research areas, (Halme 
and Laurila 2009) recently center up considering the relation between potential impact of CR 
Integration and CR Innovation. In their analysis, CR integration is regarded as conducting 
existing business operations more responsibly and CR innovation is done as developing new 
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business models to solve social and environmental problems. Based on these concepts, they 
apply investment for new possibilities and old certainties to the change in firms’ strategies.        
Considering the relationships among environmental, sustainable behaviors and 
investments of firms is a well-studied area for firms and is one of the key elements for 
sustainable development. However, the exact meaning of innovation in sustainable and 
environmental context is not clearly explained yet (Blowfield, Visser et al. 2007). For the 
relation between these resources management and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), 
(Zwetsloot 2003) points out the presence of a great potential for innovating business practices 
positively influencing People, Planet and Profit. On the other hands, the existing literature has 
focused mostly on regulated emissions data and few studies have included climate change in 
this debate. (Delmas and Nairn-Birch 2011) investigates the profitability of environmental 
initiatives within the context of supply chain management with empirical analysis which is 
based on a novel longitudinal database including over 1100 US firms between 2004 and 
2008.  
Empirically, (Borger and Kruglianskas 2006) study the adoption of the CSR strategy and 
innovation by Brazilian enterprises. They analyze how what factors related with the CSR is 
associated with the technological innovation and the environmental performance of firms. 
They adopt the case study approach, where three enterprises are considered. As a conclusion 
of the research, they suggest significant evidences of a strong relationship between the 
adoption of a CSR strategy by the firm and an effective environmental and innovative 
performance. (Frondel, Horbach et al. 2008) hypothesize that environmental management 
systems (EMSs) may increase environmental innovation performance of firms. This 
hypothesis involves the relevant incentives for a firm's voluntary adoption of an EMS and its 
environmental innovation behavior. By using a choice model for German manufacturing, 
they find the evidence between the decision on innovation activities and the decision on EMS 
adoption. (Hepburn 2010) also examines the evidence on induced innovation and the 
implications for the environmental policy with the conceptual basis and empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of climate technology policies.  
In the present chapter, we attempt to demonstrate the effect the environmental and 
sustainable behaviors on the innovation and performance of firms. This chapter offers a more 
reflexive and structured approach for more broadly considering innovation by using a 
framework that distinguishes the factors of exploration and exploitation innovations from the 
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different types of firms’ environmental and sustainable behaviors.  
3.3 Empirical Analysis   
 
3.3.1 Data and variables 
  
To consider both environmental and sustainable behaviors of firms, this study uses two 
data sources between 2008 and 2009. First, the Global 500 of CDP (Carbon Discloser 
Project) is referred to as the environmental behaviors. The Global 500 of CDP (Carbon 
Discloser Project) is collected by the 500 largest corporations in FTSE Global Equity Index 
Series and the market capitalization of these companies was 15.5 trillion dollars in 200944.  
The other one is the DJSI (Dow Jones Sustainable Index) which shows the trend and 
connection between financial performance and investment of sustainable companies45. Since 
it is necessary to consider both the concepts simultaneously for global companies, there exist 
only two years period in our data set. Using the list of DJSI and CDP, this study makes a new 
list and matches it with financial data of Thomson DataStream46.  
Finally, we obtain unbalanced panel data from 1346 observations of 806 firms with 10 
FTSE sectors47. But we drop 314 firms which are involved in financial FTSE sector so we 
use 1032 observations. Fig 3-2 presents the observations’ distribution according to the DJSI 
and CDP lists. As shown in the figure, 253 firms are identified in both the DJSI and CDP 
lists. For only CDP firms, there are 507 observations and only DJSI observation has 272 
numbers. Table 3-1 demonstrates the definition, sources, and descriptive statistics of the 
variable used in the analysis.  
 
                                               
44
 CDP Global 500 Report (2009), p. 11: “CDP continues to be the global leader firms in data that records the business 
response to climate change. The depth and standard of responses from the world’s largest companies to the latest CDP 
questionnaire is a measure of shareholder and corporate engagement on the issue of climate change. The responses 
demonstrate the many positive steps that have been taken by Global 500 companies over the past year. Climate change is 
becoming an increasingly important issue for the majority of large businesses and companies are keen to share information 
on their carbon performance and climate risks and opportunities with investors and other stakeholders.” 
45
 The Dow Jones Sustainability Index comprises the companies with the best CSR practices in their respective industries. 
The evaluation is based on the cooperation of Dow Jones Indexes, STOXX Limited and SAM. 
46
 This database covers 51,900 active global companies and offers the broadest company coverage, representing 99% of the 
global market capitalization. http://www.thomsonreuters.com (2010) 
47
 Utilities, Telecommunication Services, Materials, Information Technology, Industrials, Health Care, Financials, Energy, 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples 
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       Fig 3-2 The distribution of observations according to the lists of CDP and DJSI 
 
As dependent variables of final model, this study use three variables including log value 
of sales (lsales), log value of capital expenditure (lcapex), and log value of research and 
development expenditure (lrnd). Using logarithms, we can interpret the results of respective 
coefficients as elasticity. The characteristics of firms such as asset per shares 
(lassetpershare), revenue (lrevenue), market value (lmv), age (lage), and size (lemployee) are 
considered as well as the year dummies (d_2008 and d_2009) and dummies of DJSI or CDP 
or Both of them. The time period effect variables can capture macroeconomic shocks that 
affect all firms in the analysis. For instance, the Subprime Mortgage Problem in 2008, which 
affected the investments in all industry, can be accounted for by yearly dummies. 
Regarding the industry sectors, we divide them into 10 sectors according to FTSE 
(Financial Times Stock Exchange) industry categories as shown in table 3-A in appendixes. 
To compare environmental and sustainable indices, we drop financial industrial sectors 
because most of financial firms do not have capital or R&D expenditure. Afterward, we make 
polluting dummy variable to discriminate between polluting industry and non-polluting 
industry based on the evidence of (Clarkson, Li et al. 2010).48 Because considering firm’s 
specific industry regulation prevents the bias of the normalization for entire industry sectors. 
                                               
48
 The study’s divide sample data into four groups such as the Pulp & Paper (SIC = 26), Chemical (SIC = 28), Oil & Gas 
(SIC = 29), and Metals & Mining (SIC = 33) sectors. They focused on these four industries given the prior evidence in the 
literature that these are the most polluting in the US (Clarkson et al., 2008).  
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Table 3-1 Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
 
     Variable Definition Sources Obs Mean St.D Min Max 
adoption Dummy value=0 if firms are involved in only CDP group,  
Dummy value=1 if firms are involved in only DJSI group,  
Dummy value=2 if firms are involved in both CDP and DJSI group  
 
Computed 
 
1032 
 
0.75 
 
0.82 
 
0 
 
2 
cdp Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in CDP Lists, otherwise = 0 CDP 1032 0.74 0.44 0 1 
djsi Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in DJSI Lists, otherwise = 0 DJSI 1032 0.51 0.50 0 1 
both Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in DJSI and CDP Lists, otherwise = 0 DJSI & CDP 1032 0.25 0.43 0 1 
lcapex Log value of Capital Expenditures (US$) Thomson DB 713 13.85 1.51 6.70 17.31 
lrnd Log value of Research and Development Expenditure (US$) Thomson DB 529 12.64 2.03 4.03 16.99 
lrevenue Log value of Revenues (US$) Thomson DB 687 16.58 1.77 2.21 20.03 
lemployee Log value of Employees (Both full and part time employees of the company) Thomson DB 865 10.49 1.38 1.10 14.56 
lage Log value of (2010 - established year)  Thomson DB 1032 4.20 0.77 1.39 7.61 
lassetpershare Log value of Asset per Shares  Thomson DB 698 2.63 1.97 -3.51 18.50 
lmv Log value of Market Value (US$) Thomson DB 713 9.91 1.22 2.52 14.72 
developed Dummy value=1 if the country is involved in OECD countries OECD 1032 0.90 0.30 0 1 
d_2008 Year dummy of 2008 Computed 1032 0.50 0.50 0 1 
d_2009 Year dummy of 2009 Computed 1032 0.50 0.50 0 1 
polluting Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in Utilities, Materials, Industrials, 
Energy sectors, otherwise = 049 
FTSE 1032 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Health Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in Health Care sector, otherwise = 0 FTSE 1032 0.09 0.28 0 1 
ITcom Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in IT and Telecom sectors, otherwise = 0 FTSE 1032 0.15 0.36 0 1 
service Dummy value=1 if the firm is involved in CD and CS sectors, otherwise = 0 FTSE 1032 0.24 0.43 0 1 
                                               
49
 This Polluting Industry sectors are based on the polluting industry division of Clarkson, P. M., Y. Li, et al. (2010).  
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For the country distribution in our dataset, there are initially 39 countries and the 
deviation of firms is shown in table 3-B in appendixes. Except for the developed country 
dummy (developed), we don’t take into account specific country dummies because most of 
firms are listed in the US or EU stock markets and they are affected by the global general 
shock, standard and regulations.  
   
 
3.3.2 Model 
 
In order to control the limitation of dataset, this chapter employs an integrated model 
which incorporates two equations, i.e., adoption (or Choice or Quotation) equation of 
environmental or sustainable behaviors and output equation measured by sales, R&D 
investment, and CAPEX.   
First, in the adoption model, we estimate a multinomial logit (MNL) model, examining 
the drivers for the adoption (or Choice or Quotation) of CDP or DJSI. In this study, firms 
have three kinds of alternatives for their adoption (or Choice or Quotation) of environmental 
and sustainable behaviors: only for CDP (CDP), only for DJSI (DJSI), joint adoption of CDP 
and DJSI (BOTH). The adoption (or Choice or Quotation) probabilities that firm n selects 
alternative i among three options are derived as follows (Train, 2003). 
 
{ }
'
'
( ) ( )
, , ,
ni
nj
x
ni ni ni nj nj x
j
eProb Adoption Prob V V i j
e
where i j CDP DJSI BOTH
β
βε ε= + > + ∀ ≠ =
∈
∑
            (3-1) 
 
Representative preference of firm for adoption choice (i) is usually specified to be linear 
in a parameter, 'ni niV xβ= , where nix  is a vector of observed variables related to adoption i , 
firms’ activities, strategies and characteristics; niε  is a disturbance following type I extreme 
value distribution ,which results in a simple and elegant form of choice probability, a closed 
form although it exhibits restrictive substitution patterns due to the “Independence from 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)". In this analysis, we have concerns with the factors that affect 
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the adoption (or Choice or Quotation) of environmental and sustainable activities, especially 
to figure out which industry sectors or firms are likely to take part in DJSI or CDP behavior. 
Next, we set up the output equation to analyze the effects of DJSI or CDP adoptions and 
the other factors on the firm’s output such as performance and innovation.     
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where ( )ntx is a vector of the firm n’s characteristics and control dummies affecting 
performance. CDPntsc or 
BOTH
ntsc are the estimated coefficients of dummy variable which might 
be biased due to existence of selectivity bias. That is, the unobserved characteristics of firms 
can affect the adoption of environmental or sustainable behaviors and also have an impact on 
the output of the firms, which means that there would be correlations between the error terms 
of adoption and the output equation. If there is not a control term in the correlations, a simple 
OLS (ordinary least square) regression leads to the specification error of an omitted variable. 
Therefore, the variable should be controlled through a methodology that corrects the 
selectivity bias (Greene 2003). The parameter Dummy (CDP or DJSI or Both) represent the 
effect of firms’ adoptions on the performance and itη  denotes a distribution following normal 
distribution.    
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3.4 Results and Analysis 
 
There are two parts in our estimations according to the firms’ group of environmental 
and sustainable activities such as only CDP group, only DJSI group and Both group. First, we 
show the results of sustainable (DJSI) and environmental (CDP) adoptions (or Choice or 
Quotation)  and output models with basement estimation of Both adoption in Table 3-2. This 
means that the each coefficient represents the distance from the frontier behavior because we 
premise the Both adoption (or Choice or Quotation) is the firm’s most sustainable and 
environmental oriented behaviors.   
There are three different models according to the industrial sectors of the adoption 
equation (3-1) including firm characteristics. The result of consists of two parts, where the 
first six rows indicate the effect of firm’s characteristics on CDP adoption as environmental 
behavior while the below parts show the impact on DJSI adoption (or Choice or Quotation). 
 
Table 3-2 The results for the adoption of CDP and DJSI groups 
 Y= Adoptions All Industry (1) Polluting Industry (2a) Non-Polluting Industry (2b) Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E 
 Y= CDP   
lrevenue -0.262c 0.147 -0.243 0.212 -0.489b 0.222 
lemployee 0.039 0.098 -0.056 0.161 0.181 0.126 
lage -0.565a 0.146 -0.210 0.221 -0.844a 0.210 
lassetpershare 0.142c 0.080 -0.022 0.105 0.322a 0.118 
lmv -0.312b 0.145 -0.024 0.220 -0.586a 0.211 
_cons 9.906a 1.788 6.538a 2.268 15.863a 3.031 
 Y= DJSI   
lrevenue -0.502a 0.184 -0.626b 0.275 -0.483c 0.274 
lemployee 0.266c 0.155 0.117 0.238 0.620a 0.235 
lage -0.327 0.208 -0.200 0.288 -0.325 0.336 
lassetpershare 0.069 0.105 -0.321b 0.163 0.508a 0.158 
lmv -2.406a 0.246 -1.948a 0.337 -3.062a 0.395 
_cons 29.741a 2.816 29.355a 3.800 31.080a 4.391 
Number of obs. 626 312 314 
LR chi2(10) 322.98 152.88 197.08 
Prob. > chi2   0 0 0 
Log likelihood -488.800 -253.424 -220.504 
Pseudo R2  0.248 0.232 0.309 
Note: There are three choices for the sustainable and environmental behaviors: 0 is given in the case with Both
adoption, 1 for the adoption of CDP, 2 for the adoption of DJSI. In the analysis, 1 and 2 were compared with 0, 
which is regarded as a base outcome Both adoption=0. * a= p<0.01, b= p<0.05, c= p<0.1  
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 The first part of result (1) considers all industry sectors and the part 2  two parts (2a) and 
(2b) whether the firm is involving in polluting industry or not. Because there are some 
industries which have mandatory environmental regulation to produce, we try to estimate the 
adoption (or Choice or Quotation) of sustainable and environmental behaviors with specific 
consideration of industry. This Polluting Industry sectors are based on the polluting industry 
division of (Clarkson, Li et al. 2010).  
Using the LR test (Log Likelihood Test), we compare the log likelihoods of the two 
models and tests whether this difference is statistically significant. If the difference is 
statically significant, then the considering polluting industry can be said to fit the data 
significantly better than without considering polluting industry model.50 The test statistic is 
65.84, and that the associated p-value is very low (less than 0.001). This results show that 
dividing polluting group has a statistically significant improvement in model fit.   
This study drop financial sectors and compare polluting and non-polluting industries. 
Compared with Both adoption as top frontiers, the results (generally most values of 
coefficients might be negative) can be explained that how they are closed to Both adoption 
(Zero level). In the non-polluting industry, the group of DJSI have more revenue (lrevenue: -
0,483c > -0,489b ) and higher market value (lmv: -3,062a > -0,586a) than CDP groups’ 
firms. More bigger size of firm (lemployee: 0,620a) is more adopt DJSI and fewer assets per 
share (lassetpershare: 0,322a <0,508a) is likely to be CDP group than DJSI group. For 
polluting industry, the only DJSIP group is significantly connected with financial status than 
CDP group.  When we compare the assert per share between pollution and non-polluting 
industry, the effect lassetpershare shows the opposite effect on the choice of DJSI. 
Regarding the result of the output equations from (3-2) to (3-5) for polluting industry 
shown in Table 3-3, there are three robust least squares (OLS) results of each dependent 
variables are presented such as lsales, lcapex and lrnd. Note that firms in the other industry 
sectors expect polluting industries are not included in this analysis. First of all, most of the 
selectivity correction variable (sc1, sc2) for DJSI, CDP adoption (or Choice or Quotation) has 
significant effect indicating that we need to treat sample selection problem in estimation, 
which justifies the use of DMF (Dubin Macfadden) model. So, main interpretation and 
                                               
50
 The LR test statistic is calculated like this, 2ln( (2 ) / (2 ) )Polluting Industry Non Polluting IndustryLR L a L b −= − . 
2 2(2) 65.84,( 5.047 15)Prob eχ χ= > = −   
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conclusion are made based on the results of DMF model. 
For the effects of firms characteristics, the firms’ market value (lmv) is found to be not 
only positive but also significant for all models. The market value (lmv) has a positive 
correlation with firms’ performance and innovation activities, which implies that in the case 
of firms’ sustainable or environmental behaviors the current their market values can be the 
proxy for their adoption or quotation. Younger firms have more investment in CAPEX 
investment but more older firms shows higher effect on the performance.  
The firms of developed countries show that they are concentrating more positively on 
R&D investment (2.157a) and financial performance (0.483a) than non-developed as well as 
they are less care about capex (exploitative) investment (-0.505a).  
 
Table 3-3 The results of the output model for polluting industrial firms 
Y= 
(1) lsales (2) lcapex (3) lrnd 
Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E 
lsales 
  
0.951a 0.080 0.337 0.307 
lemployee 0.440a 0.061 -0.061 0.055 0.751a 0.109 
lage 0.093b 0.038 -0.113c 0.062 0.057 0.150 
lrevenue 0.221b 0.100 -0.108a 0.026 -0.479 0.338 
lmv 0.454a 0.072 0.212a 0.080 0.818a 0.168 
developed 0.483a 0.129 -0.505a 0.147 2.157a 0.439 
year=2009 0.244a 0.057 0.148c 0.083 0.248 0.177 
CDP Group 2.930a 0.625 -0.608 0.732 -3.787b 1.664 
DJSI Group 3.197a 0.577 -0.975 0.676 -2.602c 1.523 
Both Group -3.382a 0.574 1.311b 0.648 2.055 1.414 
sc1 -0.133a 0.031 0.120a 0.037 -0.284a 0.082 
sc2 0.073 0.071 -0.230b 0.109 0.622c 0.356 
Obs. 486 485 373 
R-squared      0.999 0.997 0.987 
Root MSE  0.574 0.797 1.468 
  
For the R&D investment, more bigger size firms are more focus on the R&D investment 
(0.751a) but there is no significant effect on CAPEX. On the other hand, Capex is more 
related with the firms’ financial status. For instance, more young firms (-0.113c) and having 
less revenue firms (-0.108a) have negative relation with capital expenditure. But, when the 
firms have more sales (0.951a) and higher market value (0.212a) then the firm try to focus on 
CAPEX in polluting industry.  
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Also, the result of the individual impact of sustainable or environmental or both  
behavior (CDP or DJSI or Both) on firms’ output shows that the individual effects of 
environmental and sustainable behavior have negative relation with firms’ R&D (explorative) 
investment (-3.787b, -2.602c) but both adoption has positive coefficient although it is 
insignificant.  
On the other hands, individual adoptions have positive effects (2.930a, 3.197a) and both 
adoption (-3.382a) shows negative effects on sales. This implies the firm which cares 
individual environmental or sustainable behaviors focuses on financial performance than both 
considering firms. Both considering firms are more taking care investment (See. the effect of 
both adoption for capex: 1.311b) than financial performance.  
 Secondly, the results of the output model for non-polluting industrial firms are 
presented in Table 3-4. The effect of specific industry sectors show that Health industry firms 
are more pay attention on the explorative investment (2.007a) than financial performance (-
0.359a) and exploitative (-0.470a) investment. The telecom sectors also show significantly 
positive relation with R&D investment (0.959a). 
In addition, we identify that the influence of firm characteristic variables on firms’ 
performance and innovation is broadly varied depending on each condition. Higher market 
value of firms lead to more investments and financial performance. But the effect of firms’ 
age and size effect on each outputs are no significant or ambiguous.  
The result of the individual adoptions shows that the individual effects of environmental 
and sustainable behavior have positive influence on the performance (3.117a, 3.167a) but 
both adoption has negative coefficient (-3.255a). On the contrary, individual adoptions have 
positive effects on both (1.787b) but negative effect on each CDP and DJSI adoption (-1.397c, 
-1.405c). This means the firm which cares individual environmental or sustainable behaviors 
focuses on financial performance than both considering firms. Both considering firms are 
more taking care investment (See. the effect of both adoption for capex: 1.787b) than 
financial performance. For the explorative investment, there is no significant relation between 
output and adoptions. Namely, there is no link between decision on investments and 
performances.   
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Table 3-4 The results of the output model for non-polluting industrial firms 
Y= 
(1) lsales (2) lcapex (3) lrnd 
Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E Coeff. Std.E 
lsales 
  
1.012a 0.082 0.822c 0.425 
lemployee 0.163a 0.063 -0.082 0.056 0.932a 0.110 
lage 0.031 0.032 -0.049 0.067 -0.028 0.151 
lrevenue 0.553a 0.142 -0.226a 0.029 -0.941b 0.469 
lmv 0.225b 0.088 0.349a 0.074 0.290b 0.116 
developed 0.339a 0.122 -0.445b 0.187 1.886a 0.530 
year=2009 0.192a 0.051 0.164b 0.083 -0.048 0.174 
Health -0.359a 0.125 -0.470a 0.119 2.007a 0.256 
ITcom -0.016 0.067 -0.232 0.171 0.959a 0.315 
service -0.104 0.087 -0.649a 0.121 -0.455 0.340 
CDP Group 3.117a 1.115 -1.397c 0.823 -0.064 1.352 
DJSI Group 3.167a 1.082 -1.405c 0.734 0.227 1.260 
Both Group -3.255a 1.112 1.787b 0.741 -0.194 1.305 
sc1 0.089 0.067 -0.175 0.108 0.181 0.298 
sc2 0.130 0.155 -0.270 0.192 -0.109 0.347 
Obs. 405 404 333 
R-squared      0.999 0.997 0.989 
Root MSE  0.458 0.732 1.352 
   
In sum, there are some findings in our results for the adoption and output models. First 
of all, the individual groups (CDP or DJSI) more concentrates on the performance than both 
considering group for both pollution and non-polluting industries. These firms do prefer 
performance to investments. And there are some difference type of firms’ investment strategy 
according to the industries. That is, the individual groups have negative effects on the 
investment of new possibility (R&D) in polluting groups and the investment of maintains 
(CAPEX) in non-polluting industry. On the other hands, the both group in polluting industry 
is focusing on explorative investment (R&D) and the both group in non-polluting group is 
prefer to invest in exploitative investment (CAPEX). Secondly, it is necessary to consider 
specific industry sectors and firm characteristics because there exists lots of heterogeneity 
according to them. Nevertheless, we can find that there is more explorative friendly 
investment in rather Health and ITcom industries than others.     
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3.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
Environmental and sustainable implementations have a long-term impact on the 
performance and innovation of firms. The adoption (or Choice or Quotation) of sustainable 
standard and environmental implementations has rather long-term effect and it is difficult to 
find the significant causality between the adoption and performance. Moreover, innovation is 
also the crucial factor of firms as well as performance because it is another core sustainable 
factor for firm’s growth and survival in future. Therefore, fostering innovation is the 
important element of policies towards sustainable development (Nill and Kemp 2009). From 
these, this chapter identify the relation between environmental, sustainable implementations 
and innovative activities based on the results of empirical analysis. Also, this study assumes 
that investment is the preparation of tomorrow’s profits not only considering investments in 
technology level and in R&D, but also dealing with sustainability to human, social, 
environmental, technical and economic investments. Categorizing the established 
environmental and sustainable issues and proposing an empirical model of the links between 
these issues and innovation activities are another contribution of this study. In particular, we 
consider the concept of environmental and sustainable implementations simultaneously, 
which provides the understanding on the effect of environmental and sustainable issues on 
the innovation and performance of firms and market.  
Based on the results of empirical estimations, we can suggest the solution to research 
questions represented in the above parts, and then make policy implication for sustainable 
development. First, we can see the overall positive relation between the voluntary behaviors 
and firms’ performance which are measured by sales of firms. Second, we find that the 
synchronous adoption of both behaviors induces investments than others. In detail, they have 
different type of investment activities. The both group in polluting industry is more focusing 
on explorative investment (R&D) and the both group in non-polluting group is prefer to 
invest in exploitative investment (CAPEX). (Knoepfel 2001) also emphasizes that investors 
are attracted to new investment style which promises to create long-term shareholder value 
by embracing opportunities and managing risks from ongoing economic, environmental and 
social developments. Therefore, considering environmental and sustainable implementations 
simultaneously is important to focus on future challenges and is necessary to consider various 
factors including quality of management, corporate governance structures, reputational risks, 
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human capital management, stakeholder relations, and corporate social responsibility. Third, 
the polluting industries are more emphasize on long-term investment than short-term one. 
Because there are more considerations, negotiators, expectations for sustainable and 
environmental behaviors for polluting industry, the long-term oriented innovation strategies 
and activities are important to firms’ business of this industry than non-polluting. (Chen, Lai 
et al. 2006) also explore whether the performance of the green innovation brings positive 
effect to the competitive advantage in some industry. They find that the performances of 
innovation and process innovation are positively correlated to the corporate competitive 
advantage. Therefore, the investment in innovation and consideration of the activities in 
innovations are necessary for sustainable development. Lastly, the effect of firms’ 
characteristics on performance and innovation can be changed according to their 
heterogeneity.   
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Chapter 4. Corporation Social Responsibility Driven Innovation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Corporation social responsibility (CSR)51 and shareholder value oriented objectives lead 
to management strategies that have been very noticeable and successful for every business 
area and size. As a consequence of such behaviors of firms, relevant activities have offered a 
powerful and creative stepping-stone for sustainable values and development (Friedman 
1967; Carroll 1979; Garriga and Melé 2004; Cetindamar and Husoy 2007; Jamali 2008; 
Gelbmann 2010).  
The focus on social responsibility and shareholder value of companies is based on the 
shareholder theory that companies should only respond to shareholders’ interests and their 
only social responsibility is to maximize companies’ values (Freeman 1984). This activity 
guarantees achieving society’s confidence for the survival of firms. Based on these 
backgrounds, the real interest of companies is changed (Jamali 2008).  
In other words, firms consider CSR and Socially Responsible Investment (CRI)52 for 
shareholders as important as profit, which is the only objective of a company. Until recently, 
most studies have shown the impact of CSR and SRI on performance in the sustainable 
development aspect, mainly social and environmental. However, there are lots of debates on 
the correlations between management strategies and financial performances, and also the 
resulting analyses have limitations statistically (Murray and Vogel 1997; Stigson 2002; 
González and Martinez 2004; Fassin 2005; O'Riordan and Fairbrass 2008).  
On the other hand, sustainable innovation (or eco-innovation) has been widely defined as 
a process of creating new ideas, behavior, products and processes that contribute to a 
reduction in environmental burdens or to ecologically specified sustainability targets 
(Rennings 2000). Innovation is one of firms’ primary concerns along with their performance.  
 
                                               
51
 CSR is "A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis." European Commission, 2010 
52
 Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) integrates - apart from the financial criteria - social, environmental and/or ethical 
criteria into the processes of analysis, selection, and choice of investment. “The environmental, social and governance stakes 
(ESG) may affect the performance of investment portfolios in different degrees according to the company, economic sectors, 
regions, classes of assets and the term of investment". VIGEO Group, 2010 
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Furthermore, innovation is a sustainable engine for firm’s growth and survival (Porter and 
Linde 1995). Today CSR without considering innovation is no longer viable in the long term 
(Grayson, Rodriguez et al. 2008). This chapter investigates the influence of firms’ sustainable 
management on the innovation activities and performance of the firm.  
In addition, various theories demonstrate that voluntary activities such as ISO 14001 or 
ISO2600053 are not directly under the control of individuals, so environmental and social 
stewardship cannot directly induce firms’ participation (Castka and Balzarova 2008; Heras-
Saizarbitoria, Molina-Azorín et al. 2011). However, it is possible for consumers with “Social 
Responsibility” preferences to induce the production of social-friendly activities through the 
marketplace. If there is sufficient demand for CSR, firms can stand out through social 
responsible changes in production processes or product characteristics (Alberini and Segerson 
2002).  
For example, (Heras-Saizarbitoria, Molina-Azorín et al. 2011) try to find the relationship 
between ISO 14001 certification and financial performance with the purpose of emphasizing 
whether better performance is caused by the beneficial effects of ISO 14001 or caused by 
selection-effects where better performance induces accreditation. Using a multivariate panel 
data analysis, the results show that firms with a better than average performance have a 
greater tendency to pursue accreditation but there are no improvements in performance with 
certification. (Link and Naveh 2006) also shows that ISO 14001 helps firms to reduce the 
negative impact of their business activities on the environment as well as improving their 
business performance.  
By using the 619 multinational firms listed on the DJ STOXX 600 and MSCI World 
indices, this study introduces an empirical model according to their industry sectors, regions, 
and firm characteristics such as size and age. Based on the analysis, we identify the 
relationship between CSR and innovation activities of firms which can be an answer to 
research questions: (i) what drives CSR behavior of firms? (ii) What are the different effects 
of explorative investment (long-run return) and exploitative investment (short-run return) on 
the CSR behavior of firms?  
 
                                               
53
 ‘‘International Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility—ISO 26000’’ is established in 2005, the SR Working Group 
contains about 500 nominated experts from 99 ISO member countries and 33 liaison organizations, which represent 6 main 
stakeholder groups (Industry, Government, Consumer, Labor, Non-Governmental Organizations and Service, Support, 
Research and Others). Hence, ISO26000 is an international standard for SR in future. 
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We assume that innovative investment is to prepare tomorrow’s profits not only 
considering investments in technology and in R&D, but also dealing with sustainability to 
human, social, environmental, technical, and economic investments. In particular, this chapter 
advocates a new approach to incorporate sustainability with innovation strategies by taking 
into account voluntary sustainable activities not just for investors, but also for other 
shareholders including communities firms serve.  
The findings of this study could provide a comprehensive understanding on the effect of 
sustainable management strategies on the innovation and performance of firms. This chapter 
is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates the theoretical background of this study, while 
section 3 presents the model and data used in this study. Section 4 states the estimation 
results and discussion. Finally, section 5 sets out the main conclusions and implications. 
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  4.2 Theoretical Background 
  
4.2.1 Corporation social responsibility (CSR) 
 
The concept of the corporation social responsibilities (CSR) has been a topic of intense 
controversy and interest over the last three decades (Jamali 2008). In particular, the debates 
for the proliferation of different CSR conceptualizations are an outgrowth. In various ways, 
CSR terms have been defined from the narrow economic angle of filling up shareholders’ 
wealth (Friedman 1967)54 to a broader economic angle such like ethical and legal issues 
(Carroll 1979) including outstanding corporate citizenship (Hemphill 2004).  
These variations are based on differing fundamental assumptions about what CSR entails 
and where a stockholder of CSR is embedded. Until now, there exists a significant 
disagreement about the meaning of terms, and how, or why it needs to be implemented 
(Stigson 2002; Welford 2004). Although no formal definition of the CSR concept has been 
agreed upon, there are common definitions that have become rather well used. This chapter 
prefers the definition used by the European Commission's definition of CSR, i.e., "A concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis." (2010).  
Basically, the CSR is based on the concept of shareholder theory. Stakeholder, acting 
whether formally or not, individually or not, is a core factor of firm’s external environment 
that has a positive or negative effect on the organization (Murray and Vogel 1997). The main 
challenge for businesses is the task of identifying to whom they are responsible and how far 
that responsibility extends.  
There are several approaches which explain the voluntary CSR behavior of firms and the 
CSR field. Those fields present not only a landscape of theories but also a spreading of 
approaches, which are controversial, mixed and vague (Garriga and Melé 2004). There are 
four major classifications of CSR background theories and related approaches: (i) 
instrumental theories, in which the firm is regarded as merely an instrument for wealth 
creation, and the social activities of firms are only a means to accomplish economic outputs 
(Friedman 1970; Windsor 2001; Jensen 2002); (ii) political theories, which related with the 
                                               
54
 "There is one and only one social responsibility of business: to use its resources to engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud." 
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power of firms in society and a responsible use of their power in the political scheme (Davis 
1960; Davis 1967; Wood and Logsdon 2002); (iii) integrative theories, in which the firm 
pursues the satisfaction of social demands (Sethi 1975; Wartick and Mahon 1994; Mitchell, 
Agle et al. 1997; Mitchell, Agle et al. 1997) and (iv) ethical theories, based on firms’ ethical 
responsibilities to society (Freeman 1984; Gladwin, Kennelly et al. 1995; Mele 2002; Phillips 
2003). In sum, these four dimensions of CSR theories are concerned with profits, political 
performance, social demands and ethical values. Therefore, it is necessary to check the 
relationship between the business and society with the integrate view of four dimensions.  
Recently, the CSR is getting more consideration as a strategy for firms’ to follow. They 
focus on this to satisfy their shareholders and to present a positive image of the company to 
the market. Management strategies with shareholder value objectives have been remarkably 
successful for all sizes of businesses for the past fifty years (Grayson, Rodriguez et al. 2008). 
For example, a lot of literatures examine voluntary environmental management or compliant 
efforts of firms, defined as environmentally friendly actions with voluntary participation 
(Lyon and Maxwell 2004). Various theories support that policy or regulation gives incentives 
and opportunities to accomplish these objectives through voluntary environmental friendly 
management (Jones 2010).  
Theory and empirical evidence show the efficiency and cost advantages of voluntary 
action have a positive relation with numerous external or internal factors of corporation 
(Porter and Linde 1995; Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Khanna, Koss et al. 2007). From this, we 
try to clarify the relationship between these voluntary behaviors and the investment activities 
of firms according to their characteristics and industry sectors. After that, we will find which 
factors drive the CSR behavior and whether the CSR can prompt the innovative investments 
of firms or not.   
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relation between CSR and innovative investments. 
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4.2.2 CSR and innovation 
 
Voluntary social responsibility management has a potential role in the financial 
performance of firms. Many studies suggest that profitability is reduced by the higher 
production costs of environment related management (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996; Russo 
and Fouts 1997). A theoretical model proposes the links between environmental management 
and improved future financial performance, as proxy by stock market performance. The 
linkage to firm performance is empirically identified with financial event methodology and 
archival data of environmental and financial performance. Although a lot of studies find the 
linkage between financial performance and CSR concepts, most of debates regarding these 
correlations are not solved (Murray and Vogel 1997; Stigson 2002; González and Martinez 
2004; Fassin 2005; O'Riordan and Fairbrass 2008).  
While the relationship between the management strategy of corporations and social issues 
has a well-established academic background, the role of innovation in effecting that 
relationship has received relatively less attention (Pavelin and Porter 2008). However, 
sustainable innovation (or eco-innovation) has been widely and broadly defined as a process 
of creating new ideas, behavior, products and processes that make a reduction in 
environmental burdens or ecologically specified sustainability targets (Rennings 2000).  
In other words, innovation is one of firms’ primary concerns along with their 
performance. Recently, (Grayson, Rodriguez et al. 2008) suggest a integrated concept of 
corporate sustainability (S2AVE), which places an emphasis on innovation as the means to 
add value while considering the environment and society at large. Furthermore, innovation is 
a sustainable engine for firm’s growth and survival. (Labatt 1997) reports on the role of 
innovation in corporate responsiveness to environmental issues and (Pavelin and Porter 2008) 
also explore, given innovation, the impact factors of the probability that the innovation brings 
a reduction of environmental impacts, and the strength of this effect.  
(Vollebergh and Kemfert 2005) show that in order to transform the impacts of its business 
activities on society, a firm should appropriately adapt innovative production processes or 
product design. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) identify the impacts of environmental regulations on 
the innovative activities in specific industry, and show a significant positive relationship 
between compliance costs and R&D investments. (Klaassen, Miketa et al. 2005) also report 
on the positive influence of government support on the innovation for wind turbine farms in 
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Denmark, Germany and the U.K. 
For the study of the detailed innovation type, recently there are some papers. (Blättel-
Mink 1998) suggests that environmental innovations could contain the creation and 
introduction of new products (environmental technologies), new system and new market as 
well as very wider the introduction of ecological classifications in managerial strategies. 
These various types of improvement clearly induce a creative and thorough transformation of 
the innovation (radical/product innovation) rather than just replacement or 
incremental/process innovation.  
(Hellström 2007) analyses environmentally sustainable innovation (eco-innovation) from 
the perspective of existing theories of innovation, in order to investigate dominant structures 
of such innovations and current weaknesses of firms resources. They estimate the type and 
mode of innovations (radical or incremental & component or architectural) in terms of 
Schumpeterian. However, the result of empirical estimation to what extent such innovation 
actually takes place is not clarified with firm level data. This chapter investigates the 
influence of firms’ sustainable management on the innovation activities of firms. Indeed, we 
examine innovation based on a framework that distinguishes the factors necessary to explore 
and exploit innovations.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There are significant different effects of explore and exploit investments on 
the CSR activities of firms.  
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4.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Previous empirical studies 
 
Recently, there have been empirical studies which have considered voluntary 
environmental behavior and performance. (Cetindamar and Husoy 2007) have tried to shed 
some light on why firms adopt environmentally social responsible behavior and what impact 
such adoption has on their performance. Using a survey which is conducted among Global 
Compact (GC) participants, they found that companies have complex and multiple reasons 
for adopting environmentally responsible behavior and that ethical issues and economic 
reasons co-exist. In terms of performance, the firm receives both ethical and economic 
benefits from participation in the GC.  
(Heras-Saizarbitoria, Molina-Azorín et al. 2011) also empirically explore the relationship 
between better performance and the beneficial effects of ISO 14001. They suggest that ISO 
14001 causes improved financial performance. With a sample of 186 industrial companies’, 
(González-Benito and González-Benito 2005) analyze the linkage between environmental 
pro-activities of firms and business performance. They show that environmental management 
can provide competitive opportunities and advantages for companies. (Khanna and Damon 
1999) identify the motivations for voluntary participation in the 33/50 Program and the 
resulting impact of the program on the toxic releases arid economic performance of firms in 
the US chemical industry. The paper shows that voluntary participation led to a statistically 
significant decline in toxic releases. Table 4-1 shows the summary of previous studies linking 
environmental issues with performance.  
 
 
4.3.2 Data 
 
The data of this study is collected from the following two sources. First, we adopt the 
Vigeo database to measure corporate social responsibility. Vigeo is the leading European 
extra financial rating agency; it evaluates the CSR performance and risk factors on 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria of European firms listed on the DJ 
STOXX 600 and MSCI World indexes (Cavaco and Crifo 2010). 
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Table 4-1 Summary of previous studies linking environmental variables to performance 
Study Sample Environmental variables Y Major findings 
(Hart 1997) 127 US firms in SIC listed 
in S&P 500 
Emission reductions based on TRI from 
the IRRC Corporate Environmental 
Profile data 
ROA, ROE, return 
on sales (ROS) 
Pollution prevention activities have a (+) influence 
on financial performance within 1~2 years. ROE 
takes longer to be affected. 
(Russo and Fouts 
1997) 
243 US firms (several 
sectors) 
Environmental ratings (FRDC): 
compliance, expenditures, waste reduction 
ROA (+) impact of environmental performance on ROA. 
(Klassen and 
McLaughlin 1996) 
69 US firms in the 
furniture industry 
Environmental technology portfolio Manufacturing 
performance 
measures 
(+) impact of environmental technology portfolio 
on manufacturing performance. 
(Christmann 2000) 88 US chemical companies Envir. Management “best practices”: use 
of pollution prevention technology (PPT) 
Cost advantage 
(perceptual 
measures) 
(+) effect of proprietary PPT innovation. 
(Khanna and Damon 
1999) 
123 US firms in the 
chemical industry 
EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program 
(emissions of toxic chemicals) 
ROI Statistically (-) impact on the current ROI. 
(González-Benito and 
González-Benito 2005) 
186 Spanish firms 
(chemical sector 63) 
(electronic-electric, 96) 
(furniture, 27) 
27 environmental management practices ROA Environmental management can bring about 
competitive opportunities for companies. Some 
environmental practices produce (-) effects. 
(Wagner 2005) Firms from four European 
countries in the pulp and 
paper manufacturing 
sector 
Input-oriented index (energy and water 
input) and output oriented index (SO2 
NOx and COD emissions) of 
environmental performance. 
ROCE, ROE and 
ROS 
A largely (-) relationship between the output-based 
index of environmental performance and financial 
performance. For the input based index, the 
relationship is generally non-significant. 
(Link and Naveh 2006) 77 ISO 14001 certified 
organizations in Israel 
ISO 14001 rules, policies and procedures. 
Emission of pollutions, use of recycled 
materials and other environmental aspects 
Gross profit margin The higher the standardization, the better the 
environmental performance. Environmental 
performance does not influence business 
performance. 
(Heras-Saizarbitoria, 
Molina-Azorín et al. 
2011) 
ISO 14001 certified 
organizations in 268 
Spanish firms 
ISO 14001 certified dummies ROA, Sale growth The firms with better than average performance 
have a greater propensity to pursue accreditation.  
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Vigeo measures companies' CSR performance on the 6 broad domains55: Human Rights, 
Environment, Human Resources, Business Behavior, Corporate Governance and Community 
Involvement. As shown in Table 2, we also restrict our analysis to six detailed CSR related 
questionnaires56 which appear to be more complementary to CSR activities of firms because 
all criteria in each of the CSR areas are accumulated for each sector. This leads to a trade-off 
effect between the sub-questionnaires of each CSR area.  
The other data source is Thomson DataStream which offers firms’ specific financial 
information. With the help of the list of the Vigeo survey data (which had 1435 observations 
in 2009), this study generates a new list, matching the financial data of Thomson 
DataStream57. Consequently, we use a total of 619 firms. Table 4-2 demonstrates the detailed 
definition and descriptive statistics of the variable used in the analysis. 
As mentioned by (Tirole and Bénabou 2010), it is worth taking into account relative 
performance between industries. (Pavelin and Porter 2008) also investigate the influence of 
innovation on the relationship between corporate strategy and social issues and find a diverse 
range of the effects of industrial sectors on the determinants of the probability that the 
innovation brings about reduced environmental impacts. By using 8 industry variables58, we 
try to identify the specific industry effect on the CSR behavior of firms and investment 
activities. To consider the regional characteristics, we also employ three representative 
continental variables such as the EU, Asia Pacific and North American.     
                                               
55
 Each of survey questions is scored on a scale from 0 to 100, representing the level of a firm's CSR engagement and 
management of associated risks. A score of 0 shows little evidence of commitment (poor to very poor guarantee of risk 
management), 30 means an initiated commitment (poor to moderate guarantee of risk management), 65 means a consolidated 
commitment (reasonable guarantee of risk management) and a score of 100 shows an advanced commitment (social 
responsibility objectives actively promoted). Points given for each question are then consolidated through a system of 
weighted averages to give an overall score for each criterion and each domain (out of 100). 
56
 HR23 (Responsible management of restructurings), HR24 (Career management and promotion of employability), CS22 
(Sustainable Relationship with suppliers), CIN11 (Promotion of social and economic development), CIN21 (Contribution to 
general interest causes), CIN22 (Social impacts of company’s products and services) 
57
 Thomson Reuters Datastream is the world's largest financial statistical database which is covering an unrivalled wealth of 
asset classes, estimates, fundamentals, indices and economic data. This dataset offers more than 140 million time series, over 
10,000 data types and over 3.5 million instruments and indicators.  
58
 IT, BT, ENERGY, MANUFACTURE, BDTRANS, FORESTWATER, RETAIL, SERVICE   
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Table 4-2 Description and statistics of variables      
Variable Description  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lcapex log (Capital expenditure) 618 13,060 1,540 8,691 17,376 
lrnd log (R&D expenditure) 616 11,973 1,927 4,443 16,373 
lage log (2009-founded year) 619 4,185 0,825 0,693 6,497 
lemployees (SIZE) log (Number of employees) 603 9,920 1,297 5,733 14,068 
lsales  log (Sales) 619 16,058 1,308 11,236 19,947 
lebitda log (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) 594 14,117 1,368 8,742 18,262 
lev log (Enterprise value) 618 16,070 1,282 12,136 20,235 
lshareholders log (Share holders equity) 609 15,290 1,223 10,201 18,755 
lhrtscore log (Human Rights total score) 619 3,588 0,409 1,099 4,511 
lhrscore log (Human Resource total score) 599 3,086 0,756 0,000 4,394 
lenvscore log (Environment total score) 604 3,226 0,704 0,000 4,263 
lcsscore log (Business Behavior (C&S) total score) 619 3,635 0,343 2,197 4,317 
lcinscore log (Community Involvement total score) 606 3,474 0,591 1,099 4,500 
lcgscore log (Corporate Governance total score) 619 3,396 0,916 0,000 4,443 
lhr23score log (Responsible management of restructurings) 180 3,142 0,732 1,386 4,419 
lhr24score log (Career management and promotion of employability) 507 3,182 0,673 0,693 4,369 
lcs22score log (Sustainable Relationship with suppliers) 83 3,141 0,595 2,303 4,190 
lcin11score log (Promotion of social and economic development) 619 3,588 0,409 1,099 4,511 
lcin21score log (Contribution to general interest causes) 269 3,512 0,631 1,946 4,500 
IT Software & IT Services, Technology-Hardware, Telecommunications 619 0,168 0,374 0,000 1,000 
BT Health Care Equipment & Services, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 619 0,128 0,334 0,000 1,000 
ENERGY Energy, Mining & Metals, Oil Equipment, Electric & Gas Utilities 619 0,141 0,348 0,000 1,000 
MANUFACTURE Aerospace, Automobiles, Mechanical Components & Equipment, Chemicals, Heavy 
Construction, Industrial Goods, Electric Components & Equipment  619 0,231 0,422 0,000 1,000 
BDTRANS Building Materials, Transport & Logistics 619 0,032 0,177 0,000 1,000 
FORESTWATER Forest Products & Paper, Waste & Water Utilities 619 0,023 0,149 0,000 1,000 
RETAIL Beverage, Food, Specialized Retail, Tobacco 619 0,089 0,285 0,000 1,000 
SERVICE Banks, Broadcasting & Advertising, Publishing, Business Support, Financial, Hotel, Leisure 
Goods, Luxury Goods & Cosmetics, Travel & Tourism 619 0,082 0,275 0,000 1,000 
EU European Union 619 0,409  0,492  0,000  1,000  
Asia Pacific Asia Pacific 619 0,333  0,472  0,000  1,000  
North America North American 619 0,258  0,438  0,000  1,000  
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4.3.3 Variables  
 
With these data sets, we set up three equations to analyze the general relationship 
between investment activities and CSR behaviors. Our empirical analysis is a robust 
regression to find the correlation between the investment activities and environmental 
behavior of firms. In here, we explore whether higher innovative investment or better 
performance is due to the social beneficial effects of CSR behavior or due to selection-effects 
where better performance or higher innovative investment precedes accreditation. To find the 
effect of six CSR activities on two types of investments (lcapex and lrnd), we consider firm 
characteristics such as age of firms (lage), size of firms (lemployees), sales (lsales), operating 
profit (lebitda), enterprise value (lev), and shareholder’s effect (lshareholder). When 
checking the correlation between explanatory variables, the existence of a high degree of 
correlations is identified. As a result, we take into account a robust regression to control 
heteroscedasticity. nη
 
denotes a distribution which follows the normal distribution. 
 
1 1 2 3 4
5 6 1 2. .
n n n n n n
n n n n n
lcapex CSR x lage lemployees lsales lebitda
lev lshareholders D Industries D Region
γ γ γ γ
γ γ δ δ η
= + + + +
+ + + + +
             (4-1) 
 
where nx  is a vector of the CSR related variables affecting investments. _ nD Industries  and 
_ nD Region  are the industry and region dummy variables. To examine the CSR effect on 
each of investment activities, we also use research and development expenditure (lrnd) as our 
dependent variable in eq. (4-2). The propensities of firm’s investments can be different 
according to firms’ strategies, behavior and governance. Therefore, this study identifies the 
effect of CSR on the investment characteristics of firms. Based on survey data from 88 
chemical companies, (Christmann 2000) also indicates that capabilities for process 
innovation and implementation are complementary assets moderating the relationship 
between best practice and cost advantage, which is a significant factor in determining firm 
performance. 
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1 1 2 3 4
5 6 1 2. .
n n n n n n
n n n n n
lrnd CSR x lage lemployees lsales lebitda
lev lshareholders D Industries D Region
γ γ γ γ
γ γ δ δ η
= + + + +
+ + + + +
        
     (4-2) 
 
Finally, we estimate the effects of firms’ investment activities on the CSR behaviors 
using the 6 Vigeo items (lhrtscore, lhrscore, lenvscore, lcsscore, lcinscore and lcgscore) with 
eq. (4-3). lhrtscore means a firms’ general respect for human rights, and lhrscore indicates a 
firms’ support for their labors and working conditions. lenvscore shows the environmental 
consideration of firms’ business strategy and organization, and lcsscore is the sustainable 
business behaviors for customers and suppliers. Lastly, lcinscore shows micro level openness 
of firms to the communities, and lcgscore means the contribution of shareholders to 
corporation governance. 
 
1 2 1 2 3 4
5 6 1 2. .
n n n n n n n
n n n n n
lCSR lcapex x lrnd x lage lemployees lsales lebitda
lev lshareholders D Industries D Region
γ γ γ γ
γ γ δ δ η
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
    (4-3) 
 
Specifically, we consider 6 sub-questionnaires (lhr23score, lhr24score, lcs22score, 
lcin11score, lcin21score and lcin22score), which are more closely related to firms’ 
shareholders oriented behaviors. These sub-questionnaires focused more on shareholder 
oriented CSR activities. This is because the former six general CSR indices are the 
summations of every sub-question which can cause a trade-off between each value (See 
Appendix).     
Finally, this study estimates the total CSR index using principal component analysis 
(PCA) which is a statistical technique for analyzing the structure of interrelationships among 
the six CSR variables. The PCA can be used as a multidimensional measure for general 
forces affecting CSR activities. PCA methods make the factors more interpretable. Factors 
which have an eigenvalue over 1 are perceived as being adequate and therefore acceptable for 
analysis. Based on the eigenvalue rule, the Varimax rotation method is used to look for a 
linear combination of the original factors, so that the variance of the loadings is maximized 
(Qi, Shen et al. 2010). 
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4.4 Result and Analysis  
  
Table 4-3 shows the estimation result of firms’ capital expenditure (CAPEX), which 
shows that it is short-term return oriented. We compared the effects of the CSR behaviors on 
the firms’ investments considering firm characteristics, industry and regional variables. Each 
column shows the separated estimations of robust regressions. The general R-squares 
(coefficient of determination) are about 0.82 which means there is a high degree of the model 
explanation. This implies that since strong linear relationships exist among variables, the 
firm’s CSR behaviors may have a direct effect on the investment activities of firms. 
This indicates that the capital expenditure amounts are positively related to size, profit 
and enterprise value, which are strongly connected to the financial situation of firms. 
However, the age of a firm is not related to its investment patterns. (Pavelin and Porter 2008) 
also demonstrated the positive relationship between the probability of innovation and roles 
for firm size using firm-level data from the UK. For the industry sectors, traditional industry 
sectors such as energy (ENERGY), building and transportation (BDTRANS), forest and water 
(FORESTWATER) show strong positive investment tendency for exploitative investment.    
Regarding CSR related variables, we can find that the Human Resource (lhrscore), 
Environment (lenvscore), Business Behavior (=C&S) (lcsscore), and Community 
Involvement (lcinscore) have positive effects on the capital expenditure of firms, i.e., these 
CSR behaviors improve the likelihood of exploitative investment (short-term return). On the 
other hand, Human Resources (lhrtscore) and Corporate Governance (lcgscore) do not have 
any relationship with the short-term investment of firms. These results mean that when the 
firm supports their laborers, their working conditions more, and pay more attention to 
environmental issues such as eco-design and green product/service, it tries to focus on rather 
exploitative investment. Also, the integration of environmental factors in the supply chain 
and the contribution of shareholders to corporation governance (= micro level openness of 
firms to the communities) shows a positive effect on short-term investment. This result also 
shows that the management strategies driven by shareholder value objectives are no longer 
viable in the long term. Based on the resource-based view of the firm, (Russo and Fouts 
1997) have shown that environmental performance and performance are positively linked 
using independently developed environmental ratings.  
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Table 4-3 Estimation results of the CSR behaviors' effect on CAPEX 
Variables Human 
Rights 
Human 
Resources 
Environment Business 
Behavior 
Community 
Involvement 
Corporate  
Governance 
lage -0,029 -0,033 -0,058 -0,028 -0,033 -0,026 
lemployees 0,180a 0,168a 0,172a 0,171a 0,178a 0,176a 
lsales 0,258a 0,215a 0,238a 0,259a 0,256a 0,263a 
lebitda 0,241a 0,230a 0,217a 0,239a 0,234a 0,243a 
lev 0,188a 0,188a 0,179a 0,187a 0,185a 0,186a 
lshareholders 0,240a 0,272a 0,262a 0,242a 0,249a 0,246a 
lhrtscore 0,085 
     
lhrscore 
 
0,156a 
    
lenvscore 
  
0,174a 
   
lcsscore 
   
0,175c 
  
lcinscore 
    
0,096c 
 
lcgscore 
     
0,006 
IT -0,243b -0,258b -0,254b -0,251b -0,273a -0,240b 
BT -0,517a -0,477a -0,497a -0,547a -0,507a -0,519a 
ENERGY 0,700a 0,656a 0,696a 0,699a 0,708a 0,692a 
MANUFACTURE 0,013 -0,024 -0,012 -0,008 0,007 0,011 
BDTRANS 0,431b 0,414b 0,408b 0,420b 0,447a 0,425b 
FORESTWATER 0,709a 0,658a 0,660a 0,714a 0,703a 0,726a 
RETAIL -0,212b -0,200c -0,197c -0,199c -0,227b -0,221b 
SERVICE -0,250c -0,308b -0,289b -0,280c -0,263c -0,251c 
EU 0,206a -0,251a 0,118 0,203a 0,192a 0,222a 
Asia Pacific 0,378a 
 
0,304a 0,381a 0,389a 0,373a 
North America 
 
-0,356a 
    
Constants -3,337a -2,558a -2,843a -3,571a -3,272a -3,191a 
Observations 568 549 555 568 559 568 
R-Squared 0,818 0,821 0,824 0,818 0,818 0,817 
Note:  a= p<0.01, b= p<0.05, c= p<0.1 
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For explorative investment, Table 4-4 shows the estimation result of the CSR behaviors' 
effect on the R&D expenditure which has long-term return. The general R-squares are about 
0.60 which means that moderate linear relationships exist among variables, and that the 
firm’s CSR behaviors may directly affect the R&D investment activities. 
This finding implies that firm size (lemployees) and shareholder’s equity (lshareholders) 
have a strong and positive effect on the R&D investment of firms. However, the other 
characteristic variables of the firm such as age (lage), sales (lsales), enterprise value (lev) and 
operating profit (lebitda) do not have a significant relationship with R&D investment. From 
this result, we find that the R&D investment is not directly affected by the financial status of 
firms. This is the opposite situation from the capital expenditure of firms. This supports our 
assumption which divides the investment activities of firms into two dimensions including 
explorative investment (long-term return) and exploitative investment (short-term return) on 
the CSR. Concerning the industry sectors, relatively new industry sectors such as the 
telecommunication industry (IT), pharmacy and medical industry (BT) have positive 
influences on exploring investment including the manufacturing industry (MANIFACTURE). 
Table 4-5 shows the rather different effects on the investment activities in each industry 
sector.  
For the CSR related variables, we can find that just the Human Rights (lhrtscore) and 
Corporate Governance (lcgscore) have an effect on the R&D expenditure of firms, i.e., these 
CSR behaviors influence the likelihood of explorative investment (long-term return). These 
show that the firms’ general respect for human rights has a positive effect on long-term 
investment, while the contribution of shareholders to corporation governance shows a 
negative influence on the explorative investment. 
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Table 4-4 Estimation results of the CSR behaviors' effect on R&D  
Variables Human Rights 
Human 
Resources Environment 
Business 
Behavior 
(C&S) 
Community 
Involvement 
Corporate 
Governance 
lage 0,009 0,017 0,021 0,018 0,021 0,023 
lemployees 0,298a 0,280a 0,288a 0,284a 0,273a 0,284a 
lsales 0,120 0,154 0,159 0,139 0,183 0,139 
lebitda 0,123 0,123 0,114 0,129 0,131 0,149 
lev 0,063 0,040 0,046 0,057 0,033 0,058 
lshareholders 0,372a 0,371a 0,362a 0,388a 0,385a 0,373a 
lhrtscore 0,305b      
lhrscore  0,150     
lenvscore   0,125    
lcsscore    0,039   
lcinscore     -0,079  
lcgscore      -0,181c 
IT 1,259a 1,268a 1,249a 1,275a 1,297a 1,308a 
BT 1,167a 1,177a 1,221a 1,150a 1,209a 1,129a 
ENERGY -1,532a -1,589a -1,581a -1,565a -1,598a -1,601a 
MANUFACTURE 0,440a 0,388b 0,359b 0,424a 0,420a 0,407a 
BDTRANS -1,514a -1,541a -1,596a -1,544a -1,579a -1,563a 
FORESTWATER -2,037a -2,025a -2,050a -1,978a -1,954a -1,987a 
RETAIL -0,585a -0,592b -0,695a -0,615a -0,623a -0,635a 
SERVICE -0,956a -0,994a -1,052a -0,963a -0,959a -0,934a 
EU -0,375b -0,352b -0,326b -0,272c -0,284b -0,006 
Asia Pacific   -0,038  -0,049  
North America -0,016 0,027  0,030  0,287 
Constants -2,339a -1,721b -1,651b -1,865b -1,626b -1,382c 
Observations 567 548 555 567 558 567 
R-Squared 0,600 0,601 0,606 0,597 0,600 0,600 
Note:  a =p<0.01, b =p<0.05, c= p<0.1     
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Table 4-5 The comparison of the CSR effect on exploitative investment (short-term) and explorative investment (long-term) 
 
[A] y=lcapex: exploitative investment (short-term return) [B] y= lrnd: explorative investment (long-term return) 
Variables A-(1) A-(2) A-(3) A-(4) A-(5) A-(6) B-(1) B-(2) B-(3) B-(4) B-(5) B-(6) 
Age 
            
Size +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Sales +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
      
Operating Profit +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
      
Enterprise value +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
      
Shareholder's equity +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Human Rights             ++           
Human Resources 
 
+++ 
          
Environment 
  
+++ 
         
Business Behavior (C&S) 
   
+ 
        
Community Involvement 
    
+ 
       
Corporate Governance                       - 
IT --- -- -- -- --- -- +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
BT --- --- --- --- --- --- +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
ENERGY +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
MANUFACTURE 
      
+++ ++ ++ +++ +++ +++ 
BDTRANS ++ ++ ++ ++ +++ ++ --- --- --- --- --- --- 
FORESTWATER  +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ --- --- --- --- --- --- 
RETAIL -- - - - -- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
SERVICE - -- -- - - - --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Note:  +++ p<0.01, ++ p<0.05, + p<0.1 & --- p<0.01, -- p<0.05, - p<0.1 
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When we compare the significances for six CSR variables, the significant variables are 
exactly contrarily distributed as shown in table 4-5. As a result, respect for laborer’s rights 
can encourage firms’ R&D investment, but can also increase complexity and so a wider 
breadth of directors might be discouraged firm following an explorative investment strategy. 
(Khanna and Damon 1999) also explored voluntary participation in the 33/50 Program and 
estimate the impact of the program on the toxic releases arid financial performance of firms 
in the US. In this case, they show a statistically significant negative impact on the current 
return to the investment (ROI) of firms, but its impact on the expected long run profitability 
of firms is positive and statistically significant.  
This study proposes two hypotheses; (i) there is a significant relationship between CSR 
and innovative investments. (ii) there are a number of significant and different effects of 
explore and exploit investments on the CSR activities of firms. For this, our results show 
significant and different effects of CSR activities on the investment strategies of firms. The 
six CSR behaviors show diverged effects according to the type of investment activities. For 
short-term and exploitative investments, CSR activities are related to human resources, the 
environment, business behavior (= C&S) and community involvement. On the other hand, 
human rights and corporate governance have a relationship with long-term oriented 
investment. This shows that understanding the specific connection between CSR behavior 
and innovative investment activities is important to set up the firms’ manageable strategies.   
For the effect of different types of investment on the CSR activities, table 6 
demonstrates the investment activities (CAPEX and R&D expenditure) on the firms’ general 
and specific CSR behaviors. Because of the possibility of leading having a trade-off effect 
between sub-questionnaires of each CSR area in the case where we use the gross CSR scores, 
we restrict our analysis to specific questionnaires (HR23, HR24, CS22, CIN11 and CIN21) 
which appear to be more complementary to the CSR activities of firms with shareholder 
theory. Note that all criteria in each of the CSR areas are accumulated for each sector. This 
leads to trade-off effects between the sub-questionnaires of each CSR area.  
From these results, we can confirm that there are almost mutual effects between CSR 
behavior and investment activities. For example, exploitative investment (lcapex) has a 
generally positive effect on the exact same CSR variables (human resource, environment, 
business behavior (= C&S) and community involvement) which are already found impact 
factors on CAPEX in table 3. Explorative investment (lrnd) also shows a positive effect on 
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human rights and a negative relationship with corporation governance. We can also check the 
detailed relationship between the type of investments and specific CSR behaviors from these 
results. However, there is no relatively positive and significant effect of CAPEX investment 
on the specific CSR activities of firms, whereas the R&D investment is positively related 
with human rights and community involvement.  
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Table 4-6 Estimation results for the effect of different type of investment on the CSR activities  
Y= Human Rights 
Human 
Resources Environment 
Business 
Behavior 
(C&S) 
Community 
Involvement 
Corporate 
Governance HR23 HR24 CS22 CIN11 CIN21 
lcapex 0,024 0,147a 0,138a 0,034c 0,055c 0,003 0,151 0,072 -0,171 0,024 0,074 
lrnd 0,028b 0,045c 0,032 0,004 -0,013 -0,047c 0,092b 0,058b -0,105 0,028b -0,001 
lage 0,032 0,096a 0,100a 0,013 0,052c 0,028 -0,148b 0,029 0,111 0,032 0,026 
lemployees -0,053c -0,072 -0,034 0,024 0,035 0,010 0,016 -0,052 0,122 -0,053c -0,008 
lsales 0,055 0,127a 0,006 0,016 0,008 -0,003 0,038 0,051 0,237c 0,055 0,078 
lebitda 0,014 0,048 0,069 0,017 0,072 0,115b -0,185b 0,063 -0,126 0,014 0,122c 
lev -0,029 -0,072 -0,030 -0,015 -0,040 0,010 0,034 -0,014 0,135 -0,029 -0,046 
lshareholders 0,039 -0,040 0,046 0,005 0,016 -0,069 -0,009 0,009 0,163 0,039 -0,081 
IT 0,031 0,171 0,158c 0,080c 0,346a 0,229a 0,240 0,152 
 
0,031 0,467a 
BT -0,058 0,059 -0,222c 0,170a -0,003 -0,092 -0,255 -0,225c 
 
-0,058 0,234 
ENERGY -0,080 0,070 -0,142 -0,066 -0,182c -0,260b -0,326 -0,075 
 
-0,080 -0,708a 
MANUFACTURE -0,051 0,210b 0,155b 0,101b 0,027 -0,100 -0,168 0,029 -0,015 -0,051 0,188 
BDTRANS -0,068 -0,038 0,072 -0,003 -0,292c -0,177 -0,371 -0,116 
 
-0,068 
 
FORESTWATER 0,236a 0,408c 0,324 0,050 0,233 -0,157 0,849a -0,108 
 
0,236a 0,550a 
RETAIL -0,094 -0,103 -0,044 -0,122b 0,101 -0,112 0,051 -0,310b -0,177 -0,094 0,385b 
SERVICE 0,031 0,201 0,244b 0,184a 0,069 0,078 0,559b 0,268b 
 
0,031 0,354 
EU 0,203a 0,594a 0,471a 0,107a 0,539a 0,011 0,602a 0,428a -0,033 0,203a 0,504a 
Asia Pacific -0,171a -0,052 0,235a -0,106a 
 
-1,405a -0,441 0,105 
 
-0,171a 
 North America 
    
0,345a 
   
-0,263 
 
0,391a 
Constants 2,136a -0,370 -0,653c 2,444a 1,224a 3,519a 1,734c 0,100 -1,678 2,136a 1,001c 
Observations 566 547 554 566 557 566 161 466 73 566 245 
R-Squared 0,223 0,317 0,319 0,220 0,287 0,576 0,967 0,967 0,975 0,991 0,982 
Note:  a = p<0.01, b = p<0.05, c= p<0.1 
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This study also tries to create a more integrated general CSR index using the PCA 
method. This is then used to find the relationship between integrated CSR and certain types 
of investments. Basically, Vigeo’s framework includes 6 evaluation fields with 37 criteria, 
which is a CSR evaluation based on internationally recognized standards, conventions, 
recommendations, statements, and guidelines from the UN, ILO, UNEP, Global Compact, 
OECD, etc. Therefore, each item represents the CSR principles of universal application 
translated into action steps for the management of corporations. On the other hand, since CSR 
is an integration of firms’ total shareholder oriented behaviors, it is valuable to check the 
integrated general CSR index finding the direct relationship between total CSR activity and 
type of innovative investments.  
The relative importance of these individual rating factors is measured through the 
questionnaire survey based on the score from 0 to 100. As a result of PCA, one retained 
factor is obtained with an eigenvalue greater than 1, capturing about 52% of the variation. We 
rename this factor as CSR and then try to find the relationship among CSR, CAPEX and 
R&D. The result in table 4-7 shows that CSR is more related to exploitative investment than 
explorative one. For the other variables, we can find consistent results with previous 
individual analysis for the relationship between six CSR ratings and type of investments.    
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Table 4-7 Estimation results of the CSR behaviors' effect on CAPEX and R&D 
  y= CSR y=Capex y=R&D 
  Coef, P>|t| Coef, P>|t| Coef, P>|t| 
lcapex 0,132a 0,008 
    
lrnd 0,045 0,166 
    
csr 
  
0,092c 0,011 0,101 0,183 
lage 0,105b 0,031 -0,032 0,395 0,042b 0,578 
lebitda 0,124 0,163 0,229a 0,000 0,123 0,167 
lemployees -0,091 0,166 0,163a 0,001 0,291a 0,001 
lev -0,075 0,355 0,168a 0,006 0,052 0,709 
lshareholders 0,124c 0,093 0,216a 0,001 0,144 0,242 
lshareholders 0,025 0,736 0,297a 0,000 0,356a 0,005 
IT 0,322b 0,015 -0,267a 0,009 1,241a 0,000 
BT 0,072 0,624 -0,482a 0,000 1,140a 0,000 
ENERGY -0,277b 0,049 0,686a 0,000 -1,574a 0,000 
MANUFACTURE 0,153 0,173 -0,004 0,965 0,364b 0,025 
BDTRANS -0,185 0,363 0,423b 0,013 -1,578a 0,004 
FORESTWATER 0,505c 0,074 0,685a 0,000 -2,063a 0,000 
RETAIL -0,152 0,360 -0,197c 0,066 -0,700a 0,003 
SERVICE 0,523a 0,001 -0,311b 0,049 -1,133a 0,000 
EU -4,311a 0,000 -2,362a 0,000 -1,584c 0,074 
Asia Pacific -5,443a 0,000 -2,092a 0,000 -1,217 0,203 
North America -4,946a 0,000 -2,475a 0,000 -1,266 0,176 
Obs. 533 534 534 
R-squared 0,387 0,998 0,99 
Root MSE 0,785 0,657 1,223 
Note:  a =p<0.01, b =p<0.05, c= p<0.1 
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4.5 Conclusion and Implications 
 
This chapter carries out an empirical analysis of the interactions between CSR practices 
and investment and specifically, examines the explorative investment (long-term return) and 
exploitative investment (short-term return). With the use of multinational firm-level data, we 
identify the relationship between CSR and innovation activities and find the answers to the 
following research questions: (i) what are the distinctive effects of explorative investment 
(long-term return) and exploitative investment (short-term return) on the CSR behavior of 
firms? and, (ii) what drives the CSR behavior of firms?   
For the first question about the distinction in the effects of explorative investment and 
exploitative investment on the CSR behavior of firms, we identify the difference between 
capital expenditure and R&D expenditure. For exploitative investment (short-term return), we 
clarify that when the firm supports their laborers more and pays more attention to 
environmental issues, it tries to focus on exploitative investment. Also, the integration of 
environmental factors in the supply chain and the micro level openness of firms to 
communities shows positive effects on short-term investment.  
For the explorative investment (long-term return), we find that respect for labor’s rights 
can encourage firms’ R&D investment, but a more complex and broader management 
structure might discourage an explorative investment strategy. When we compare the 
significances of six CSR variables, the significant variables are found to be exactly contrarily 
distributed. This implies that there is a strong relationship between these types of investments 
and the CSR activities. Consequently, when the firm builds their short- and long-run business 
strategies, the consideration of the relationship between the types of investment and CSR 
practice will lead to a greater synergy effect on the outcome of investments.  
Concerning the firms’ characteristic variables, the result also shows a significantly 
different effect of finance related variables on the types of investments. For example, the 
R&D investment is not directly affected by the financial status of firms, while the capital 
expenditure of firms is readily affected by sales, operating profit, and enterprise value in 
market, all of which are strongly connected with the financial situation of firms. The effect of 
each industry sector also shows that rather new industry sectors including IT and BT show a 
positive influence on the exploring investment, whereas traditional industry sectors including 
energy, industrial, etc. have strong positive tendency for exploitative investment. This 
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indicates that considering the different effects of specific industry sectors is of importance in 
order to encourage exploitative investment and explorative investment. 
Finally, we identify the impact factors of general and specific CSR behaviors. From 
these results, we can confirm that there are almost mutual effects between each CSR behavior 
and investment activities. This shows that exploitative investment has positive effect on the 
same CSR variables which are already found impact factors on exploitative investment, and 
explorative investment also has positive effect on human right and negative relation with 
corporation governance. Indeed, we also measure the gross CSR index which contains six 
individual CSR fields by using PCA method.  
From this, the current study demonstrates that the gross CSR is relatively more related 
with capex investment which has short-run and exploitative investment than R&D 
investment. Hence, considering each specific CSR field is important, which is more related 
with innovative investment with long-run and explorative investment. Therefore, the results 
of this study support the proposition that type of investments and corporation social 
responsibility have consistent and interactive relations. Overall, these findings are expected to 
develop implications for MNE management and research, as well as public policy. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
 
5.1.1 The mandatory industry policy  
 
For the telecommunication industry, it has been just a few decades since it became 
universe and penetrated when we are comparing the developing timeline with other industries 
such as material, energy and so on. Now the effect and portion of telecommunication industry 
in our society is prodigious such that we cannot exemplify industries without 
telecommunication sector. So, the developing and proliferating of telecom industry was the 
top priority of policy maker.  
To encourage the invest efficiency of former “natural monopoly” and diffuse the new 
technologies, telecommunication liberalization policies such as competition and 
privatizations, have implemented for last three decades in most OECD countries. Until now, 
this assumption is still very controversial from a theoretical point of view. From this, this 
study tries to shed some implication on the role of liberalization policies in determining 
firms’ investment activities.  
Using the firm level data between 1994 and 2008, we tested assumptions in 
telecommunication market, where there exist competition and privatization regulations. 
Specifically, we consider the nature of investment and adopt more general and complemented 
policy. The assumption regarding Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect related 
with R&D investment and network deployment allows us to decompose the investment 
activities of firms.  
Hence, this study has two distinct contributions to the regulation and innovation in 
telecommunication industry. First, we consider the composition of investment (exploration 
vs. exploitation investment) while most of the studies dedicated to the impact of competition 
on innovation have focused on the level of R&D investment. We apply these concepts, 
"exploration of new possibilities" and "exploration of old certainties" to the relationship, 
R&D vs. infrastructure investment. Second, not only focusing on the impacts of single 
regulation but also adopting more general and complemented policy views is the other main 
contribution of this chapter. 
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With the empirical method, we try to suggest the answer to these questions; i) How do 
liberalization policies affect the operators' investment strategies? ii) To what extend do they 
affect the Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect between exploration (R&D) 
and exploitation (CAPEX) investments? Based on the empirical results, we can claim that 
considering interaction among liberalization policies and allowing the industry characteristics 
are critical to determine for the Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect and level 
of investments.  
More precisely, there are major three findings from our analysis. First, there is a 
significant Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect among firms’ investment 
activities. If competition is induced, firms are likely to emphasize investments with 
exploitable characteristics which using existing knowledge and technologies to develop new 
products and services. Particularly in the case of privatization, firms make more investments 
in “exploitation of old certainties” than in “exploration of new possibilities”. Second, 
competition effect leads to more higher influences on liberalization policies in the mobile 
industry than in the broadband industry. In the case of mobile industry, inter- and intra-
competition highly lead firms to make short-term investments. Finally, the simultaneous 
implementations among liberalization policies make firms to more concentrate on the 
investment for developing new product and service than existed knowledge and technology.   
There are some implications of this part. Firstly, the liberalization policies may weaken 
the firms’ sustainable ability of next generation networks in long terms. However, when 
privatized firms adopt competition, they focus on explorable investments in new possibilities. 
In other words, firms seek strategies for long-term investments in the case where competition 
becomes severe and many dimensions are faced. Therefore, it is necessary for policy 
regulators to take account of the complementary among liberalization policies providing an 
incentive to create new knowledge and technologies.  
Also, the design of liberalization policies should consider the Profitability effect and 
Operational efficiency effect between investments from a perspective of long term policy. 
Some economic theory indicate that competition is the good proficient tool at the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. However, it might not be good at prompting investment of new 
and advanced technology, particularly when the market is dominated by former natural 
monopoly. In such a case, governmental leadership combined with market circumstances can 
attain better results more easily. It has not only allowed its priorities public but has also set up 
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an arena for the relevant stakeholders to achieve a mutual understanding of their relatively 
long term objectives. Again, such an intervention is able to be effective only in the existence 
of a cooperative circumstance among the related stakeholders.   
 
 
5.1.2 The corporate environmentalism   
 
The corporate environmentalism is more bilateral agreement, the terms of the agreement 
are determined by implementation between the regulator and the firms (Alberini and 
Segerson 2002). These terms include the obligations of both parties. There are typically 
firm’s obligations involve certain restricted activities that will be undertaken. For example, 
the global environmental issues on climate change and with wider scope of sustainability 
have growing impact over the few decades on the social demand and the international 
political agenda and some regulations for eliminating of CO2 have changed the market 
mechanism and activities of corporations.  
Therefore, the recognition and reaction of business leaders and consumers are turning 
into voluntary. CSR (Corporation Social Responsibility) and SRI (Social Responsibility 
Investment) are becoming globalised concepts and most multinational firms try to induce the 
sustainability practices to make stakeholders’ satisfaction and give a positive signal to the 
market; the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1983; Frooman 1999). Consumers and investors 
also show the confidence for the corporation’s social responsible activities in the market; the 
legitimation theory (Campbell, Craven et al. 2003; Lopez, Garcia et al. 2007).  
For the firms’ environmentalism behaviors, this chapter considers two major concepts. 
One is an environmental behavior of firms which can be represented by Carbon Discloser 
Project (CDP) activity. The other one is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) which 
shows firms’ sustainable activities. The reason why we adopt both of these concepts 
simultaneously is that there are a lot of initiatives in the market as a term of firm’s strategies. 
From this, we choose major two activities of firms’ environmentalism strategies then we try 
to find the answer of theses research questions: i) What is the relation between voluntary 
activities and performance? ii) Do firm’s voluntary activities in environmental and 
sustainable implementations induce innovation? iii) How is the nature of innovation 
depending on voluntary types of firm? iv) What is the link between firm characteristics and 
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innovation according to voluntary types?  
In particular, environmental and sustainable implementations have a long-term impact 
on the performance and innovation of firms. The adoption or quotation of sustainable 
standard and environmental implementations has latent effect and it is difficult to find the 
causality between adoption and performance. Nevertheless, most studies only consider the 
existence of significant impact for performance. Innovation is the priority of firms as well as 
performance because it is also sustainable factor for firms’ growth and survival. Therefore, 
we propose the each influence of environmental and sustainable behaviors on the innovation 
activities and performance of firms.  
From these, we identify the relation between environmental, sustainable 
implementations and innovative activities based on the results of empirical analysis. Based on 
this, we can suggest the solution to research questions represented in the above parts, and 
then make policy implication for sustainable development. First, we can see the overall 
positive relation between the voluntary behaviors and firms’ performance which are 
measured by sales of firms. Second, we find that the synchronous adoption of both behaviors 
induces investments than others. In detail, they have different type of investment activities. 
The both group in polluting industry is more focusing on explorative investment (R&D) and 
the both group in non-polluting group is prefer to invest in exploitative investment (CAPEX). 
Therefore, considering environmental and sustainable implementations simultaneously is 
important to focus on future challenges and is necessary to consider various factors including 
quality of management, corporate governance structures, reputational risks, human capital 
management, stakeholder relations, and corporate social responsibility. Third, the polluting 
industries are more emphasize on long-term investment than short-term one. Because there 
are more considerations, negotiators, expectations for sustainable and environmental 
behaviors for polluting industry, the long-term oriented innovation strategies and activities 
are important to firms’ business of this industry than non-polluting. Therefore, the investment 
in innovation and consideration of the activities in innovations are necessary for sustainable 
development. Lastly, the effect of firms’ characteristics on performance and innovation can 
be changed according to their heterogeneity.   
Categorizing the established environmental and sustainable issues and proposing an 
empirical model of the links between these issues and innovation activities are another 
contribution of this study. In particular, we consider the concept of environmental and 
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sustainable implementations simultaneously, which provides the understanding on the effect 
of environmental and sustainable issues on the innovation and performance of firms and 
market.      investment than short-term one. The innovation strategies and activities are 
important to firms’ business.  
 
 
5.1.3 The business-led initiatives   
 
 This chapter carries out an empirical analysis of the interactions between CSR practices 
and investment and specifically, examines the explorative investment (long-term return) and 
exploitative investment (short-term return). With use of the multinational firm-level data, we 
identify the relationship between CSR and innovation activities.  
By using the 619 multinational firms listed on the DJ STOXX 600 and MSCI World 
indices, this study introduces an empirical model according to their industry sectors, regions, 
and firm characteristics such as size and age. Based on the analysis, we identify the 
relationship between CSR and innovation activities of firms which can be an answer to 
research questions: (i) what drives CSR behavior of firms? (ii) What are the different effects 
of explorative investment (long-run return) and exploitative investment (short-run return) on 
the CSR behavior of firms?  
From the results, we find the different effects of explorative investment and exploitative 
investment on the CSR behavior of firms.  For the exploitative investment (short-term 
return), we clarify that when the firm more supports their labors and more pays attention to 
the environmental issue, it tries to focus on rather exploitative investment. Also, the 
integration of environmental factors in the supply chain and the micro level openness of firms 
to the communities show positive effect on the short-term investment. For the explorative 
investment (long-term return), we find that the respect for labor’s right can encourage firms’ 
R&D investment, but more complex and boarder management structure might discourage the 
explorative investment strategy.  
Concerning the firm characteristic variables, we also find significantly different effect of 
finance related variables on the types of investments. The effect of each industry sector also 
shows that new industry sectors show positive influence on the exploring investment, 
whereas traditional industry sectors have strong positive tendency to exploitative investment. 
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This indicates that considering the different effects of specific industry sectors is of 
importance in order to encourage exploitative investment and explorative investment. 
Finally, we identify the impact factors of general and specific CSR behaviors. From 
these results, we can confirm that there are almost mutual effects between CSR behavior and 
investment activities. Therefore, the results of this study support the proposition that type of 
investments and corporation social responsibility have consistent and interactive relations. 
Overall, these findings are expected to develop implications for MNE(Multi-National 
Enterprise)s management and research, as well as public policy. 
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5.2 General Conclusions and Implications  
 
To increase the cooperating effect arising from innovation activities of firms and 
industrial policies with voluntary or mandatory approaches, policy makers are required to 
understand the driving and impact factors of policy approaches. This understanding can help 
policy makers to decide whether or not use of such policy approach is advisable and to design 
the policy ensuring that it is as effective and efficient as possible. Through the theoretical and 
empirical analysis, this study identifies some key features that are likely to increase both the 
effectiveness and efficiency of industrial policies with voluntary and mandatory approaches. 
Consequently, the current study investigates the difference and tendency of industrial policy 
approaches and the type of innovation carrying out three analyses according to the mandatory 
and voluntary approaches. 
Firstly, the mandatory approach is positive and effective to prompt or growth in 
telecommunication industry. In detail, there are major three findings from our analysis. First 
of all, there is a significant Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect among firms’ 
investment activities. If competition is induced, firms are likely to emphasize investments 
with exploitable characteristics which using existing knowledge and technologies to develop 
new products and services. Particularly in the case of privatization, firms make more 
investments in “exploitation of old certainties” than in “exploration of new possibilities”. 
Second, competition effect leads to more higher influences on liberalization policies in the 
mobile industry than in the broadband industry. In the case of mobile industry, inter- and 
intra-competition highly lead firms to make short-term investments. Finally, the simultaneous 
implementations among liberalization policies make firms to more concentrate on the 
investment for developing new product and service than existed knowledge and technology.   
Secondly, we analyze the voluntary industrial policy like the Corporate 
Environmentalism using CSP and DJSI activities of firms. This analyzing attempts to find the 
relations among voluntary activities, performance, and the type of innovation. Then we find 
that the overall positive relation between the voluntary behaviors and firms’ performance 
which are measured by sales of firms, as well as the synchronous adoption of both behaviors 
induces investments than others. These results show that the firms’ behavior is varied 
depending on the industry sectors, firm characteristics, and environmental and sustainable 
activities. Hence, our study considering the sustainable, environmental behavior and 
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innovation of firms can offer solution to which value for which organization. For instance, 
there are some difference type of firms’ investment strategy according to the industries. That 
is, the individual groups have negative effects on the investment of new possibility (R&D) in 
polluting groups and the investment of maintains (CAPEX) in non-polluting industry.      
Finally, using the 619 multinational, this study identify the relationship between 
‘Business-led Initiatives (CSR)’ and innovation activities of firms.  Consequently, when the 
firm builds their short- and long-run business strategies, the consideration of the relationship 
between types of investment and CSR practice will lead to more synergies effect on the 
outcome of investments. The findings of this study could provide a comprehensive 
understanding on the effect of sustainable management strategies on the innovation and 
performance of firms.  
Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, this study identifies some key features 
that are likely to increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of industrial policies with 
voluntary and mandatory approaches. One key feature is the existence of a strong relationship 
between innovation and industrial policies. The explorative innovation increases the 
incentives for participation in long-term but also reduces the financial incentives in short-
term. Considering firms' characteristics and industry sector also increases in the cooperating 
effect of policies and regulations. In sum, when based on the understanding and consideration 
on the nature of innovation and other impact factors, industrial policy can provide a 
mechanism for meeting industrial quality goals both effectively and efficiently. 
Some researches indicate that industry policy design can contribute the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources. In such a case like telecommunication industry, governmental 
leadership combined with market circumstances can attain better results more easily. It has 
not only allowed its priorities public but has also set up an arena for the relevant stakeholders 
to achieve a mutual understanding of their relatively long term objectives. Such an 
intervention is able to be effective only in the existence of a cooperative circumstance among 
the related stakeholders.  On the other parts, regulation is widely considered to be more 
expensive and less efficient than voluntary action making them worse than they would have 
been in the absence of the policy. That is, the voluntary  approach is more comprehensive and 
have long-term effect, and the mandatory approach have intensive and short-run effect. In 
terms of policy makers implementation, it is necessary to consider the specific industry 
circumspect and characteristics to accomplish sustainable development in the society.    
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Résumé en français  
 
Résumé 
  
De manière générale, différentes approches s’offrent aux décideurs politiques lorsqu’il 
s’agit de promouvoir l’innovation. Pour reprendre la distinction posée par la plupart des 
économistes industriels, les politiques peuvent être de nature presciptive ou incitative. A 
travers une série d’analyses théoriques et empiriques, cette thèse identifie plusieurs facteurs 
clés qui déterminent l’efficacité des politiques d’innovation, que l’approche adoptée soit de 
nature prescriptive ou incitative. En guise de préambule, nous soulignons que les politiques 
mises en oeuvre constituent un déterminant fondamental des capacités d’innovation d’une 
industrie, notamment parce que les incitations marchandes à engager des activités de 
recherche fortement exploratoires sont limitées. Par ailleurs, nous signalons que la nature des 
politiques susceptibles de favoriser l’innovation dépend fondamentalement des 
caractéristiques des industries, et même des firmes, auxquelles elles sont destinées. La mise 
en oeuvre de politiques (incitatives ou presciptives) efficaces requiert ainsi une 
compréhension approfondie du secteur d’activité que l’on souhaite promouvoir et de la nature 
des processus d’innovation qui impliquent notamment différents types d’investissements (à 
plus ou moins long terme, plus ou moins risqués et plus ou moins exploratoires). Cette thèse 
analyse ensuite, à travers trois études de cas, l’incidence de différentes politiques (incitatives 
ou presciptives) mises en oeuvre dans des contextes industriels distincts. Partant de 
l’hypothèse selon laquelle les politiques presciptives ont un impact bénéfique sur l’innovation 
et le développement technologique d’un secteur à court terme mais des effects plus incertains 
à long terme, nous étudions l’impact des politiques de libéralisation (ouverture à la 
concurrence et privatisation des opérateurs historiques) qui ont été mises en oeuvre dans le 
secteur des télécommunications. A travers une étude économétrique portant sur un panel de 
20 pays de l’OCDE sur la période 1994-2008, nous soulignons que l’impact de la 
concurrence sur les décisions d’investissement s’exerce à travers deux effects : l’effet 
«profitabilité» et l’effet «efficacité opérationnelle». Nous soulignons par ailleurs que la 
relation entre intensité concurrentielle et investissement varie signicativement entre 
entreprises publiques et firmes privées. Dans une seconde étude, nous analysons le lien entre 
la propension des firmes à adopter spontanément des comportements écologiques (mesurée à 
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partir des données du Carbon Discloser Project et du Dow Jones Sustainability Index) et la 
nature de leurs innovations. Ce travail fait apparaître de forte différences inter-industries et 
inter-entreprises mais permet de valider l'hypothèse d'une relation positive entre le niveau des 
investissements de R&D et la propension à adopter des comportements écologiques. Nous 
nous intéressons enfin à la relation entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et innovation. 
Nous utilisons pour cela le classement Vigeo que des données financières sur l’année 2009. 
Notre étude met en évidence une relation positive entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et 
capacité des firmes à innover. Nous interprétons ce résultat de la manière suivante : la 
responsabilité sociale d’entreprise conduit les firmes à réaliser des investissements non 
seulement de court terme mais également de long terme et à tenir compte de la 
complémentarité de ces investissements. La responsabilité sociale d’entreprise accroît ainsi 
les synergies entre les différents types d’investissement réalisés par les firmes. 
 
 
Politiques industrielles prescriptives ou volontaristes 
 
D’un point de vue théorique, la régulation est fondée sur l’idée que le libre jeu des forces 
du marché ne conduit pas nécessairement à une allocation optimale des ressources. La 
régulation est toutefois susceptible d’induire des coûts et des distorsions et le remède peut 
parfois s’avérer pire que le mal. Les économistes industriels cherchent donc à déterminer 
sous quelles conditions la régulation se traduit effectivement par une allocation plus efficace 
des ressources.  
Il existe par ailleurs différentes formes de régulation. On peut notamment distinguer deux 
grandes approches : la régulation prescriptive (ou « réglementation ») et la régulation 
incitative (Bohm et Russell 1985). La conception des politiques et le choix des instruments 
constitue donc également une question fondamentale pour les économistes industriels. Cette 
question se pose également pour les décideurs qui peuvent choisir entre l’approche 
prescriptive ou l’approche incitative ou encore combiner ces deux approches (Alberini et 
Segerson 2002). 
Les approches prescriptives et incitatives se distinguent par la capacité (ou l’incapacité) 
du régulateur à imposer des coûts et des contraintes aux entreprises. Dans le cadre de 
l’approche incitative, la régulation doit être conçue de sorte qu’il soit dans l’intérêt des firmes 
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d’adopter le comportement que l’on souhaite promouvoir. En d’autre termes, la contrainte de 
participation des firmes doit être satisfaite (Paton 2001). Le régulateur dispose d’une marge 
de manoeuvre plus importante dans le cadre de l’approche prescriptive : il peut imposer des 
coûts et des contraintes qui réduisent les profits (ou plus généralement, les « gains ») des 
entreprises. L’approche prescriptive traduit généralement une volonté politique tandis que 
l’approche incitative vise simplement améliorer le fonctionnement d’un marché. La 
régulation incitative peut émaner des acteurs d’une industrie. Nous parlerons dans ce cas 
d’approche volontariale. 
L’intéret que suscitent les politiques d’innovation auprès des décideurs s’est traduit par le 
développement d’une littérature sur les mérites respectifs des approches prescriptives et 
incitatives (voir Lyon et Maxwell 1999 et Khanna 2001 pour une revue de cette littérature). 
Deux conclusions principales ont été mises en évidence par ces travaux : (i) l’approche 
incitative est généralement préférée à l’approche prescriptive car elle est moins coûteuse et 
plus simple à mettre en oeuvre; (ii) plus la régulation est stricte, plus ils est coûteux d’adopter 
un comportement conforme à cette régulation et plus les incitations des firmes à aller au delà 
des exigences du régulateur sont fortes (Segerson et Miceli 1998; Lyon et Maxwell, 2004). 
En outre, de nombreuses études empiriques ont mis en évidence une corrélation positive 
entre régulation prescriptive et régulation incitative : lorsqu’ils régulent étroitement une 
industrie, les pouvoirs publics ne se contentent pas de fixer des règles et des sanctions mais 
cherchent à ce que leurs objectifs soient relayés par les comportements stratégiques des 
entreprises (Jones 2010). 
De manière générale, la littérature souligne que les politiques prescriptives sont moins 
efficaces et plus coûteuses que les politiques incitatives (Segerson et Miceli 1998; Baldwin et 
Cave 1999). Cependant, parmi les différentes formes de régulation incitative, il a été montré 
empiriquement par plusieurs études que l’approche volontariale n’a généralement qu’un 
impact limité sur le comportement des firmes (Stigler 1971 ; Arora et Cason 1996; Videras et 
Alberini 2000; Khanna, Koss et al 2007). Par ailleurs, la théorie microéconomique standard 
peine à expliquer les motivations des entreprises à adopter des régulations sur une base 
purement volontariale (Paton 2001). 
En matière de politiques environnementales, trois types d’approches volontariales 
peuvent être distinguées (Carraro et Siniscalco 1996; Lyon et Maxwell, 1999; Segerson et Li 
1999; Braathen et Co-ope 2003).: «les initiatives des entreprises », « l’environnementalisme 
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de l'entreprise » et « l’auto-réglementation industrielle » (Alberini et Segerson 2002).59 Parmi 
ces approches, notre travail se concentre sur les initiatives des entreprises et 
l'environnementalisme de l’entreprise. 
D’un point de vue méthodologique, plusieurs études examinent les décisions des firmes 
en se fondant sur l’hypothèse de maximisation des profits. Cependant, d’autres travaux 
indiquent que l’hypothèse de la maximisation de l’utilité permet d’accroître le pouvoir 
explicatif des modèles (Baron, 2001;. Nakamura et al, 2001). Cette hypothèse est moins 
restrictive que l’hypothèse de maximisation des profits. Elle revient à supposer que les firmes 
cherchent à maximiser la satisfaction de leurs nombreuses parties-prenantes et permet 
d’expliquer pourquoi les entreprises adoptent des régulations sur une base volontariale 
(Khanna, 2001 ; Henriques et Sadorskry, 1996; Esty et Winston, 2006; Baron, 2001; 
Nakamura et al, 2001). Elle permet également de comparer les coûts et bénéfices associés aux 
différentes formes de régulation. 
A ce jour, les travaux comparant les approches volontariales aux autres formes de 
régulation (régulation incitative obligatoire et réglementation) sont encore relativement peu 
nombreux et s’intéressent uniquement à quelques secteurs (l’énergie) ou domaines 
(l’environnement) spécifiques. Par ailleurs, la plupart des études consacrées à l’approche 
volontariale ont surtout cherché à expliquer les motivations des firmes à mettre en place de 
telles régulations (Paton 2001; Alberini et Segerson 2002; Khanna, Koss et al 2007.). Les 
quelques comparaisons existantes concluent que l’approche volontariale a un effet diffus et 
de long terme, alors que l’approche obligatoire a un effet intense et de court terme (Bohm et 
Russell 1985). 
Dans une certaine mesure, il peut être avancé que ces deux approches sont 
complémentaires. Si les décideurs souhaitent promouvoir la diffusion rapide de technologies 
spécifiques ou le développement de certaines industries, la politique obligatoire sera sans 
doute la plus efficace. Par exemple, au cours des dernières décennies la plupart des pays de 
l’OCDE ont mis en place des politiques réglementaires et incitatives (privatisations, 
régulation pro-concurrentielle) pour stimuler le développement du secteur des 
                                               
59
 « L'autorégulation peut stimuler la demande en reduisant l'incertitude sur la qualité des produits ou en assurant l'interopéra
bilité des produits de plusieurs entreprises. Elle peut mettre accroître le bien-être au travail en améliorant la sécurité ou d'autr
es dimensions de la qualité du lieu de travail. Elle peut aussi servir des causes plus stratégiques, comme la réduction de l’inte
nsité de la concurrence (...) ». Maxwell, John W., Thomas P. Lyon, et al. (2000). "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Po
litical Economy of Corporate Environmentalism." Journal of Law and Economics 43(2): 583-618. 
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télécommunications60. Si l’objectif du régulateur est d’infléchir à long terme le comportement 
des firmes, l’approche volontariste sera sans doute la plus efficace. 
En somme, cette thèse vise à expliquer les motivations des pouvoirs publics et des acteurs 
industriels à mettre en place tel ou tel type de régulation (réglementation, régulation incitative 
obligatoire ou volontariale) et à étudier leurs effets sur les comportements d’investissement. 
Pour cela, nous assouplisson l’hypothèse selon laquelle les firmes cherchent à maximiser 
leurs profits et considérons plus généralement qu’elle maximisent une fonction d’utilité qui 
traduit les motivations des différentes parties-prenantes (actionnaires, dirigeants, clients, 
fournisseurs, salariés, Etat, organisation non gouvernementales).  
 
 
Développement durable et innovation 
 
Au cours des trois dernières décennies, le thème de la responsabilité sociale des 
entreprises (RSE) a fait l'objet d’un intérêt croissant mais a également donné lieu à de 
nombreuses controverses (Jamali 2008). Plusieurs définitions et tentatives de 
conceptualisation concurrentes ont été proposées. La conception la plus étroite consiste à 
supposer que la firme a pour fonction la maximisation de la richesse des actionnaires 
(Friedman 1967)61. Les conceptions les plus larges incluent les responsabilités non seulement 
économiques mais également sociales, juridiques et éthiques de l’entreprise (Carroll 1979 ). 
Certains auteurs parlent même de citoyenneté d'entreprise (Hemphill, 2004). 
Le concept de RSE est essentiellement fondé sur la théorie des partie-prenantes (ou 
« hypothèse de maximisation de l’utilité des parties-prenantes »). Le terme « parties-
prenantes » désigne l’ensemble des intervenants, individuels ou collectifs, qui influencent le 
comportement des firmes de manière officielle ou officieuse (Murray et Vogel 1997). Dans 
ce cadre, le principal défi auquel sont confrontés les entreprises consiste à identifier ces 
parties-prenantes et à déterminer quelles sont leurs réponsabilités envers elles. 
Depuis quelques années, les entreprises semblent tenir davantage compte de leur 
responsabilité sociale. Plusieurs travaux montrent que certains objectifs en matière 
                                               
60
 Voir Cambini et Jiang (2009) pour une revue de la littérature consacrée au lien entre régulation et investissement dans les t
élécommunications. 
61
 "Il existe une seule responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise: utiliser les ressources dont elle dispose pour s’engager dans des a
ctivités créatrices de richesses, tout en respectant les règles du jeu, c’est-à-dire en s’engageant dans une concurrence ouverte 
et libre, sans défection ni fraude." 
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d’environnement ne pourront être atteint que grâce à une combinaison des approches 
obligatoires et volontariales (Jones 2010). Des travaux théoriques et des études empiriques 
montrent que les deux approches ont un impact positif, tout en soulignant les avantages de 
l’approche volontariale en termes de coûts et d’efficacité, notamment dans le long terme 
(Porter et Linde, 1995; Lyon et Maxwell 2004;. Khanna, Koss et al 2007). 
Bien qu’il soit établi par de nombreux travaux que les politiques industrielles permettent 
d’atteindre des objectifs sociaux et environnementaux, la question de l’innovation a été 
relativement peu traitée par cette littérature (Pavelin et Porter, 2008). Rennings (2000) définit 
néanmoins l’innovation durable comme l’introduction d’idées nouvelles, de comportements, 
produits et procédés nouveaux qui contribuent à diminuer les coûts environnementaux. 
Plusieurs travaux ont cherché à mettre en évidence l’impact de la régulation sur les 
« performances » des industries en matière d’écologie et de développement durable. 
Toutefois, l’existence d’un tel impact reste fortement débattu et les corrélations établies par 
les études statistiques souffrent d’un certain nombre de biais. Il convient notamment de 
souligner que les politiques de régulation ont un effet longitudinal et qu’il est difficile d’en 
mesurer l’impact, c’est-à-dire de mettre en évidence un lien de causalité entre ces politiques 
et les comportements des firmes. De surcroît, les effets dont tiennent compte ces travaux sont 
essentiellement des effets de court terme. 
Sur la base des études précédentes (March 1991), la nature des investissements peut être 
définie comme la répartition des ressources entre la recherche exploratoire et les activités 
plus appliquées (ou « investissement d’exploitation »). La première renvoie aux dépenses de 
R&D, à la création de technologies et connaissances nouvelles, à l’innovation radicale ; les 
secondes désignent les dépenses en capitaux (« capital expenditure » ou « CAPEX ») qui 
consistent à exploiter les connaissances et technologies existantes et donnent essentiellement 
lieu à des innovation incrémentales. La recherche d’une combinaison optimale entre 
investissement exploratoire et investissement d’exploitation constitue une dimension 
essentielle des stratégies d’investissement des firmes. 
Quelques travaux récents ont cherché à mettre en évidence l’incidence de la régulation 
sur les nature des investissements. Calderini et Garrone (2001) se sont par exemple intéressés 
à l’impact des politiques de libéralisation sur l’investissement des opérateurs de 
télécommunications. Hellström (2007) a étudié la structure des innovations 
environnementales. 
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Dans le prolongement de ces travaux, notre thèse tente d’établir une relation entre 
régulation et nature des activités innovantes. Nous nous intéressons plus généralement aux 
déterminants des comportements d’investissements et aux différents facteurs susceptibles 
d’exercer une influence sur les arbritages entre exploration et exploitation. 
 
 
Cadre général de la recherche  
 
Ce travail consiste à étudier et à comparer les effets de différents types de politiques 
industrielles sur la nature des innovations introduites par les firmes. Le cadre d’analyse sur 
lequel il se fonde est présenté par la figure 1-1. 
 
 
Fig. 1-1 Le diagramme schématique des approches de la politique de l'industrie  
 
La première partie de notre travail souligne que l’approche obligatoire a un impact à court 
terme et est efficace pour stimuler l’adoption de nouvelles technologies et favoriser le 
développement d’une industrie spécifique. Dans cette partie, nous nous intéressons plus 
spécifiquement aux investissements des opérateurs de télécommunications. Il s’agit là d’une 
question essentielle dans la mesure où ces investissements ne sont pas seulement à l’origine 
de gains pour les consommateurs mais génèrent des externalités positives sur de nombreux 
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secteurs. Ils constitueraient par conséquent une source de croissance économique et 
d’avantages concurrentiels (Greenstein, McMaster et al 1995;. Roller et Waverman 2001; 
Datta et Agarwal 2004).  
Dans la plupart des pays de l’OCDE, des politiques ont été mises en oeuvre pour 
« libéraliser » ou « déréglementer » le secteur des télécommunications. Ces politiques 
reposent sur un postulat qui reste largement débattu : le développement de la concurrence et 
les privatisations seraient par nature favorables à l’innovation. 
La première partie de cette thèse consiste ainsi à évaluer l’impact des politiques de 
libéralisation (privatisation et concurrence) sur la nature des innovations introduites par les 
opérateurs de télécommunications. A travers une étude économétrique portant sur un panel de 
20 pays de l’OCDE sur la période 1994-2008, nous soulignons que l’impact de la 
concurrence sur les décisions d’investissement s’exerce à travers deux effects : l’effet « 
profitabilité » et l’effet « efficacité opérationnelle ». Nous soulignons par ailleurs que la 
relation entre intensité concurrentielle et investissement varie signicativement entre 
entreprises publiques et firmes privées. 
Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous analysons et comparons les effets de 
politiques volontariales sur l’adoption par les entreprises de comportement écologiques. Etant 
donné la nature de ces politiques, les effets mesurés ici sont des effets de long terme. Dans 
cette partie, nous nous efforçons notamment de répondre aux questions suivantes. i) 
Comment les politiques volontariales affectent-elles la performance des firmes. ii) Ces 
politiques favorisent-elles les comportements écologiques ? iii) Plus généralement, comment 
ces politiques affectent-elles la nature des investissements iv) Dans quelle mesure et à travers 
quels mécanismes les caractéristiques des entreprises influencent-elles leurs incitations à 
mettre en place des régulations sur une base volontariale. 
La troisième partie de notre thèse s’intéresse à la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises 
et cherche à répondre aux questions suivantes. i) Quelles sont les motivations des firmes en 
matière de RSE ? ii) Quelle est la relation entre nature des investissementes (arbitrage 
exploration/exploitation) et RSE ? 
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Conclusions générales et implications politiques 
 
La nature des politiques susceptibles de favoriser l’innovation dépend fondamentalement 
des caractéristiques des industries, et même des firmes, auxquelles elles sont destinées. La 
mise en oeuvre de politiques (incitatives ou presciptives) efficaces requiert ainsi une 
compréhension approfondie du secteur d’activité que l’on souhaite promouvoir et de la nature 
des processus d’innovation qui impliquent différents types d’investissements (à plus ou 
moins long terme, plus ou moins risqués et plus ou moins exploratoires). 
A travers des analyses théoriques et empiriques, nous avons identifié quelques 
dimensions clés susceptibles d’améliorer l’efficacité des politiques de régulation, qu’elles 
soient fondée sur une approche prescriptive ou incitative, obligatoire ou volontariale. 
La première partie de notre thèse souligne que l’approche obligatoire s’est avérée 
efficace pour promouvoir l’investissement dans le secteur des télécommunications. Plus 
spécifiquement, nous avons mis en évidence les trois résultats suivants. Les politiques de 
libéralisation affectent l’investissement des opérateurs de télécommunications à travers deux 
effets : l’effet « profitabilité » et l’effet « efficacité opérationnelle ». Ces effets se traduisent 
tout d’abord par un accroissement significatif des investissements d’exploitation, qui peut 
s’effectuer au détriment d’investissements plus exploratoires. Par ailleurs, la concurrence sur 
le marché mobile affecte davantage les stratégies d’investissement des firmes que la 
concurrence sur le marché fixe : qu’elle s’effectue « par les infrastructures » ou « par les 
services », la concurrence sur le marché mobile se traduit toujours par d’avantage 
d’investissement d’exploitation, ce qui n’est pas le cas de la concurrence sur le marché 
mobile. Enfin, la combinaison des privatisations et des politiques de régulation pro-
concurrentielle amènent les firmes à privilégier l’exploitation des connaissances et 
technologies existantes au développement de connaissances et technologies nouvelles. 
Dans une seconde étude, nous analysons le lien entre la propension des firmes à adopter 
spontanément des comportements écologiques (mesurée à partir des données du Carbon 
Discloser Project et du Dow Jones Sustainability Index) et la nature de leurs innovations. Ce 
travail fait apparaître de forte différences inter-industries et inter-entreprises mais permet de 
valider l'hypothèse d'une relation positive entre le niveau des investissements de R&D et la 
propension à adopter des comportements écologiques.  
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Nous nous intéressons enfin à la relation entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et 
innovation. Nous utilisons pour cela le classement Vigeo ainsi que des données financières 
sur l’année 2009. Notre étude met en évidence une relation positive entre responsabilité 
sociale d’entreprise et capacité des firmes à innover. Nous interprétons ce résultat de la 
manière suivante : la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise conduit les firmes à réaliser des 
investissements non seulement de court terme mais également de long terme et à tenir compte 
de la complémentarité de ces investissements. La responsabilité sociale d’entreprise accroît 
ainsi les synergies entre les différents types d’investissement réalisés par les firmes. 
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Résumé en coréen  
 
?? ?? ?? ?? ?, ????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ????? 
? ? ?? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ? ??? ?? ???? ?? 
???? ?????? ??? ? ??. ????? ?? ?? ?????? ?? ?? 
??? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?? ??? ???? 
????? ? ????? ????? ?? ??  ??????? ?? ???? ??.  
 
??? ?? ? ??? ??? ??? ? ??? ? ?? ????? ???? 
??? ???? ??? ????? ??. ?? ? ??? ??? ?????? ?? 
?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?? (Explorative 
investment)? ??? ?? (Exploitative investment)? ??? ?? ?? ?? ? 
???? ??? ?????. ? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ? ? ???? 
???? ??? ??? ??? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???? 
???? ??? ??? ?? ????? ??? ???.  
 
??? ??? ?? ? ?? ????? ???? ?? ?? ? ??? ?? 
???? ??? ???. ?? ???? ?? ??? ?? ? ??? ??? ??? 
??? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?? ? ??? ??? ???? ??? ? 
??? ????. ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?? 
??? ??? ?? ? ??? ??? ? ? ?? ????? ? ? ??? ??. ?? 
??? ??? ??? ??? ? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ??? ??? 
???? ??? ?? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ???? 
???? ????? ???? ? ???? ? ????? ????? ??.   
 
??, ?? ???? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ???? 
????? ????? ??? ???? ? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??? 
??? ?????. OECD 20 ? ??? 1994 ??? 2008 ?? ???? ??? 
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???? ??? ????? ??? ?? ? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? 
?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ? ? ???.  
 
? ??? ??? ? ? ???? ??? ???? ???? (Corporate 
Environmentalism) ? ??? ? ??? ???? ??? ??? ???? ????? 
???? ??? (the Carbon Discloser Project Rreport) ? ???? ?????? (Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index) ? ???? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?????. 
?? ??? ??? ?? ??? ???? ??? ?? ??, ??? ?? ? ???? 
?? ??? ?? ?, ????? ???? ???? . 
 
????? ? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?? (Business-led Initiatives) ? 
???? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ?? ??? 
?????. ???? ???? ??? ??? ?? 6 ?? (??, ??????,  
??????, ???? ??, ??????) ? ?? ??? ?? Vigeo ??? 
2009? ???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?? 
????? ???? ?????. ????? ??? ?-???? ????? ??? 
??? ????? ??? ????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ? ? 
??? ???? ?? ? ??? ? ? ???.  
 
???? ???? ??? ???? ? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? 
?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? 
?? ???? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??? ?????? ????? 
??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ??. ?? ?? ???? ??? 
???? ??? ????? ????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ? ??? 
??. 
 
???: Business-led Initiatives, Corporate Environmentalism, Nature of Innovation, 
Innovation, Liberalization Policies, Sustainability 
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Appendices 
 
Ch. 2.2.1 
 
In this section, we use this framework to identify the impact of competition on 
investment by a private and a government-owned incumbent operator. In section 2.2.1.1, we 
suppose that the private incumbent maximized its profit. For government-owned incumbent 
in section 2.2.1.2, we consider two sub-cases, the case of a firm which is maximizing the 
social welfare at the competition and the investment stage, and a firm which is maximizing its 
profit at the competition stage, but maximizes the welfare at the investment stage. Finally we 
discuss the results considering different forms of competition  in section 2.1.1.3.  
 
 2.2.1.1 The case of a private (profit-maximizing) incumbent 
 
When the incumbent is privatized, we assume that it maximizes its profit function. It is 
competition on the retail market with entrant which is also a private profit-maximizing firm. 
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In this case, the equilibrium qualities are the solutions of the system 
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  where 
EΠ and IΠ are respectively given by eqs. (2-2) and (2-3) of section 2.2.1.  
Under the assumption that both firms are active in the market ( Iq , Eq  0≥ )62 , the 
equilibrium quantities and the corresponding prices are  
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As standard, the intensity of competition can be measured by the price - marginal cost 
margin. Since we normalized the marginal cost to zero, the price Ip can be used as an 
indicator of the intensity of competition faced by firm I. From eq. (2-5), we see that the 
higher is the quality of the service provided by the entrant, the lower is the equilibrium price 
set by I  ( 0I
E
q
x
∂
<
∂
), and thus the higher is the intensity of competition faced by I.  
The incumbent's equilibrium profit *IΠ  is found by introducing the equilibrium prices 
and quantities (eqs. 2-5 and 2-6) in eq. (2-3). The quality of service chosen by I is derived 
from the first order condition   
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under the assumption that the second order condition  
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decreases when Ex increases, and 
as a consequence when the competition intensity increases. 
Referring to the effects described in the introduction of section 2.2.1, we can interpret 
this result as follows: the Schumpeterian effect dominates the “Escape competition” effect. In 
fact, firm I decides to marginally increase the quality of its service if the difference between 
the before and after profits, and the marginal increase (i.e. the “marginal incentive to invest) 
is higher than the corresponding increase in the investment cost ( Ixγ ). 
The marginal incentive to invest can be written ( ) ( )I I I Ix xpi pi− where IIII qpx ⋅=)(pi  
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∂ ∂ . Consequently, the marginal incentive to invest is always 
positive and the impact of an increase in the quality of service on the revenue Ipi  can be 
decomposed into two positive effects: the “price effect” I I
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: the marginal incentive to invest decreases when Ex increases, and as a 
consequence when the competition intensity increases. This result can be explained as 
follows: the raise in the revenue resulting from an increase in the quality Ix  is lower when 
  
 
128
Ex increases, because the quantity effect I I
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2.2.1.2 The case of a government-owned incumbent 
 
In this part, it can be assumed that government-owned incumbents are welfare-
maximizing firms in section 2.2.1.2.1. However, in most cases, incumbent operators are 
partially government-owned. Moreover, they operate on competitive markets. In this context, 
it is uncertain that these companies will be pure welfare-maximizes63 and it may be more 
realistic to assume that these companies mimic the behavior of their private competitors in 
their routine decisions such as setting quantities but are subject to political pressure for 
welfare maximization in their investment decisions. In section 2.1.2.2.2, we assume that 
public incumbent operators adopt this kind of “hybrid behavior”. 
                                               
63
 See e.g Caves, D. W. and L. R. Christensen (1980). "The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive 
Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroads." The Journal of Political Economy 88(5): 958-976., p. 959: “There is no 
clear consensus as to whether public firms facing competition behave more like their private counterparts or more like their 
noncompetitive government counterparts”. 
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2.2.1.2.1 Welfare-maximizing firm 
 
In this case, we suppose that the entrant maximizes its profit, whereas the incumbent 
maximizes the social welfare. Thus first order conditions used to determine the equilibrium 
quantities are thus 0=
∂
∂
Iq
W
 and 0=
∂
∂
Eq
W
. From eqs. (2-1), (2-2) and (2-4), we find 
 
 EII xxAq −+= 2                                                 (2-9) 
and  
  IEE xxq −=                                      (2-10) 
 
The corresponding prices are  
        IEEI xxpp −== ,0                                                  (2-11) 
 
However, this result only applies for IE xx ≥  (case 1), i.e. if the entrant has higher QoS 
than the incumbent. As this assumption is very restrictive, the case where EI xx >  (case 2) 
must also be taken into consideration. In this case, we have  
II xAq +=                                             (2-12) 
 
0=== IEE ppq .                                                       (2-13) 
 
In case 1, we find 
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the QoS chosen by the incumbent is 
12, −
=
∗
γ
A
xI , and for 
Ex
A
+≥ 1γ , its 
3
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−
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∗
γ
E
I
xA
x .  
Finally, the investment and quantity decisions of the incumbent can be described as 
follows. When the cost of increasing the quality is low (case 2, 
Ex
A
+< 1γ ), the welfare-
maximizing incumbent's QoS is higher than the QoS of the entrant, and the former decide to 
preempt the market for telecommunications services and to set a null price. In this case, the 
incumbent's investment is independent from the QoS of the entrant. When the cost of 
increasing the quality is high (case 1, 
Ex
A
+≥ 1γ ), the incumbent does not invest much and 
provide a low quality service at a null price. In this case, the incumbent's investment 
decreases when the QoS of then entrant increases. In both cases the price of the service 
provided by the incumbent is zero. This result is not related to the intensity of competition 
faced by the incumbent but is the direct consequence of its decision the set a quantity Iq that 
maximizes the welfare. Consequently, when the government-owned incumbent is a welfare-
maximizing firm, nothing can be said about the relationship between competition and 
investment.  
 
 
2.2.1.2.2 Firm with hybrid behavior  
 
As explained above a government-owned incumbent adopting a hybrid behavior, 
maximizes its profit at the competitive stage and maximizes the welfare at the investment 
stage. Thus, the equilibrium quantities and corresponding prices are the same as in section 
2.2.1.1 eqs. (2-5) and (2-6). We use these prices and quantities in eq. (2-4) to compute the 
objective function of the incumbent at the investment stage. Under the assumption that the 
second order condition 
2
2
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 is satisfied, we derive the equilibrium QoS from 
the first order condition.  
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Then, we find  
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and we deduce the following result: If the government-owned incumbent adopts a hybrid 
behavior, any increase in the competition intensity decrease its investment. 
 
This result indicates that increase competition raises the social welfare before investment 
more than it raises the social welfare after investment. In fact, the incumbent with hybrid 
behavior decides to marginally increase its QoS if the corresponding increase in the social 
welfare (
Ix
w
∂
∂
 with 9I Ew cspi pi= + + ) is higher than the corresponding increase in cost ( )Ixγ . 
The marginal social incentive to invest is always positive. Indeed, we have 
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raises the consumers' surplus more than it reduces the profit of the entrant E
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marginal social incentive to invest is always positive 
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However, the marginal social incentive to invest decreases when Ex raises, i.e. when 
competition intensity increases. After simplifications, the variation of the marginal social 
incentive to invest can be written 
2 22 2
I E
E I E I E I E I
w cs
x x x x x x x x
pi pi∂ ∂∂ ∂
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. From section 2.2.1.1 (see 
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 (the “Schumpeterian” effect 
dominates the “Escape competition” effect). For the same reason, 0
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 are derived. This result can be explained as 
follows: the higher is the contribution of Eq  in the social welfare. Consequently, the negative 
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impact of I's investment on the consumers' surplus (i.e. the decrease in Eq ) is reinforced by 
an increase in Ex . The higher is Ex , the lower is the contribution of Iq  in the social welfare. 
As a consequence, the positive impact of I's (i.e. the increase Ix ) in is lessened by an increase 
in Ex . 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.3 The different form of competition in telecommunications 
 
So far, we have assumed that the incumbent is competing with an entrant that owns an 
infrastructure and cannot invest to improve it. However, this representation of the 
competition is quite distant from those used in literature on the relationship between 
competition and investment in telecommunications. Previous works usually distinguish two 
forms of competition 64 : service-based and facilities-based competition. Service-based 
competition (SBC) means that only the incumbent has its own infrastructure and that the 
entrant needs to access this infrastructure to provide services. Facilities-based competition 
(FBC) implies that both the incumbent and the entrant have their own infrastructure.  
 
 
2.2.1.3.1 Service-based competition (SBC) 
 
                                               
64
 See the table 2-A Summarized previous theoretical studies in appendix. 
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Under SBC, the profit functions of the entrant and the incumbent are respectively 
 
EEE qap )( −=Π∗                                               (2-16) 
and 
2
2
I
EIII
x
aqqp
γ
−+⋅=Π∗                                          (2-17) 
 
where a  is the per unit access price charged by the incumbent to the entrant. The 
welfare and inverse demand functions are unchanged are respectively given by eqs. (2-1) and 
(2-4). As firms I and E use the same infrastructure, we assume that they provide the same 
service ( )E Ix x= 65. 
 
 
 
 
For the profit maximizing firm and the firm with hybrid investment behavior the 
equilibrium quantities derived from the first order conditions ( 0=
∂
Π∂ ∗
E
E
q
 and 0=
∂
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I
q
) are  
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The corresponding prices are  
3
I
I E
A a xp p + += = .                                     (2-19) 
 
The access price determines the access price set by firm I and is thus the determinant of the 
competition intensity. From eq. (2-19), we find 0>
∂
∂
a
p I : the higher is the access price ( i.e. 
the higher is the retail price set by firm I), and thus the lower is the competition intensity 
                                               
65
 For a model on profit-maximizing firms relaxing this assumption, see Foros, s. (2004). "Strategic investments with 
spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market." International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 22(1): 1-24. 
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faced by firm I. 
For the welfare-maximizing firm, the equilibrium quantities are derived from the first 
order conditions 0=
∂
Π∂ ∗
E
E
q
 and 0=
∂
∂
Iq
W
, II xaAq ++=  and aqE −= . As Eq cannot be 
negative, the equilibrium quantities and prices are  
 
0, =+= EII qxAq ,                                         (2-20) 
 
0== EI pp .                                                        (2-21) 
 
As in section 2.2.1.1, when it maximizes the social welfare, the incumbent set a quantity 
that implies null retail prices. Moreover, the incumbent always preempt the market for the 
innovative service  
The equilibrium QoS of the profit-maximizing incumbent is derived from the first order 
condition 0=
∂
Π∂ ∗
I
I
x
 where  Iq , Eq , Ip  and  Ep  given by eqs. (2-18) and (2-19). In this case, 
we have  
29
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and the following property can be highlighted: A decrease in the access price, i.e. an 
increase in the intensity of service-based competition decreases the investment of the profit 
maximizing incumbent. 
 
The equilibrium QoS of the welfare-maximizing firm is derived from the condition 
0=
∂
∂
Ix
W
 where W is defined by eq. (2-4) and where the values of Iq , Eq , Ip  and Ep  are given 
by eqs. 2-20 and 2-21. In this case,  
1−
=
γ
A
xI .                                                  (2-23) 
 
Since the incumbent always preempts the market for telecommunications services, nothing 
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can be said about the relationship between competition intensity and investment when the 
incumbent is a welfare-maximizing firm.  
The equilibrium quality of the firm with a hybrid behavior is derived from 0=
∂
∂
Ix
W
, with 
Iq , Eq , Ip  and Ep  given by eqs. (2-18) and (2-19). Here, 
29
8
−
−
=
γ
aA
xI                                            (2-24) 
 
and the following property can be highlighted: 
 
Lemma 1. A decrease in the access price, i.e. an increase in the intensity of service-based 
competition, increases the investment of the firm with a hybrid behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Facilities-based competition (FBC) 
 
Competition as it was modeled in sections 2.2.1.1.1 and 2.2.1.1.2 can be considered as a 
particular case of FBC where the entrant cannot invest to improve its infrastructure. It also 
represents a case where both firms can invest but where the investment is a sequential game 
in which the entrant invests first. However, an important characteristic of FBC as it was 
defined by previous literature is that firms make their investment decision simultaneously 
(Gans 2001; Hori and Mizuno 2006; Vareda and Hoernig 2007; Hori and Mizuno 2009). In 
this framework, investment follows a logic of preemption and firms do not maximize their 
profit with the meaning of max ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i i i i i
x
p x q x c xΠ = ⋅ −  but adopt the level (or, in the papers 
mentioned above, the date) of investment such as they win the preemption game at the lowest 
cost. In these models, investment can be compared to an auction and the stronger is rivalry 
between firms, the higher (or the earlier) is investment.  
However, the concept of rivalry refers more to competition “for” than “on” the market 
and is not well reflected by the standard proxies for competition intensity such as the price - 
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cost margin, the learner index or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Vickers 1995). 
Finally, the analyses of sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2 can be considered as an adequate 
representation of the effects of FBC as it has been measured by previous empirical studies. 
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Table 2-A The list of firms used in the empirical analysis  
Number Country Fixed or Mobile Name of Firms 
1 Australia F  TELSTRA CORP LTD 
2 Austria F  TELEKOM AUSTRIA 
3 Canada F  BCE (Bell Canada Enterprises) 
4 Denmark F  TDC 
5 France F  FRANCE TELECOME 
6 Greece F  HELLENIC TELECOM(OTE) 
7 Hungary F  MAGYAR TELEKOM 
8 Italy F  TELECOM ITALIA 
9 Japan F  NIPPON TELEG/TELEPH. 
10 South Korea F  KT CORP 
11 Netherland F  KPN 
12 New Zealand F  NEW TEL LIMITED 
13 Spain F  TELEFONICA 
14 Switzerland F  SWISSCOM 
15 UK F  BT GROUP 
16 US F  AT&T 
17 Germany M DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG 
18 Japan M NTT DOCOMO INC. 
19 South Korea M KT FREETEL CO 
20 Sweden M TELIASONERA AB 
(Source: the Thomson Datastream Database) 
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Table 3-A The frequencies of firms according to the industry sectors 
  FTSE Industry Sectors Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 Utilities 82 7.95 7.95 
2 Telecommunication Service 75 7.27 15.21 
3 Materials 126 12.21 27.42 
4 Information Technology 84 8.14 35.56 
5 Industrials 202 19.57 55.14 
6 Health Case 88 8.53 63.66 
7 Financial 
   
8 Energy 125 12.11 75.78 
9 CD (Consumer Discretionary) 117 11.34 87.11 
10 CS (Consumer Staples) 133 12.89 100.00 
 
Total 1347 100 
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Table 3-B The frequencies of firms according to the countries  
  Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 Australia 20 1.94 1.94 
2 Austria 1 0.10 2.03 
3 Belgium 4 0.39 2.42 
4 Bermuda 1 0.10 2.52 
5 Brazil 13 1.26 3.78 
6 Canada 44 4.26 8.04 
7 Chile 1 0.10 8.14 
8 China 19 1.84 9.98 
9 Czech 2 0.19 10.17 
10 Denmark 9 0.87 11.05 
11 Finland 13 1.26 12.31 
12 France 64 6.20 18.51 
13 Germany 48 4.65 23.16 
14 Greece 1 0.10 23.26 
15 Hong Kong 9 0.87 24.13 
16 India 19 1.84 25.97 
17 Indonesia 1 0.10 26.07 
18 Ireland 6 0.58 26.65 
19 Israel 2 0.19 26.84 
20 Italy 19 1.84 28.68 
21 Japan 131 12.69 41.38 
22 Korea 13 1.26 100.00 
23 Luxembourg 2 0.19 41.57 
24 Mexico 7 0.68 42.25 
25 Morocco 1 0.10 42.34 
26 Netherlands 25 2.42 44.77 
27 Norway 7 0.68 45.45 
28 Portugal 4 0.39 45.83 
29 Russia 15 1.45 47.29 
30 Singapore 2 0.19 47.48 
31 South Africa 8 0.78 48.26 
32 Spain 35 3.39 51.65 
33 Sweden 15 1.45 53.10 
34 Swiss 25 2.42 55.52 
35 Taiwan 9 0.87 56.40 
36 Thailand 4 0.39 56.78 
37 Turkey 2 0.19 56.98 
38 UK 97 9.40 66.38 
39 US 334 32.36 98.74 
Total 1,032 100 100 
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Table 4-A Vigeo’s detailed rating framework (6 evaluation fields / 37 criteria) 
1. Human Rights (lhrtscore)  
HRts1 Respect for human rights 
HRts1.1 Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations 
HRts2 Respect for human rights in the workplace 
HRts2.1 Respect for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
HRts2.4 Non-discrimination 
HRts2.5 Elimination of child labor and forced labor 
    
2. Human Resources (lhrscore) 
HR1 Continuous improvement of industrial relations 
HR1.1 Promotion of labor relations 
HR1.2 Encouraging employee participation 
HR2 Career development 
HR2.3 Responsible management of restructurings 
HR2.4 Career management and promotion of employability 
HR3 Quality of working conditions 
HR3.1 Quality of remuneration systems 
HR3.2 Improvement of health and safety conditions 
HR3.3 Respect and management of working hours 
     
3. Environment (lenvscore) 
ENV1 Integration of environmental issues into corporate strategy 
ENV1.1 Environmental strategy and eco-design 
ENV1.2 Pollution prevention and control 
ENV1.3 Development of « Green » products and services 
ENV1.4 Protection of biodiversity 
ENV2 Incorporation of environmental issues into the manufacturing and distribution of products 
ENV2.1 Protection of water resources 
ENV2.2 Minimizing environmental impacts from energy use 
ENV2.4 Management of atmospheric emissions 
ENV2.5 Waste management 
ENV2.6 Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise 
ENV2.7 Management of environmental impacts from transportation Environment 
ENV3 Environmental consideration in the use and disposal of products/services 
ENV3.1 Management of environmental impacts from the use and disposal of products 
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4. Business Behavior (Customers and suppliers - C&S) (lcsscore) 
C&S1 Customers 
C&S1.1 Product safety 
C&S1.2 Information to customers 
C&S1.3 Responsible Contractual Agreement 
C&S2 Suppliers and Contractors 
C&S2.2 Sustainable Relationship with suppliers 
C&S2.3 Integration of environmental factors in the supply chain 
C&S2.4 Integration of social factors in the supply chain 
C&S3 Business Integrity 
C&S3.1 Prevention of corruption 
C&S3.2 Prevention of anti-competitive practices 
    
5. Community Involvement (lcinscore) 
CIN1 Impact on local communities 
CIN1.1 Promotion of social and economic development 
CIN2 Responsible societal behavior 
CIN2.1 Social impacts of company’s products and services 
CIN2.2 Contribution to general interest causes  
    
6. Corporate Governance (lcgscore) 
CGV1 Board of Directors 
CGV1.1 Board of directors 
CGV2 Audit and Internal controls 
CGV2.1 Audit and Internal Controls 
CGV3 Shareholders 
CGV3.1 Shareholders’ Rights 
CGV4 Executive remuneration 
CGV4.1 Executive Remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
École Nationale Supérieure des Mines 
de Saint-Étienne 
 
N° d’ordre : 2011 EMSE 0610 
 
Author : Yunhee KIM 
 
Title : Regulation, Policies and Innovation Activities in Industries : Approaching Methods and 
Implications 
 
Speciality : Sciences and Engineering for the Environment 
 
Keywords : Business-led Initiatives, Corporate Environmentalism, Nature of Innovation, Innovation, 
Liberalization Policies, Sustainability 
 
Abstract : 
 
In general, policymakers are often faced with a different choice, i.e., the choice between using 
regulation-based instruments and using incentive-based instruments, where the policy instruments could be 
based either on mandatory approach or voluntary approach with economic incentives in market. Historically, 
industrial economists have regarded the issue of policy design as the one focused primarily on the choice 
among alternative policy instruments, where those are generally viewed as falling into two broad categories: 
regulation-based instruments and incentive-based instruments. Through the theoretical and empirical 
analysis, this study identifies some key features that are likely to increase both the effectiveness and 
efficiency of industrial policies with voluntary and mandatory approaches. One key feature is the existence 
of a strong relationship between innovation and industrial policies. The explorative innovation increases the 
incentives for participation in long-term but also reduces the financial incentives in short-term. Considering 
firms' characteristics and industry sector also increases the synergy effect of policies and regulations. In sum, 
when based on the understanding and consideration on the nature of innovation and other impact factors, 
industrial policy can provide a mechanism for meeting industrial quality goals both effectively and 
efficiently. This understanding also can help policy makers to decide whether or not use of such policy 
approach is advisable and to design the policy ensuring that it is as effective and efficient as possible. 
Consequently, the current study investigates the difference and tendency of industrial policy approaches and 
the type of innovation carrying out three analyses according to the mandatory and voluntary approaches. 
With the assumption that the mandatory approach has short-run impact to prompt new technology or grow a 
specific industry, we firstly assess the impact of regulation, such as privatization of nature monopoly. Using 
the firms’ data of 20 OECD countries between 1994 and 2008, we can claim that considering interaction 
among liberalization policies and allowing the industry characteristics are critical to determine for the 
Profitability effect and Operational efficiency effect and level of investments. Secondly, this study analyzes 
the relationship between ‘Corporate Environmentalism’ and composition of innovation using the Carbon 
Discloser Project (CDP) and (Dow Jones Sustainability Index) DJSI index data. The result shows the 
significant variation of firms' investment activities according to the industry sector, firm characteristics, 
sustainable and environmental behaviors of firms. Finally, this study identifies the relationship between 
‘Business-led Initiatives (CSR)’ and innovation activities of firms. Using the Vigeo rating and financial data 
in 2009, this study shows the relationship between CSR and innovation activities of firms. Consequently, 
when the firm builds their short- and long-run business strategies, the consideration of the relationship 
between types of investment and CSR practice will lead to more synergic effect on the outcome of 
investments. The findings of this study could provide a comprehensive understanding on the effect of 
sustainable management strategies on the innovation and sustainability of firms. 
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Résumé : 
  
De manière générale, différentes approches s’offrent aux décideurs politiques lorsqu’il s’agit de 
promouvoir l’innovation. Pour reprendre la distinction posée par la plupart des économistes industriels, les 
politiques peuvent être de nature presciptive ou incitative. A travers une série d’analyses théoriques et 
empiriques, cette thèse identifie plusieurs facteurs clés qui déterminent l’efficacité des politiques 
d’innovation, que l’approche adoptée soit de nature prescriptive ou incitative. En guise de préambule, nous 
soulignons que les politiques mises en oeuvre constituent un déterminant fondamental des capacités 
d’innovation d’une industrie, notamment parce que les incitations marchandes à engager des activités de 
recherche fortement exploratoires sont limitées. Par ailleurs, nous signalons que la nature des politiques 
susceptibles de favoriser l’innovation dépend fondamentalement des caractéristiques des industries, et même 
des firmes, auxquelles elles sont destinées. La mise en oeuvre de politiques (incitatives ou presciptives) 
efficaces requiert ainsi une compréhension approfondie du secteur d’activité que l’on souhaite promouvoir et 
de la nature des processus d’innovation qui impliquent notamment différents types d’investissements (à plus 
ou moins long terme, plus ou moins risqués et plus ou moins exploratoires). Cette thèse analyse ensuite, à 
travers trois études de cas, l’incidence de différentes politiques (incitatives ou presciptives) mises en oeuvre 
dans des contextes industriels distincts. Partant de l’hypothèse selon laquelle les politiques presciptives ont 
un impact bénéfique sur l’innovation et le développement technologique d’un secteur à court terme mais des 
effects plus incertains à long terme, nous étudions l’impact des politiques de libéralisation (ouverture à la 
concurrence et privatisation des opérateurs historiques) qui ont été mises en oeuvre dans le secteur des 
télécommunications. A travers une étude économétrique portant sur un panel de 20 pays de l’OCDE sur la 
période 1994-2008, nous soulignons que l’impact de la concurrence sur les décisions d’investissement 
s’exerce à travers deux effects : l’effet «profitabilité» et l’effet «efficacité opérationnelle». Nous soulignons 
par ailleurs que la relation entre intensité concurrentielle et investissement varie signicativement entre 
entreprises publiques et firmes privées. Dans une seconde étude, nous analysons le lien entre la propension 
des firmes à adopter spontanément des comportements écologiques (mesurée à partir des données du Carbon 
Discloser Project et du Dow Jones Sustainability Index) et la nature de leurs innovations. Ce travail fait 
apparaître de forte différences inter-industries et inter-entreprises mais permet de valider l'hypothèse d'une 
relation positive entre le niveau des investissements de R&D et la propension à adopter des comportements 
écologiques. Nous nous intéressons enfin à la relation entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et innovation. 
Nous utilisons pour cela le classement Vigeo que des données financières sur l’année 2009. Notre étude met 
en évidence une relation positive entre responsabilité sociale d’entreprise et capacité des firmes à innover. 
Nous interprétons ce résultat de la manière suivante : la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise conduit les firmes 
à réaliser des investissements non seulement de court terme mais également de long terme et à tenir compte 
de la complémentarité de ces investissements. La responsabilité sociale d’entreprise accroît ainsi les 
synergies entre les différents types d’investissement réalisés par les firmes. 
